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MEDICAID: ANATOMY OF A DILEMMA*
ROSEMARY STEVENS AND ROBERT STEVENSt
The Medicaid program-title XIX of the Social Security Act-was passed amid
great hope on the part of the liberals as the so-called "sleeper" of the Social Security
Act of 1965. The optimistic saw Medicare (title XVIII) as a step towards a Swedish
form of social insurance and title XIX as a step towards something like the
British National Health Service. They could not have been more wrong. While
title XVIII has achieved general acceptance, titie XIX has lived up to almost none
of the expectations of its proponents; it has served only to confirm many of the
doubts about government programs of medical care on the part of professional
critics and fiscal conservatives.
One of the great attractions of the United States to those who have studied other
developed societies is the reluctance of American reformers to be daunted by dis-
aster. If one solution has failed, then their urge is to try another-preferably pour-
ing in still more money. Yet this willingness to try ever newer innovations is
coupled with a surprising reluctance to analyze the failure of earlier schemes.
Evaluations of existing or earlier programs have far less attraction than some new
program, with the prospect of yet more demonstration projects. Of all western
societies, the United States is the most ahistorical. Thus today, the medical care
establishment, or at least its reformist wing, is in hot pursuit of health insurance;
and that may well be an admirable goal. But it may also be that blind adherence
to the goal of insurance, without an evaluation of the mistakes of Medicaid, will
head its proponents squarely into the same road-blocks which proved the undoing
of the earlier program.
It is still too early to pass final judgment on all aspects of Medicaid. Indeed,
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it may be premature to make final judgments on any of its aspects, since so little work
has been undertaken1 even in relatively narrow areas-in terms of economic,
sociological, and political studies. Methodologically reliable studies of the quality of
care or the impact of Medicaid on providers have yet to appear.2 Even policy
studies on the implementation of tide XIX are as yet unpublished3 We have
therefore been driven both to rely on information which is not as reliable as we
would have liked, and on other occasions to delve more deeply into detail than we
would have wished had an adequate literature on Medicaid existed. Bearing these
reservations in mind, however, there are certain basic questions which must be
asked and hypotheses and theories which may be offered.
How did it come to pass that, in five brief years between 1965 and i97o, title
XIX grew astronomically in its financial demands (it was originally projected to
cost the federal government $.7 billion annually and by 1970 was in fact costing
Washington $2.8 billion-with a total estimated annual cost from all governmental
sources of some $5.5 billion) and yet failed to satisfy the persons it was supposed
to serve as well as the hopes of its supporters?
The answers are vital, and we suggest that they include these: Medicaid was built
on a program-Kerr-Mills-which was itself a failure; the structure of the program
ensured that it would never be able to escape the debilitating effect of its welfare
parentage; the concept of "medical indigency" was (and is) meaningless; the
administration of the program was a failure at every level; and finally one can posit
the proposition that there can be no breakthroughs in the delivery of medical care
until there is reform and restructuring among the providers of medical care.
While the details of these assertions will have to emerge in this paper, at least
some of the issues raised have to be aired at this stage. The "Kerr-Mills par-
entage" and the "Welfare Stigma" are inevitably related, and are based on twin
assumptions. The first is that adequate medical care is unlikely to be available for
the poorer groups in society unless it is provided as an integral part of a nationwide
system of health care. The second assumption is that the historical baggage of the
welfare system, and especially the means test, insured that the stigma of welfare
would attach to Medicaid and that the idea of "pauperization" would inevitably
be attached to the program's image. If the American public schools were available
only on a means-test basis they would no doubt soon be used only by those on
or near welfare, their standards would fall, and efforts to raise those standards would
'This may explain why the literature on Medicaid is so sparse. The best-and only-bibliography
is E. FEINGOLD, REFERENCES To BACKGROUND M.aamALS ONi MEDICAID (i969). For a related collection
of materials, see NATIONAL INSmTUTE FOR EDUCATION IN LAw AND POVERTY, MATERIALS ON HEAL.T LAw
(Northwestern University, 1970).
' Such studies, funded by the federal government, are currently being undertaken at Columbia Uni-
versity and the University of Pittsburgh.
' Such a study is currently being undertaken by the Brookings Institution, under the editorship of
Professor Eugene Feingold.
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doubtless meet many of the same political problems encountered in Medicaid.
Services tied to the means-test image of cash payments have a built-in failure factor.
The inappropriateness of a welfare-means-test approach is not only particularly
noticeable in a program of services but is also economically unrealistic in connection
with the provision of medical services. "Medical indigency" is a more meaningless
concept than "poverty" itself, if only because the breakthroughs and potential of
modern medicine make it possible for virtually any American to be "medically
indigent." A heart transplant could be paid for by very few Americans out of their
own assets. What has happened is that perhaps half the nation, basically that half
in middle-class employment or with membership in a strong trade union, is spared
the fear of medical indigency because of the intervention of health insurance. Thus,
the concept of "medical indigency" is economically deceptive. What a significant
percentage of the American population is suffering from is a "health insurance in-
digency," and this perhaps might be better remedied through making health in-
surance more readily available rather than attempting to extend concepts of public
welfare, which have been under increasingly heavy attacks for the past few years.
Finally, it will be suggested that Medicaid failed because of inadequate admin-
istration. In terms of the federal bureaucracy, its supervision was assigned to a
division with insufficient prestige and resources either to administer or to police, or
in some ways even to advise, the program. In terms of the states, administration was
equally unsatisfactory, for rather similar political reasons, although at a somewhat
lower administrative level. Both these administrative weaknesses, coupled with
Congressional unwillingness to come face to face with the powerful medical lobbies,
meant that the traditional medical monopolies, privileges, and forms of practice were
left totally untouched. The economic advantage of the providers over the pur-
chasers, coupled with the inadequate administrative safeguards, virtually assured
that the Medicaid program would be plagued by a series of financial crises.
In an attempt to test these assumptions, we shall look first at the pre-Medicaid
history of public medical care, second at the passage and implementation of the
program, third at the financial pressures on and from Medicaid, and finally at the
administrators, providers, and recipients. A brief conclusion attempts to emphasize
the positive aspects of Medicaid which might be relevant for future programs.
I
THE COMING OF MEDICAID
A. 1935 and All That
The provision of medical care to the poor has for long been a recognized part
of the American system of public relief. Early arrangements were made on an ad
hoc, decentralized, local, and often erratic basis, following the patterns of cash relief
in the towns, counties, and states. With the introduction of federal grants-in-aid
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under the Social Security Act of I935' for population groups who were at that time
most urgently in financial need, came old-age assistance (OAA), aid to the blind
(AB), and aid to dependent children (now aid to families with dependent children,
AFDC).' A fourth categorical cash assistance program, aid to the permanently and
totally disabled (APTD), was added in 195o. These joined the earlier programs of
general assistance by the states or local government units, and in large part supplanted
them, although joining in categorical programs remained voluntary for the states.
Thus, between 194o and 1966 the number of individuals receiving cash payments
under general assistance declined from four million to less than 6oo,ooo, while the
number receiving categorical assistance rose from three million to over seven million
persons. 6
Federal-state grants for certain medical services were made available as separate
programs under the 1935 legislation, most notably for maternal and child health
services and for services to crippled children, all service programs provided by the
states and not directly related to welfare programs. No separate provisions were
made, however, for health services in the federal matching grants for categorical
assistance programs; the federal sharing applied only to payments made directly to
welfare recipients and not to physicians, nurses, or hospitals. In some areas, notably
California and the City of New York, as a matter of policy, health services at low
cost for the indigent were provided in public hospitals and clinics. But in general
the provision of health services for the poor remained, at best, a subsidiary part of
cash benefit programs and a neglected area of state and local welfare responsibilities,
until the establishment of a federally-supported program of vendor payments for
medical care in 195o.
If Congress or the states had enacted a comprehensive system of health insurance
or service for the whole or a substantial sector of the population, health services and
income maintenance programs would have been long ago divorced in the United
States, as they are in the United Kingdom and many other western European coun-
tries. Health services would have been made available to the poor and to other
beneficiaries as an entitlement (similar to education in the public school system) quite
apart from programs of cash assistance and other supporting services. But the early
movements for health insurance failed; first in the period 1915-2o, when state health
' Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620.
'The Social Security Act provided the umbrella legislation for an array of federally-supported pro-
grams. These included both contributory, work-related programs of social insurance (programs financed
through Social Security contributions with benefits by entitlement) and programs of public assistance
in which there are no contributions and in which eligibility is determined by a means test. It may be
noted that much of the subsequent debate over the federal role in paying for health services hinged on
the inclusion of both principles under the same legislation; arguments were polarized in favor of health
insurance as a right through a contributory social insurance system, or in favor of health services to the
poor through public assistance. For the early background of the categorical programs, see R. Ltsaova,
THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 1900-1935 (1968).
' U.S. DP'r OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRA.MS IN THE UNITED
STATES 14 (1968).
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insurance plans were actively discussed; then in the rejection of health insurance
as an integral program within the 1935 Social Security Act; and again in a con-
tinuing but unsuccessful push for national health insurance legislation which
reached its zenith in the years 1945 to i949.' Lacking a separate administrative struc-
ture for the provision of health services, the poor continued to be dependent on
haphazard and unequal medical care, which varied from place to place and from
state to state.
The Social Security Act Amendments of 195o, s however, were designed to
reverse, at least somewhat, the formal federal unconcern with medical care. Under
these amendments, the federal government agreed to share with the states the cost
of direct payments to those physicians, hospitals, and the like who provided medical
care to persons on public assistance. With the availability of these federal grants-in-
aid for vendor payments the states began providing medical services on a much larger
scale. By i96o, vendor payments under all public assistance programs had reached
a total of $514 million, well over half of which was for hospital and nursing home
care.' These payments were still, however, limited to persons on the existing welfare
rolls, for almost all of whom the states were also recovering part of their cash benefits
from the federal government through one of the categorical assistance programs.10
Concern over the plight of the elderly during the I95OS eventually focused Con-
gressional attention on the medical needs of that increasingly articulate, numerous,
and socially dependent group. By I96O, there were 16.5 million people sixty-five years
of age and over, representing 15.4 per cent of the population twenty-one years and
over." This sizeable proportion of potential voters could not be ignored politically,
and Congress became increasingly concerned about improving medical services for
the aged. In the face of the substantial and well-funded opposition from the AMA
and other groups, the movement for national health insurance for all had been
dropped. It was replaced in i95o by a demand for the more limited goals of hospital
insurance benefits for the aged, available to all those eligible for Social Security
retirement benefits. Health Insurance for the Aged, the forerunner of hospital bene-
fits under Medicare, appeared forcefully in 1957 under the sponsorship of Senator
'See ROBERT STEVENS, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: INCOME SECURITY 275-89, 401-36
(1970) [hereinafter cited as STATUTORY HISTORY OF Tm UNITED STATES]; ROSEMARY STEVENS, AMERICAN
MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTERE T ch. 13 and passim (forthcoming 1971).
' Ch. 8og, 64 Stat. 477.
' U.S. DEP'T OF HE~ALTHr, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, MEDICAL REsoURcEs AVAILABLE TO MEET THEI
NEEDS OF PtmUIC ASSISTANCE REcIPIENTs, H.R. Rs.. No. 1799, 87 th Cong., Ist Sess. 31 and passim
(196i) (hereinafter cited as MEDICAL REsOURCES].
" Since these payments had to be within the existing maxima on federal sharing, which was at that
time on an individual case basis, federal financial participation was limited. In x956 an amendment was
adopted which provided for separate matching for vendor medical payments with the maximum based
on the monthly average payment per recipient. Federal matching for vendor medical payments and
cash payments was recombined in 1958, and the averaging formula basis was retained.
"
1 STAFF OF SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON AGING, 87TH CONG., Isr SEss., NEW POPULATION FACTS ON
OLDER AMERICANS, I960, at zo (Comm. Print I96I).
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Aim6 Forand. Others were meanwhile pressing for expanded medical care through
the categorical forms of public assistance.
By 196o health insurance for the aged had become a major political issue. 2 In
part this was a reflection of the inadequate services made available under public
assistance vendor payments to the two million persons on old-age assistance.13 In
part it was a reflection of inadequate levels of retirement benefits under Social
Security. But above all was the impelling factor of the rapidly rising costs of medical
care, which, especially as far as the elderly were concerned, were pricing vital health
services out of reach. The average annual medical bill per OAA recipient in the
relatively generous scheme in New York in 196o was $7oo.14 This was not only
higher than the cash benefits provided to the elderly in that state even as an average,
but it was appreciably more than many of those not on public assistance could
afford for medical services. Persons sixty-five and over were reportedly twice as
likely as other members of the population to need medical care, and at the same
time held significantly less private health insurance (and because of their high
medical risk were unable to buy health insurance at prices they could afford).1
These and other problems besetting the elderly were emphasized in House and Senate
hearings on the Forand bill in 196D.16 The health insurance principle was again
vigorously opposed, but at least there was a willingness to upgrade medical benefits
under the welfare system.
In 196o, as a countermeasure to the proposals for hospital insurance for the aged,
the Eisenhower Administration proposed a new federal-state program to protect the
low-income aged against the cost of long-term illness. This proposal would have
"
1 The development of the Forand bill and the subsequent bills and debates which led to Medicare
in 1965 have been well documented. See J. SuNDQuIsr, POLITICS AND POLICY: TIHE EisENs-owER, KENNEDY,
AND JOHNSON YEARS 287-321 (1968) [hereinafter cited as POLITICS AND PoLICY].
"
5Information from the Bureau of Public Assistance for the calendar year ended December 31, i96o
,
noted xo states and jurisdictions which made no vendor payments. And in states with a federal-state
vendor payments program, there were wide variations. Under OAA, the monthly amount paid for
medical care per recipient varied from i9 cents (Montana) to $43.93 (Wisconsin). Services to be covered
also varied widely, some states covering hospitalization but not physician services, some excluding hos-
pitalization, and so on; and there were often variations from county to county. For a comprehensive
description, see MEDICAL REsoURCEs, supra note 9, at 46, 48-51, 54-56, 59-62, 8o.
14 V. KAUFMAN, ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL CARE ExPENDITUREs By LOCAL PUBLIC WELFARE DSRICTs o
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS IN Naw YoRK STATE DURING 196o (New York State Department of
Public Welfare, Special Research Statistical Reports No. 17, Sept. I96I).
" U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERviCE, HEALTH STATISTICS FROM THE U.S. NATIONAL HEALTH SURvEY:
OLDER PERSONS, SELECTED HErTH CHAAcrTEISTICS, JULY 1957-JUNE 1959 (Public Health Service Pub.
No. 5 84 -C4 , x96o).
"A number of analyses have been done on the political and legislative background of the Medicare
legislation, of which the Forand proposals were an important part. See 0. ANDERSON, THE UNEASY
EQUILIBRIUM: PuVATE AND PUBLIC FINANCING OF HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1875-1965
(x968); P. CORNING, THE EvoLrrrioN OF MEDICARE (Social Security Admin., Office of Research and Sta-
tistics, Research Report No. 29, 1969); E. FEINoOLD, MEDICARE POLICY AND POLITICS: A CAsE STUDY AND
POLICY ANALYSIS (1966); R. HARIUs, A SACRED TRUST (1966); M. SKIDMORE, MEDICARE AND THE AIER-
iCAN RHETORIC OF RECONCILIATION (1970); Marmor, The Congress: Medicare Politics and Policy, in
AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY: FivE CONTEMPORARY STUDIES 2-67 (A. Sindler ed.
1969); POLITICS AND POLICY, supra note 12, at 287-321-
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established a national means-test eligibility level for assistance, with specified medical,
hospital, and nursing benefits.17 But this, too, was rejected by the House Ways and
Means Committee. Instead, similar proposals sponsored by the committee chairman,
Representative Wilbur Mills of Arkansas, and by Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma,
were added to the omnibus social security bill (H.R. i258o) and enacted into law
as the Kerr-Mills Act of i96o.1s Health insurance for the aged was defeated.
B. Kerr-Mills
The Kerr-Mills Act provided more generous federal matching grants for vendor
medical payments under old-age assistance.19 But it also included a new category
of assistance in a separate program of federal grants to the states, medical assistance
to the aged (MAA), with respect to the "medically needy" aged; after x962 the blind
and disabled were included under a similar category (title XVI). These new bene-
ficiaries were to be defined as elderly or blind persons (or totally disabled persons
over twenty-one) not on public assistance, whose income might be above state
eligibility levels but was not high enough to meet their medical bills. There was thus
a new assistance category of "medical indigence," but primarily for those sixty-five
years of age and over. The new program provided matching grants to participating
states of fifty to eighty per cent of the cost of vendor payments.
The structure, to be followed later by Medicaid, was one of open-ended federal
cost sharing, without limitations on individual payments or total state expenditures;
cost control was left to the states. The matching formula favored lower-income
states, including incidentally those of Representative Mills and Senator Kerr, but
state participation was optional, as with other assistance titles. Unlike the Eisen-
hower proposal, each state would set its own definition of the limits and scope of
medical indigence. The act did, however, suggest a broad range of hospital, nursing
home, physician, and other services. In addition it required each plan to include
both institutional and noninstitutional care as a condition of federal sharing. Thus
while the new program was left in the hands of state administrators, it included as
an important precedent the concept of federal standard-setting of benefits. There
" The suggested income level was $25oo for an individual, $38o0 for a couple. As an option, cash
benefits would be provided for the purchase of private health insurance. The proposal was revealed in
testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee on May 4, 196o. A strong supporter was
Vice President Richard Nixon. See CONGREsSIONAL QUARTERaLy SERVICE, CONGRESS AND THE NATION
X945-I964, at a153-54 (x965) [hereinafter cited as CoNGREss AND TH NATION]; PoLITIcs AND POLICY,
supra note 12, at 287-305.1 8 Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 987.
Under the x95o authorization for vendor medical payments for OAA, AB, and APTD, the federal
government matched the state budget on the equivalent of $30 of the first $50 of a state's combined
monthly payments for living expenses and vendor payments for welfare recipients. The formula was
revised upwards in 1952, 1956, and x958. Under the latter change the federal share was between
$41.50 and $46.75 of the first $65 a month of the state's combined outlay per client, with the greater
share going to the poorer states. The Kerr-Mills Act added on to this a federal matching payment of
50% to 80% (depending on the state) of the next $12 a month spent on medical care for OAA
recipients (that is, over and above the $65 limit for all vendor payment recipients of categorical assis-
tance). CONGRESS AND THE NATION, supra note 17, at 1154.
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were provisions that a recipient could not receive medical care under both OAA and
MAA,20 that states were not to set up enrollment fees for participation, and that (as
with other categorical public assistance programs) the program had to be in
effect in all administrative subdivisions of a state.
Two innovations were also included which set the new MAA apart from other
public assistance programs: States were not to impose residency requirements on
participants except for current residence, nor were they to impose liens on the
recipients property during his lifetime or that of a surviving spouse.2 ' The Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare was made responsible for approving state
plans, issuing guidelines, and receiving reports on their operation. The program
was to begin on October I, 19602
In theory the new program could have provided extensive services to a substantial
proportion of the elderly population and to the other two adult groups included in
at least some of its provisions. It could have thus met a considerable share of the
needs of those who fell into the gap between adequate coverage of their medical
bills through private health insurance schemes and those receiving cash payments
under public assistance.P But in fact the nature of Kerr-Mills was predetermined by
its heritage as a political compromise in Congress, staving off the threat of hospital
insurance for all the aged, and also by its formulation as a supplement to existing forms
of poor relief.
Kerr-Mills was also, importantly, a means of increasing federal grants for vendor
payments in the states. The many counties in the United States which were sub-
sidizing medical relief could look upon Kerr-Mills as a source of additional state
support; hospitals and doctors could view it as a means of reducing their own
private contributions to medical care to the indigent by the introduction of more
realistic fees for welfare patients who were elderly;" and the states had the pleasant
" For the breakdown between OAA and MAA in these early years, see U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH, ED-
UCATION, AND WELFARE, MEDICAL RESouRCEs AVAILABLE TO MEET NEEDS OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS
29 (Comm. Print i96s).
," Under other public assistance programs, it is open to the state to make a recipient liable in per-
petuity should he ever earn enough to repay sums received by way of welfare payments. See Graham,
Public Assistance: The Right to Receive; The Obligation to Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 451 (1968).
22 Soc. SEC. BULL., Nov. ig6o, at I=-i5.
as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Arthur Flemming, speaking in favor of the original
Eisenhower Administration proposal, estimated that 75% of all persons over 65 would be eligible to
participate under the initial plan (thus providing a major system of free or "socialized" medicine to
the elderly). See STATUTORY HIsTORY OF THE UNITEi STATES, supra note 7, at 559-6o.
"Services given to the poor of all age levels by physicians were estimated in 196o to be worth
$658 million. Voluntary hospitals were estimated to be providing at least $i8o million of care without
charge from their own resources (income from endowments, fees from paying patients, gifts and other
income). Many of the providers of care, particularly physicians, were presumably subsidizing their
welfare practice through higher charges to other patients; thus the net amount of charity was not as
great to the providers as might be supposed. Nevertheless, hospitals were by i96o beginning to feel
crimped by rising prices and salary levels; between 1945 and I96o hospital room rates had tripled.
They could not afford much longer to continue to care for heavy loads of welfare patients without ade-
quate reimbursement. See MEDIcA. REsoURCEs, supra note 9, at 64, 69-70; H. SoMaRS & A. SoMaas.
DoToas, PATIENTS, AND HETH INSURANCE 195 and passim (ig6i).
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prospect of expanded federal funding. California defined its new MAA program quite
clearly as being designed "to supplement the financial ability of counties to meet
the health needs of aged persons."' 5
At the federal level, the program was administered by the Bureau of Public
Assistance, not by the Public Health Service. Without exception the states in imple-
menting their programs designed means tests for the medically indigent under
MAA, which, while more liberal than the means test for both cash and health pro-
grams under OAA, were similar in administration and intent2  Nor were the
benefits much more generous than those available under the previous programs.2 1 In
terms of vendor payments, Kerr-Mills extended OAA at a somewhat higher income
level. The atmosphere of "welfare" was all-pervasive.
No one seriously pretended that Kerr-Mills was the final answer to meeting the
health needs of the elderly. Nevertheless the program was disappointing to con-
servatives and liberals alike. It did not vindicate the view of those who saw the
long-term answer to health care financing as a mix of private health insurance backed
by public assistance, rather than as comprehensive national health insurance; nor
did it begin to meet the concern of those who looked for a full range of preventive
as well as curative services for the elderly as a means of forestalling possible in-
digence. Under MAA, the elderly were forced to spend down to the relatively low
income eligibility limits of the program before receiving any benefits. As Secretary
Celebrezze pointed out in the 1963 hearings on hospital insurance for the aged, Kerr-
Mills did not prevent dependency but only dealt with it after it had happened 8
2 Sucom . ON HEALTH OF THE ELDERLY OF THE SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON AGING, 88ri Co No.,
IsT SEss., MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR. THE AGED, TiE KERR-MILLs PROGRAM 296O-63, at 75 (Comm. Print
x963) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE AGED].
" E.g., New York's relatively comprehensive and liberal MAA program, begun in April 1961. The
basic income levels were $i8oo for a single applicant and $260o for a married couple. Applicants were
allowed health insurance policy premiums of up to $250 a year for married applicants, life insurance
with a cash surrender of $5oo, and cash reserves of $1300 per married couple. The home was exempt
from means test levels, as were clothes and household effects. "Nonessential" property (as defined by
the public assistance case worker in terms of regulations in the state manual and the plans of the
local welfare district) and excess assets were applied against the costs of medical care. In addition there
was provision for recovery from the estate of a deceased recipient (though not a live one), and the
spouse, parents, and children of the recipient were liable for payment of medical bills when they wero
found able to assist. Patients in medical or nursing institutions for chronic care were allowed up to
$io a month for personal care items. These provisions followed the provision of other state welfare
programs. Id. at 89.
"E.g., Kentucky inaugurated a vendor payment plan under the federally aided programs (including
MAA) in January ig6i. Hospital care was included, but only in cases of acute, emergency, and life-
endangering conditions, and only, as of June i, 1961, for 6 days per admission. MEDICAL REsoUters,
supra note 9, at 52. When asked what happened if the patient were still sick after 6 days, the Ken-
tucky commissioner for economic security replied, "We pay only for 6 days. If the patient is in the
hospital longer, the care may be paid for by a relative or a charity, or the hospital may discharge him.
We do not know what happens after our responsibility is met." MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE AGED,
supra note 25, at 5. For a survey of programs in effect in 1961, see U.S. DET OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SEcuiT ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF PROGRAM RESEARCH, THE HEALTH CARE OF
THE AGED: BACKGROuND FACTS RELATING TO THE FINANCING PROBLEMuS 122-23 and passim (x962).
2'Hearings on H.R. 3920 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
31 (x963-64) [hereinafter cited as z963 Hearings].
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C. Implementation of Kerr-Mills
The implementation of Kerr-Mills in the states was similar in flavor to the later
implementation of Medicaid. The Bureau of Public Assistance, renamed the Bureau
of Family Services of the Welfare Administration, issued a series of State Letters
summarizing the provisions of the legislation and reflecting the department's view
that both the extended OAA vendor payment provisions and the new MAA program
would result in the improvement of programs of health care for the elderly. The
bureau also prepared information leaflets, met with state directors of public assistance,
appointed a group of consultants on medical matters, prepared a guide and a hand-
book of regulations, published statistics, and assisted the states through technical
medical consultation. 9 As a voluntary program of grants-in-aid, however, MAA
imposed little responsibility on the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Apart from exhortation, the federal role was minor.
In the states, the new program was embraced as an extension of existing welfare
programs and as a new source of federal budgetary assistance. Because of the higher
federal sharing provisions under MAA there was an immediate incentive, particularly
in the richer states with large vendor payment programs, to shift part of their
existing programs into the new category. This was also encouraged by the pro-
vision that a recipient could receive medical care through OAA or MAA, but not
both. A study of the impact of MAA in Connecticut found that in its first month
of operation (April 1962) 3887 of the total of 3929 individuals placed on MAA were
already receiving welfare assistance through OAA; and the transfers continued 3P
Altogether, it was estimated that nearly iooooo persons then on other welfare pro-
grams in the states were moved to the new program,"1 thus frustrating the intention
of Kerr-Mills to provide a major new source of services to the elderly. Indeed, one
report in 1963 found that the combined percentage of old people who were covered
for medical care under OAA and MAA had actually declined after the adoption of
the new program, from fourteen to thirteen per cent.
3 2
An important byproduct of the funding arrangements was -that, instead of en-
couraging services where they were most needed through higher federal matching
grants to the low-income states, Kerr-Mills proved more attractive to states which
already had substantial vendor programs. By 1965, the five states of New York,
California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania, which together included
about thirty-one per cent of the aged in the country, were receiving about sixty-two
-o See MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE AGED, supra note 25, at 65-72.
0
A. Snoke & P. Snoke, How Kerr-Mills Works in Connecticut, MODERN HOSPITAL, Aug. 1963, at
79. A ready device for such transfers was for states to drop the expensive services, notably nursing
home care, from OAA and transfer them to MAA; the person needing these services was thus transformed
into an MAA recipient.
"
1 MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IOR THE AGED, stipra note 25, at 2.
" NEw Yomuc STATE DEPARTzmNT OF SOCIAL WELFARE, OFFICE OF MEDICAL ECONOMICS, MEDICAL
CARE EXPENDITURES FOR mE AGED IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE FEDERALLY AIDED PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, JANUARY-MARCH 1963 (1963).
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per cent of federal MAA funds.3 Forty-four of the fifty-four jurisdictions had
some program in effect, but in many cases programs were minimal and there were
wide and confusing variations. Only five jurisdictions were judged to provide com-
prehensive medical services.84 Eligibility levels varied widely; indeed, in fourteen
of the states the MAA income levels were found in 1963 to be more rigidly interpreted
and often lower than those for OAA. 5 The continuation of family responsibility for
the medical care of elderly relatives,36 the custom of attaching property after death
(although forbidden during the recipient's lifetime), and the pauperization pro-
visions of the means test all added to the failure of Kerr-Mills to provide even a
minimal alternative to a general program of health care benefits for the aged.
One major difficulty-which was to be transported lock, stock, and barrel into
Medicaid-was the financial inability and thus unwillingness of low-income states
to afford a medical assistance program even when the federal matching grant was
up to eighty per cent of the total cost. Georgia, for example, authorized MAA in
I961 and Mississippi in 1964, but no state funds were ever appropriated. Even the
richer states were already aware of state funding problems. Governor Brown of
California stated in 1963 that the cost of making MAA a comprehensive medical 'care
program in that state "would bankrupt the State and county governments." 37
Kerr-Mills was built on the dilemma which foreshadowed Medicaid. Benefits for
the medically indigent could be viewed as a program of health services, or even as
a form of private health supplement. But if this were so, there was no particular
virtue in attaching them administratively to a program of public assistance cash
benefits whose primary capability lay not in providing services but in determining
individual eligibility through means tests. Educational services for the poor were
not channelled through public welfare departments. The problem of health care
was that no separately subsidized or organized alternative existed. If Kerr-Mills (and
Medicaid) were to be seen as an integral part of the welfare structure, logic would
suggest the development of medical assistance along similar administrative lines to
cash assistance; that is, with the state establishing or expanding public medical clinics
and hospitals where state employees would provide health services at minimal costs to
those eligible. But the concept of medical indigence as proposed for Kerr-Mills
rejected the latter approach. While determination of medical indigence was uni-
versally interpreted in the states in terms of standard means-test provisions, the
01 Testimony of Wilbur Cohen, Hearings on H.R. 6675 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 89 th
Cong., ist Sess. 166 (1965) [hereinafter cited as x965 Hearings].
'Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and North Dakota. Id. at i63.
" There was also the problem of the arbitrary cut-off when a recipient's income was above the
state eligibility level (now referred to as the "notch" effect). A Michigan case was cited in which a
needy man was refused services under MAA because his annual income was $1542, while the MAA
level was $1500. In this case he was, however, still eligible for the more flexible eligibility provisions
of OAA. MEDicAL Assisr.sA~c Fop THE AGED, supra note 25, at 35-36.
asIn Connecticut, for example, 75% of MAA applications which were refused were for reasons of
family responsibility. Testimony of Joseph C. Bober, z963 Hearings, supra note 28, at 140.
" Testimony of Edmund Brown, id. at 920.
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"medically indigent" were emphatically not "indigent" in the sense of being on cash
relief; thus public hospitals and clinics, with their stigma of welfare, were not
necessarily appropriate places for treatment. Kerr-Mills thus fell between two stools.
It was both a reflection of inadequate medical services to those with low and middle
incomes and an extension of traditional notions of assistance.
D. More Radical Changes?
While the Kerr-Mills programs were being developed in the states side-by-side
with the continuing vendor payments under the other categorical assistance programs,
further pressures were building up in the Congress for hospital insurance for the
aged through Social Security for persons at all income levels; that is, the provision
of specific services as a covered benefit under the Social Security program, free of
state variations and of the administration of a means test. The two movements-
the growing failure of Kerr-Mills and the pressures for health insurance for the aged-
gathered momentum in the years after i96o, culminating in the Social Security
Amendments of 1965, which established both Medicare and Medicaid.
President Kennedy strongly endorsed hospital insurance for the aged through
Social Security in his health message to Congress in 196.38 This was followed by an
Administration bill introduced in the Senate by Senator Clinton Anderson and in
the House by Representative Cecil R. King. 9 Opposed on the outside by the AMA
and by the Health Insurance Institute, representing the private insurance interests,
and with little chance of support from Representative Mills's powerful Ways and
Means Committee, the King-Anderson bill was initially unsuccessful; and a similar
proposal offered by Senator Anderson as an amendment to the Public Welfare
Amendments in 1962 suffered a resounding defeat.40 Nevertheless, supporting evi-
dence was slowly being built up. Hearings by the Ways and Means Committee in
196i documented the continuing failure of the existing system to meet the medical
bills of the elderly. Hospital expenses had risen from $9.39 a day in 1946 to $32.23 in
196o, and were rising increasingly rapidly 1 Born of the continuing increase in
medical costs and encouraged by the lack of effectiveness of 'the Kerr-Mills program,
by the changed composition of the Senate after the 1962 elections, and perhaps
even by the sheer familiarity of the emotive phrases and the lessening of credibility
in the AMA's position, support for health insurance for the aged was rising.
President Kennedy outlined his proposals for hospital insurance in a Special Message
of February 1963; the King-Anderson bill was introduced again, and the House
Ways and Means Committee again held hearings 2  The following year, after
1 i7 CONoRESSIONAL QUART h Y SERVICE, CONGRESSIONAL QuOATERLY AL ANAC 870 (ig6i).
so CONGRESS AND TnE NATION, supra note 17, at 1154.
"°Id. at 1154-55.
"1 Hearings on H.R. 4222 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., ist Sess. 40
(596!).
"' President Kennedy's proposals were submitted to Congress on February 21, 1963, as part of the
message "Aiding Our Senior Citizens." He called for Social Security payment of inpatient hospital
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bipartisan efforts to break the deadlock and reach agreement on some constructive
health proposal, the Senate for the first time passed a proposal for hospital insurance
for the aged as an amendment to the Social Security Bill of 1964; but it died in a
House-Senate conference committee.43
With the Democratic landslide in the elections of November 1964, the composition
of the House of Representatives (and of the Ways and Means Committee) was
changed in favor of compulsory hospital insurance. President Johnson at once called
for action on the King-Anderson proposals-Medicare-as a first priority of business.
Hospital insurance for the aged through Social Security appeared as the first
bill on the calendar for both Senate and House in 1965-S. i and H.R. i of the 89th
Congress. The proposals were incorporated into the over-all aims of the new Admin-
istration's program for a "Great Society." Hearings were held by the House Ways and
Means Committee in January and February 1965. While the AMA continued to
claim that "we physicans care for the elderly and know their health needs better
than anyone else" and that health insurance controlled by Washington was in-
compatible with "good medicine,"44 the tide was turning in favor of including com-
pulsory hospital insurance as a benefit of Social Security.
Other proposals for financing health care were, however, by no means dead.
Indeed, it was the eventual combination of several major proposals which was to
give the 1965 legislation its peculiar and distinctive character. In I961 Senator
Jacob Javits had revived the Eisenhower proposal for federal support of extensive
state programs for those over sixty-five whose individual incomes did not exceed
$3000 or whose joint incomes did not exceed $4500. The AMA developed its own
"Eldercare" proposal, sponsored in the Congress by Representatives Curtis and
Herlong and by Senator Tower. This called for a federal-state program which
would subsidize private insurance policies for the elderly, for hospital, doctor, and
drug bills. A similar bill was sponsored by Representative John W. Byrnes and
endorsed by the House Republican leadership. The Byrnes bill, "Bettercare," sug-
gested a federal (rather than a state) program whereby the elderly would be en-
couraged to contribute part of the premiums of a voluntary health insurance program
with public subsidy of the remainder. There was also continuing proposals for tax
credits and deductions for health insurance premiums, and for expanding the
struggling Kerr-Mills program.45
costs for the elderly of up to 90 days with some contributions from the patient, of up to 18o days with
the patient making a greater contribution, or of all costs for 45 days. The proposals also included up to
i8o days of nursing home care and 240 home health-care visits. The Administration bill was introduced
by Representative King (H.R. 3920) and Senator Anderson (S. 88o) in February 1963, and initial hearings
were held in November. CONGRESS ANO nm NATION, supra note 17, at 1155.
431d.
"'Testimony of Dr. Donovan Ward, Executive Hearings on H.R. r Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 741-47 (1965).
"For a report of the congressional history of the different bills, see 2x CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
SRtvICE, CONGREaSSIONAL QUtusaRTRLY ALMANAC 248-69 (1965).
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Representatives Mills, King, Herlong, Byrnes, and Curtis were all members of
the House Ways and Means Committee. The full range of points of view was
present in Congress's vital committee, and the outcome of the debate over Medicare
was thus by no means predictable. In the end, the bill reported out of the Com-
mittee was not one bill but a compendium of three originally separate, and in some
respects competing, proposals. The Administration's proposals for hospital insurance
for the aged, financed through the Social Security system, would provide basic in-
patient and nursing home coverage for all those eligible for Social Security retire-
ment benefits. As a second layer, there would be a system of federal subsidies to
enable old people to buy into a voluntary program of insurance for their doctors' bills
(the Byrnes proposal), with the federal government setting premiums and benefits
but with the administration of the scheme being funneled through insurance com-
panies and nonprofit agencies. These two proposals were to become, respectively,
parts A and B of title XVIII of the Social Security Amendments of 1965. They
provided the two interlocking parts of Medicare.46
At the same time, a third proposal was made to liberalize and extend the pro-
gram of federal grants to states for the indigent and medically needy. This last
proposal became title XIX of the Social Security Amendments, popularly known as
Medicaid. The different points of view over medical care financing were thereby
brought together. In one fell swoop the elderly were offered compulsory hospital
insurance through Social Security, subsidized voluntary health insurance for their
medical bills, and the expanded program of benefits under the rubric of "medical
indigence," a program now to be available on a more general basis. In terms of
passage, this strange mixture, brewed by adept political alchemists, proved to
be brilliantly successful. The revised proposals passed the House, survived hearings
by the Senate Finance Committee, were voted with some modifications in the
Senate, were further modified in conference committee, and Public Law 89-97 was
signed by President Johnson, amid some flourish and in the presence of former
President Truman, on July 30, 1965.
Title XIX (Medicaid) was based not on the insurance principles of specified
benefits for specified contributions which distinguish Medicare but on the time-worn
structure of federal grants-in-aid to states for medical assistance. While appearing in
"Pub. L. No. 89.97, 79 Stat. 343. Under part A, the hospital insurance program of title XVIII,
funding is provided through Social Security contributions paid by the working population; in return,
beneficiaries are entitled at age 65 to specified hospital and related benefits. Part B of Medicare is also
based on the insurance principle, although it is outside the compulsory Social Security contributory
scheme. This part is a federally-subsidized voluntary insurance scheme with deductible and co-
insurance features to which those over 65 may contribute on a monthly basis. The federal government
matches-from general revenues-the subscribers' voluntary contributions. Its basic provisions extend to
physician bills (inside or outside hospitals), other medical services and supplies such as injections and
dressings, and a specified number of home and health agency visits. Payments are geared to customary
and prevailing fees. For a discussion of the impact of Medicare, see H. SoMaas & A. SoMERs, ME.DICAE
AND THE HosPITALs (1967).
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the same legislative package as Medicare, its origins and underlying assumptions
were quite different. It was, in fact, Kerr-Mills applied to a much wider audience:
an extension of state welfare provisions rather than a new health service program.
II
TITLE XIX AND ITs IMPLEMENTATION
The somewhat vague-or at least poorly drafted-provisions of title XIX took up
only nine pages in the official version of the act-a relatively small space for what was
to become one of the more expensive and most controversial pieces of federal legis-
lation of the 196os. Such brevity was not always matched by clarity of expression.
A. The Provisions of Public Law 89-97
Title XIX extended medical assistance to all those in the categorical public
assistance programs, thus applying across-the-board the principle which had been
introduced for the aged by MAA and extended to other groups by tide XVI. In addi-
tion it combined the separate public assistance medical vendor programs for cash
recipients into a single program. The act did not require the states to establish such
a program, but it put very considerable pressure on them to do so by providing that
after December 31, 1969, there would be no further federal funds for medical vendor
payments under the categorical tides for OAA, AFDC, AB, APTD, and Kerr-Mills.
Perhaps even more important as an inducement-especially to the larger states, which
had "suffered" under the earlier variable formula-was the provision in tide XI
(section 1i8) allowing states establishing tide XIX programs to use the more favor-
able title XIX reimbursement formula for their other categorical assistance programs.
The pressures were effective. Although some states barely made the deadline-for
example, Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi commenced their programs on Jan-
uary i, 197o-only two, Alaska and Arizona, failed to implement it at all, pleading
extenuating circumstances in that, since virtually all Eskimos and Indians would be
eligible, the potential costs would be "unbearable."
The 1965 law, as interpreted by the regulations, required the states to provide five
basic services for those covered by Medicaid: physician's services, skilled nursing home
services, inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital services, and other laboratory
or x-ray services. The states also had the option of providing a number of other
services, including "medical care, or any other type of remedial care recognized
under State law, furnished by licensed practitioners within the scope of their prac-
tices as defined by State law," home health care services, private duty nursing services,
clinic, services, dental services, physical therapy, drugs, dentures, eyeglasses and
prosthetic devices, "other diagnostic, screening, preventive and rehabilitative services,"
and "inpatient hospital services and skilled nursing home services for individuals 65
years of age or over in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases." Finally, in a
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catch-all provision, the subsection allowed the states to provide "any other medical
care, and any other type of remedial care recognized under State law, specified by
the Secretary."" At the same time it was clear that benefits might differ between
those covered by cash programs and those categorized as medically needy, and also
that, provided it was done uniformly, a state was free to reduce benefits.
While it is relatively easy to describe what was covered, it is appreciably less
easy to describe and analyze who was covered. No lawyer finds it easy to dissect the
poorly drafted legal prose of title XIX-a task made significantly more difficult
with each amendment-and it is clear that many state health departments and welfare
departments have had similar problems. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted4" that
tide XIX has three aspects in terms of coverage.
First, the state Medicaid plan must include those receiving aid under the four
categorical assistance programs (OAA, AB, AFDC, APTD) or the combined adult
medical group (tide XVI), those who would be included in such programs were it
not for a state provision invalidated by tide XIX (for example, section 19o2(b) (3)
prohibited durational residence requirements, which many states still had in 1965 for
public assistance programs), and those under twenty-one who would be eligible for
AFDC if they were under eighteen. In the curious prose of officialdom, these latter
two groups are often known as "categorically related needy."49
There are then three other categories of persons who may be included in the
Medicaid program and for whom federal cost-sharing is available. This first category
includes two groups-those who could be covered by federal categorical programs
if the state had adopted the broadest programs possible, 0 and those who would be
eligible for assistance if they were not in a medical facility (excepting those under
sixty-five who are in mental or tuberculosis institutions) ' This category is also
included under the rubric of "categorically related needy." The second category-
the "categorically related medically needy"--allowed the states to include "all
individuals who would, if needy, be eligible for aid or assistance under any such
State plan and who have insufficient (as determined in accordance with comparable
standards) income and resources to meet the costs of necessary medical or remedial
1
7 Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 19o5(a), 79 Stat. 35X.
"The generally accepted categories of covered persons were clarified in AvIsorty CoMMnssoN ON
INTElGOVERNMENTAL PELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAID 10-12 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as INTERGOVERINMENTAL PROBLEMS]. See also CCH MEDICARE & MEDICArD Gra paras. 14,2=-71;
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND NVELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION:
SUPPLEMENT D paras. D-4oio-5o (1966) [hereinafter cited as SUPPLEMENT D].
"'We are here using the terminology of INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS, supra note 48, rather than
SUPPLEMENT D, supra note 48. Their relationship is described in CCH MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUmE para.
14,251.
"O The categorical forms of public assistance are, in general, voluntary not compulsory. The federal
government will provide funds under the formula only after the appropriate state legislation has been
passed. For instance, some states do not have AFDC-UP programs.
" The provision in the 1965 act making it possible to provide medical assistance to those in mental
institutions is known as the Long Amendment. It was the first time that medical assistance or vendor
payments had been extended to this group.
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care and services." ' Third, the state might cover all those who were under twenty-
one and "medically indigent" even if they were not eligible for another categorical
program-that is, were not blind, disabled, or in a family eligible for AFDC; this
group was then called "noncategorically related medically needy.""3
Finally, the 1965 legislation allowed the states to include a category which covered
various groups for whom there were no matching funds for services but for whom
the federal government was prepared to share in the administrative cost only. This
category included those who qualified for general assistance 4 (that part of public
assistance not yet absorbed by federal categorical programs) and others between
twenty-one and sixty-five who were "medically needy" but who did not fall into a
"categorically related" definition "5 (for example, persons who might be unemployed
and without children, or even working but with an income insufficient to meet medi-
cal bills).
The 1965 law normally required payments directly to the providers of services.
In the case of hospitals it was provided that the test of reimbursement should be
"reasonable cost." This phrase was also applied to hospital reimbursement under
Medicare. While there was no requirement that Medicaid and Medicare regula-
tions be combined (or even similar), it was agreed after debate in HEW that hospital
reimbursement under Medicaid would follow the same broad test as in Medicare.
With respect to other medical services, states were free to apply their own standards,
although there was a hope that other medical providers would be paid according
to locally prevailing fees. The 1965 law also prohibited deductions and cost sharing at
least for those recipients also receiving money payments, while states were required
to meet, for those sixty-five and over and covered by Medicaid, the cost of any
deductibles under Medicare. Liability of relatives-which some states still impose on
recipients of public assistance-was prohibited, the prohibition of liens on the later
income of recipients was carried over from Kerr-Mills, and states were free to
determine their own notions of who was "medically needy.""0
242 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (so) (B) (i) (Supp. I, 1965). It is this provision which, coupled with id.
§ 1396d(a)(ii), enabled states to pay the medical expenses of families with children who did not qualify
for public assistance. The latter provision included within the definition of "medical assistance" parents
or relatives with whom a child was living.
53 This was the group inserted under the Ribicoff Amendment. It should be noted that in one sense
this group was categorically related-to title IV. A further group was added in this category by the
x967 Amendments-the "essential person" category. See note 124 infra.
"' StPPLaEmENr D, supra note 48, notes, however, at D-4o4o(a) (6), "Persons currently receiving gen-
eral assistance could meet the test of 'categorically needy,' using the standards of assistance in the most
nearly related approved State public assistance plan."
asThis is interpreted in id. para. D-4o4o(B) as follows: "Self-supporting individuals between 21 and
65 years of age, whose income and resources cover their maintenance needs according to the income
and resources level for the 'medically needy,' but not their needs for medical care, could be included as
'medically needy.' (Such individuals, whose income and resource- are below the level of maintenance
of OAA, AB, APTD, AABD, or AFDC, as appropriate, would qualify as 'categorically needy.')"
" Again the states were encouraged to be liberal. State plans had to "include reasonable standards
(which shall be comparable for all groups) for determining eligiblity for and the extent of medical
assistance over the plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide for
taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards
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The minimum federal contribution to the states' eligible Medicaid programs was
fifty per cent with a maximum of eighty-three per cent, based on the variable-grant,
federal-state matching formula, which pays most to the state with the lowest per
capita income. The federal government covers seventy-five per cent of professional
administrative costs and fifty per cent of other administrative costs. The law also
sought to prevent the states from using the new federal medical care dollars to
replace existing state expenditures; in other words, Medicaid programs had to be
incremental." As with other federal-state programs, certain administrative standards
had to be met, in terms of designating a single state agency for administration and
providing uniformity throughout the state, equality of medical care in the different
categories, fair hearing procedures, confidentiality, and similar requirements.Y8 Nor
should the importance of these changes be underestimated. The requirement of equal
medical treatment in all categories was an important step forward, while the end of
relatives' responsibility was to have an important effect on the utilization of nursing
homes.
Convoluted as the wording was, the main thrust of title XIX was expansionist.
Section 1903(e), for instance, set the long-term goal:
The Secretary shall not make payments under the preceding provisions of this
section to any State unless the State makes a satisfactory showing that it is making
efforts in the direction of broadening the scope of the care and services made avail-
able under the plan and in the direction of liberalizing the eligibility requirements
for medical assistance, with a view toward furnishing by July ", 1975, compre-
hensive care and services to substantially all individuals who meet the plan's
eligibility standards with respect to income and resources, including services
to enable such individuals to attain or retain independence or self-care.
At least some states took the encouragement seriously.
B. Implementation 1965-67
After the passage of the 1965 legislation, as suggested earlier, many saw title XIX
as the "sleeper." Some saw it as more important than title XVIII (Medicare)," while
others saw it as the National Health Program of the future.6 ° Certainly, for those
who saw evil in Medicaid, the months of implementation early in 1966 were a cause
of excitement and trauma. For a while most states moved to implement Medicaid at
fairly modest levels; Pennsylvania set $4ooo as a limit of "medical dependency" for
prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient ...... 42 U.S.C. § X39 6 (a)(i7)
(Supp. I, 1965).
" This was known as the concept of "state effort." The rules for "Payment to States" are codified
at 42 U.S.C. § I396b (Supp. I, 1965).
" See id. § 1396a, which deals with "State Plans for Medical Assistance."
"' E.g., "Because of the limited scope of Tide I8 in terms of persons covered, types of health service
insured against, and the presence of deductibles and coinsurance, it is Title i9 that we shall find it
necessary to rely on as the main instrument for ensuring that no one who needs health services is denied
them." Burns, Some Major Policy Decisions Facing the United States in the Financing and Organization
of Health Care, 42 BULL. N.Y. Ac'D. MED. (2d ser.) 1072, 1oo (1966).
"oE.g., Werne, Medicaid: Has National Health Insurance Entered by the Back Door?, 18 SmcusE L.
REV. 49 (1966).
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a family of four ("Pennsycare"), while Illinois set it at $3600. Two states, however,
New York 1 and California,62 established programs which were shortly the center
of violent controversies. Moreover, the effects of the disputes in Albany and Sacra-
mento were soon felt in Washintgon, D.C.
New York-and especially New York City-had a relatively generous program
of medical care for those on public assistance and Kerr-Mills, and so it was not
surprising that, when the time came to prepare state legislation early in 1966, Gov-
ernor Rockefeller should propose a base of $5700 for a family of four, while Speaker
Travia, the Democratic leader, proposed a base of $67oo, ° or that ultimately a com-
promise of $60oo was agreed upon. What was rather more surprising was that only
one day's hearings were held on the bill. The Travia bill passed the Democratic-
controlled Assembly and the Rockefeller bill the Republican-controlled Senate, both
almost without debate, during March 1966. In April, after a warning by Rockefeller
that New York stood in danger of losing possible new federal funds, the Speaker
and the Governor met, worked out the $6ooo compromise with reasonably generous
provisions for excluding essential property and savings,64 and the bill shot through
both chambers 5 with remarkably little dissent.6" In signing the bill, Governor
Rockefeller called it "the most significant social legislation in three decades."6 7
It was only after the bill had passed that the fireworks began. The eligibility stan-
dards s came under vigorous attack. It was appreciated, by many for the first time,
that some 8,oooooo people, or forty-five per cent of the population of the state, would
"1 On the New York experience, see id. at 49; Furor Over Medicaid, 3 COLTUM. J. LAw & SoC. PRoB. 158
(1967); R. B. Titus, New York's Medicaid: A Study of the Development of a State Title XIX Program-
Its Problems and Prospects, 1968 (paper presented at Yale University Law School on file with the
authors). The authors acknowledge their debt, especially to the last of these, in their description of the
early stages of Medicaid in New York.
"
2 M. GREENFIELD, MED-CAL: THE CALIFORNIA MEDICAiD PROGRAM (TITLE XIX) (1969) [herein-
after cited as MEni-CAL]; A. C. B ANEs, A Dascsus'oN OF THE ORGANIzAKFoN AND ADmINIjmSAON or
THE CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: TITLE XIX (1968) [hereinafter cited as BARNEs].
' N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, x966, at 26, col. 3; id., Mar. 29, 1966, at 27, col. I. Republican legislators
alleged that Travia was the "tool" of Senator Robert Kennedy in these proposals and that the package
was "designed to steal Republican thunder." id., Mar. 30, 1966, at 48, col. I.
:'Details of these are set out by Werne, supra note 6o, at 53-56.
' t passed the Assembly 136-15 and the Senate 64-1. See N.Y. Soc. WELFm LAW § 363 el seq.
(McKinney 1966).
66 Commenting that few legislators appreciated the scope of the program, one Senator later com-
mented: "And it's a damn good thing ... because they would never have voted for it if they had."
N.Y. Times, May 21, 1966, at 14, col. 6. For what legislators had thought they were voting for, see
New Worry for Medicare, U.S. NEws & WoaL REPORT, June 20, 1966, at 54.
:7 N.Y. Times, May I, 1966, at I, col. 2.
'
0N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 366 (McKinney 1966). Annual Net Income Allowable:
Number of Persons No Wage One Wage Two Wage
in Househ old Earner Earner Earners
I $2300 $2900 S--
2 3250 4000 4850
3 4350 5200 6o5o
4 5150 6ooo 685o
5 6000 685o 7700
6 6850 7700 8550
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now be eligible for Medicaid.69 Governor Rockefeller, in a statement which tells
much about medical care in America, vainly protested that experience showed that
only twenty-five per cent of potential participants signed up for public assistance
medical programs."0 He also argued that, despite the increase in eligibility, the
new program would actually save money for the state and local authorities.71 The
Governor appeared on television in a vain effort to quell the rising hostility,72 most
of it from upper New York State, where average incomes were lower than in and
around New York City. It was claimed that in some up-state counties seventy per
cent of the population would be eligible for Medicaid, a prospect which offended
local authorities, who at that time were required to provide a quarter of the cost,
and local physician groups, who saw the possible evisceration of their practices.
Farmers' groups, employers' lobbies, and medical groups73 (although not the state
medical society)74 lobbied for repeal. In an unusual move, the legislature held post-
passage joint hearings to allow the hostility to be aired, but the only important legis-
lative change to come out of the hearings was a limited one per cent of earnings
deductible for those families earning more than $45oo.Y' The Governor was still
being heckled about Medicaid in his campaigning for re-election up-state,7" but by then
the program was ready to be implemented.
" Comparable figures of potential coverage were: California 13%, Connecticut io%, Maryland 9.7%,
Massachusetts 7%, Oklahoma 16%, Rhode Island 8%, Utah 2o%, and Washington 8%. U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND EV£LFA.RE, TiLE XIX FACT-SHEET passim (1966-1967). The median family
of 4 or 5 members had an income of $6371 in New York State in 1965. U.S. BUEAu OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. STATiSTCAL ABSnACr: 1966, at 338 (87th ed. 1966).
"'The estimate was roughly correct. HEW reported first year utilization of Medicaid in New York
at 2,000,000 or ii% for the entire population of the state. Other states (and Puerto Rico) had the
following first year figures: California 5% (I,ooo,ooo), Hawaii 5% (34,000), Illinois 5% (5oo,ooo),
Kentucky io% (300,000), Maryland 7.2% (26o,ooo), Michigan 4% (330,000), Minnesota 5% (72,ooo),
North Dakota 2.5% (x6,640), Oklahoma 8% (195,000), Pennsylvania 6% (583,000), Puerto Rico
50% (1,200,000), Utah 4% (40,000), and Wisconsin 6.3% (262,000). TrrLE XIX FAcT SHEET, supra
note 69, passim.
The Governor estimated the comparison as follows:
Total Federal Share State Share Local Share
(in millions of dollars)
1965 429 59 172 198
z966 532 217 I7 144
19 N.Y. STATE DEP'T HErALT WE.xLy BuLL. xi8 (July 25, 1966).
11 N.Y. Times, May x9, 1966, § L, at 49, col. 1; id., May 23, x966, at I, col. 2.
"
5E.g., the Erie County Medical Society was demanding repeal. Later the Suffolk County Medical
Society labelled Medicaid "socialized medicine," designed "to deprive physicians of their constitutional
rights to practice medicine in a free society." N.Y. Times, June 4, 1966, at i, col. 2; id., June 5,
1966, at 66, col. 3.
" The State Medical Society was in a difficult position. The AMA was committed to an extension
of "welfare medicine" rather than Medicare, and the State Society had in fact supported higher eligibility
standards in earlier years. As it was, at the State House of Delegates' meeting in May, the resolutions
were limited to those aimed at ensuring strong physician control over the program. 22 N.Y. M.D. 384
(x966).7 5 N.Y. Times, July 2, 1966, at x, col. 6, and at 7, col. 5; Werne, supra note 6o, at 57-58. Speaker
Travia had used various procedural devices in an attempt to block the amendments. N.Y. Times,
June 30, 1966, at 19, col. i.
W N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1966, at 24, col. I.
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First, however, HEW had to approve the New York plan, and so opponents had
further opportunity to intervene. Litigation, alleging abuse of administrative power
by establishing unreasonable standards, failed in the New York courts.77 But this
time there were various New York groups attempting to persuade HEW not to
approve the plan, including the Citizens Committee for Responsible Government and
the Association of New York State Physicians and Dentists.7 Eight state legislators
from Erie and Niagara counties formally asked HEW to disapprove the plan, and
soon Congressman Stratton from Rochester was organizing the opposition in Wash-
ington.79
At the same time, the Governor and his advisers were communing with HEW,
although the Department was by then showing some reluctance to move since
Congress had become increasingly concerned about the cost of title XIX. On
Capitol Hill, Senator Saltonstall took the same line that some of the New York
legislators had espoused:
There was little discussion of tide i9; which certainly has proved to be the "sleeper"
in the bill. I am certain no one dreamed that within the next five years, "medicaid"
as the program established by that title is called, could come to dwarf medicare.80
Meanwhile, the architect of tide XIX, Chairman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways
and Means Committee, was holding closed hearings. HEW was in a difficult posi-
tion. There was no legal reason why they should not approve the New York plan,
yet that plan alone would use up almost all the money which, one year earlier, had
been estimated as the total federal cost of tide XIX. 1 Before the Committee, Robert
Myers, Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration, was blunt about the
potential fiscal situation:
It seems quite likely that under "mature" conditions, with full utilization of the
provisions by those eligible to do so, and with expansion of the provisions of many
of the State plans ... so that they become much more like the New York plan,
"' Robinson v. Wyman, 51 Misc. 2d 480, 273 N.Y.S.2d 450 (S. Ct. x966). The petitioner alleged
that he stood "aggrieved by the administrative act, not only as a general taxpaying citizen of New York
State, but also as a man who runs his own business in this state; that if this program is allowed, a
tremendous tax burden will be placed on both individuals and businesses in New York State and your
petitioner frankly believes said burden, as hereinafter set forth, will force him to move his business
elsewhere." 5x Misc. 2d at 48o-81, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 451. Justice Koreman held that the petitioner
lacked standing.
"Furor Over Medicaid, supra note 61, at 165-66.
" N.Y. Times, June 24, I966, at 7, col. 8.
so 112 CONG. REC. 20,267 (1966) (remarks of Senator Saltonstall).8 When Mills had proposed his tripartite solution for medical care, HEW had estimated that title XIX
would "increase the Federal Government's contribution about $200 million in a full year of operation
over that in the programs operated under existing law"--that is, approximately $95o million per annum.
S. REP. No. 404, 89 th Cong., ist Sess. xx (x965). Even by August x966, with only 22 programs projected,
the estimates had been revised upward to $1.3 billion. See Soc. SEC. BUtLL., July x966, at 5; Id.,
Aug. 1966, at 2. The various cost estimates for the 17 programs actually in existence in August 1966
appear in 112 CoNG. REC. 2o,268 (x966). The implications of these estimates are discussed at length
at pp. 378-80 infra.
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the Federal cost for Title XIX as it now exists would be as much as $3 billion per
year (or even more). 82
The committee report noted that "while most of the State plans raise no question
at this time, a few go well beyond what your committee believes to have been
the intent of the Congress."' 3 The mood was set for continuing Congressional
watchfulness of Medicaid in the states. Increasingly Medicaid was to be regarded
not as one component of state welfare programs but as a substantial national com-
mitment of funds for medical services.
While consideration of the New York plan continued in the executive branch,
the legislature sought ways to tame the financial ogre with which it now saw itself
faced. Senator Javits suggested more flexibility in deductions for services under
Medicaid, variations in the type of services offered to different groups within Med-
icaid, and variations in eligibility standards in different parts of a state0s While Javits
was essentially seeking to save the New York legislation, the Ways and Means
Committee was working on long-term solutions to control the federal costs of Med-
icaid. After considering abolishing the "open-ended" funding of title XIX by
putting a ceiling on the federal contribution, fixing a maximum percentage of the
population which might be covered in any one state, 5 and fixing a standard for
"medical indigency" beyond which states could not go, 6 the committee finally came
down in favor of cutting back certain groups which might be covered-in particular
those relatives with whom children were living who were not already receiving cash
payments under AFDC.sr Ultimately, however, in the shadow of impending elec-
tions, it was decided to delay changes in title XIX until the Ninetieth Congress; and
on November 15, 1966,8s HEW formally approved the New York program, with
the expectation that the federal government would meet the first $217 million out
of a total annual cost of $532 million (including services not covered by federal
matching provisions)."
" HOUSE VAYs AND MEANS COMmriTEE, LIMITAnONS ON FEDERAL PARnCIPATION UNDER TITLE XIX
OP ThE SOCiAL SEcuiUTY Act, H.R. RP. No. 2224, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as HOUSE REPORT].
" Id. The total cost (federal, state, and local) if all states adopted a New York type plan was
estimated at $6.4 billion annually. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, I966, at 23, col. I.
", Office of Senator Javits, Press Release, June x6, 1966. Some of the amendments appeared in S. 3513.
"
5 This was similar to Congressman Stratton's solution. N.Y. Times, June 24, 1966, at 30, col. I.
" Id., Sept. 8, x966, at 27, col. '.
" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 82, at 3-6. This would have called for the addition of the words "if
money payments with respect to such child are being made under the state plan approved under Title
IV, or if such money payments would upon application be made. ... to § 1905(a)(ii). The House
Report also called for a right to "buy in" to XVIII-B selectively, a weakening of the comparability pro-
visions, a relaxation of "state effort," and increased matching for administration-all provisions destined
to appear in the 1967 amendments. The change would have cost New York between $2o million-$25
million a year in federal funds. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, x966, at 20, col. 5.
"
8 N.Y. Times, Nov. x6, 1966, at 56, col. i. In theory HEW had violated the law by waiting more
than 9o days to approve the plan.
s However, the federal government refused to pay for expenses before March 31, i966, despite
alleged earlier representations that it would. Id., Jan. 7, 1967, at 29, col. x.
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But approval was only the beginning of other types of problems. The New York
program ran into criticisms from a variety of sources and at a variety of levels as
implementation proceeded. The health professions were dissatisfied with their
conditions. Dentists, who were paid on a fee schedule, protested that (in the words
of the Eighth District Dental Society), "Fee schedules will be determined by men
who sit behind desks who have not been in practice and have no clinical experi-
ence."90 Physicians in New York City opposed a recommendation by the state that
there should be a penalty clause for physicians who abused the plan as being "un-
duly punitive and arbitrary."'" Pharmacists refused to comply with a New York
City order that they substitute cheaper generic drugs for brand names.0 2 A citizen's
committee accused the New York City Welfare Department of "gross negligence"
in its administration of the program, and cited its "incomprehensible forms, un-
necessary red tape and confused administration. '9 3 Meanwhile, especially in upstate
New York, there was growing pressure to curb the spiraling costs of the program,
particularly by limiting the number of non-welfare recipients.9 4 Medicaid was
already beginning to appear to be a program which gave the poor services at vast
and uncontrollable cost and which, at the taxpayers' expense, made the doctors rich.
Moreover in the very same month that HEW approved the New York program-
November 1966-a new political crisis broke in Medicaid in the state which had the
second largest program, California. The idea of Medicaid was viewed by the state
administration in California not so much as one of extending the number of people
covered as one of liberalizing the type of care available to recipients. 5 An act to
:0 Dr. Joseph D. Giovino, AMA News, Jan. 2, 1967.
'
1 AMA News, Jan. 16, 1967. New York City also attempted to impose qualifications on physicans
as a condition of participation, but these were dropped following professional opposition. All practitioners
became eligible to participate. AMA News, July 3, 1967. There were also complaints by the President
of the New York State Medical Society that Medicaid "had degenerated into an extended welfare
program," presumably in contrast to the hopes of physicians that the scheme would approximate private
practice. Dr. John A. Lawler, MED. TUBUNE, June 1a, 1967. Claims processing was so far behind that
in 1967 a private corporation began to purchase Medicaid bills from physicians at 9o% of their collec-
tion value. This was stopped on the grounds that the law provided payments only to the actual vendors.
AMA News, June 19, 1967. But for later developments see notes 115 & 127 infra.
:2 MED. TIuaxm , Aug. 28, 1967.
' Much of the criticism came from the chairman, Frederick W. Richmond, honorary president of the
Urban League of Greater New York and a member of the City Commission on Human Rights. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 20, 1967, at 88, col. i.
9' Indeed, Representative Stratton of New York would have imposed cuts much more drastic than
those actually made in the 1967 amendments. His proposals would have barred federal approval for
Medicaid plans that made more than 20% of a state's residents eligible to participate, or made free medical
care available to anyone whose income was more than 9o% of the national average. Noting that the
New York program made about 40% of the population eligible, the Congressman stated, "in some
counties, including my own county of Montgomery, the figure is as high as 79 per cent." N.Y. Times,
Jan. 20, 1967, at 88, col. i.
95 While the California program covered fewer persons, it was actually costing more. Between
April and September, 1966, the New York program cost $120,749,017, while the California program
cost $226,197,342. The federal share of the programs for calendar year 1966 was expected to be $217
million and $2zo million respectively. See MEDI-CAL, supra note 62, ch. i & app. A; BMuNEs, supra
note 62, § 2.
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implement title XIX as "Medi-Cal" had been approved late in 1965, and the program
began in March 1966. There were the usual complications involved in the imple-
mentation of any federal-state program, but the first few months of the program did
not cause the storm which they provoked in New York. 6 While the range of services
was wide, the eligibility levels were relatively low; this was still a program for the
destitute, not for low-income workers07 At the financial level the initial concerns
were more closely connected with establishing better care and paying providers more
quickly than with the actual cost of the program. A comprehensive group of
services was offered to public assistance recipients, replacing previously fragmented
and incomplete programs. But in addition efforts were made to abolish the stigma
of second-class poor relief in medicine by dropping previous requirements that the
poor (including Kerr-Mills recipients) could only be cared for in county hospitals
and clinics.
California epitomized the views of those who wished to bring medical care for
the poor into the "mainstream"--that is, to treat the poor as well as the rich in
private hospitals and through private medical practice. To advance this aim Medi-
Cal introduced a system of payment to physicians according to their usual and
customary fees, instead of through the fixed fee schedules of earlier assistance pro-
grams. Administration was shifted from county social welfare departments to an
office of Health Care Services within the state Health and Welfare Agency, thus
emphasizing the health rather than welfare attributes of the program. At the same
time Blue Cross and Blue Shield were designated as state fiscal agents of Medi-Cal
for processing and reviewing claims. Taken together these moves represented a
significant shift in emphasis, away from a minimal direct-service welfare system
to a system more like private health insurance.
It was expected in the debates over Medi-Cal in the legislature that the sub-
stantial additional costs of the program-the amount of vendor payments per capita
nearly tripled between 1965 and 19 67 9s--would be largely absorbed through
additional federal matching funds. But in November 1966, after the election of
Governor Reagan but before his inauguration, the Administrator of the Health and
Welfare Agency announced that Medi-Cal was running out of money and that either
the legislature would have to vote more funds or benefits would have to be reduced
" See MEnI-CAL, supra note 62, chs. 3-7; BARNEs, supra note 62, §§ 3-7.
" Eligibility for service in California was limited until January x, 1967, to persons considered needy
or medically needy under state programs in effect as of December 1965. The initial thrust of the pro-
gram was a considerable expansion of services to those eligible, stressing comprehensive health benefits
and continuity of care. As of September 1967 the per-month subsistence amounts for medical indigency
were fixed at $289 for two persons, plus $26 for each additional person in the immediate family. But
even this per-year total of $4092 for a family of four was low compared with New York's initial means
test of $6ooo. See Maf=.CA., supra note 62, at 17-18, 31.
" Taking total vendor medical payments divided by the population of the state, per capita payments
rose from $1o.69 in x965 to $29.44 in 1967. TAx FouaNArso, INC., MEnscAm: STm PaoRahass AFtm
Two YFaAs 70 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Manscxan].
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before the end of the fiscal year. 9 By the spring of 1967, with bills for services coming
in slowly, it was estimated that in the first sixteen months of the program the state
would be "in the red" to the amount of $130 million, with a further deficit of $8o
million for the following fiscal year.1°0
It was in this atmosphere that Governor Reagan delivered a televised "Report
to the People" on July io, 1967, arguing that the program was likely to increase in
cost fifty per cent each year and that "something must be done before this ill-
conceived program bankrupts the state." The premature release of the information
caught the program administrators by surprise and had the effect of legitimating the
amount of the projected budget deficit, and of providing ammunition for the
Governor's office to castigate the profligacy of the previous Democratic administration.
In fact, both the estimate and the multiplier proved to be inaccurate, but they had
become political facts of life.1°1
In California, staff work on possible cutbacks in the Medicaid program began in
the summer of 1967. More than forty per cent of the estimated program expenditures
were on behalf of 2ooooo persons classified as medically needy, but a substantial
minority of these were old and disabled persons in nursing homes whose benefits
could not be cut off without a resulting public outcry.'0 2 Instead of reducing the
number of beneficiaries, the staff recommended the reduction of available services,
from the relatively comprehensive benefits then available to the five basic services then
required under the federal legislation (inpatient care, nursing home care, physician ser-
vices, laboratory services, and outpatient clinic services). In addition, other savings
were suggested, including a rollback in physician fees to the level of "usual and cus-
tomary fees" prevailing as of January i, 1967. These cutbacks were announced in
August 1967 and received widespread public attention. They were immediately
deplored by an effective alliance between professional organizations in the health field
and representatives of poverty groups in the state.
This opposition was crystallized in a restraining order obtained the same month by
California Rural Legal Assistance (a legal services program funded by the Office of
Economic Opportunity) temporarily blocking the cutbacks. Attorneys representing
medical, dental, and pharmaceutical groups appeared as amicii curiae. Despite claims
from the state that it would lose $5 million a day if reduction in service were not
" The reasons given to Governor-elect Reagan were the nursing profession's demand for higher
salaries and an unanticipated increase in the number of elderly and disabled persons receiving nursing
home benefits. MEan-CAl, supra note 6a, at 53.
... Half of this would be from state funds. BARNEs, supra note 62, at 127-28.
... There were a byzantine series of announcements as to the extent of the deficit which would be
carried over into the state budget for 1967-68. One problem involved the use of accrual accounting
in recording expenditures, i.e., including all outstanding but unpaid obligations rather than utilizing
a straight month-by-month outflow method. The higher figures were ascertained by use of the former
method. Eventually, the estimate was reduced to $35.5 million in terms of payments from the California
General Fund. But the action was too late to stem the political action which followed in the state. The
history of the deficit and subsequent reactions to it are presented in MEui-CAL, supra note 62, at 53-60;
BARNEs, supra note 62, at 125-47.
... BARN S, supra note 62, at 131.
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made, the Superior Court in Sacramento made the order permanent. The state
appealed the case, but lost its appeal in November x967, the California Supreme Court
ruling that the Health and Welfare Agency had authority to reduce the program
but that the manner in which the reductions were made was ultra vires the 1965
and 1967 Medi-Cal laws, the latter requiring either elimination of medically needy
beneficiaries or a proportional reduction of all services as opposed to elimination of
particular services."' 3 Governor Reagan immediately put the question of Medi-Cal
before the legislature, then meeting in special session, and warned that he would be
forced to remove benefits from the medically needy unless the projected cutbacks
could be made; the supposed deficit for 1967-68 was then claimed by the Reagan
Administration to be $71 million.104 As the months went by, however, the fiscal
situation changed significantly. By the spring of 1968, the deficit had not only dis-
appeared; a surplus of $31 million was allowed for carryover into i968-69.1°5 But that
announcement coincided with the signing of the 1967 Social Security Amendments
in Washington; Congress had acted.'0
C. The Social Security Amendments of 1967
Hearings on the 1967 Social Security amendments had begun before the House
Ways and Means Committee on March i, with proposals by Secretary Gardner. As it
happened, Medicaid was overshadowed both by legislative changes in the OASDHI
program and, in political terms, by the House-inserted amendments about the "man-
datory work provisions" and the AFDC "freeze" in the nonmedical parts of the
public assistance program. Behind the scenes there was no doubt political bargain-
ing. Secretary Gardner was known to be anxious that title XIX be treated as a
"'
5 Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d 697, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967). See especially
Justice Sullivan's comments:
"Our function is to inquire into the legality of the regulations, not their wisdom. Nor do we
superimpose upon the Agency any policy judgments of our own....
[W]e have concluded that the regulations under review are violative of the pertinent law in
two major respects: (i) by restricting physicians' services for recipients of public assistance without
eliminating the medically indigent from the Medi-Cal program; and (2) by eliminating certain
services entirely in the absence of a showing that proportionate reductions were not feasible to
some extent."
Id. at 737, 433 P.2d at 70o, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 692.4MEn-CAL, supra note 62, at 59; B AEs, supra note 62, at 144 and passim.
105 BARNES, supra note 62, at 147. The story is chronicled in detail in id. chs. 8 ("The Case of the
Disappearing Deficit") and 9 ("The Sound and Fury").
"" While income eligibility levels were reduced in California, major cutbacks in service were not
made. The California program remains relatively comprehensive in services, while continuing to have
relatively low eligibility limits. The maximum income allowable for a single person in 1967 was $2028;
it was $3900 for a family of four (including liquid assets). The present basic income scale is $1944 for
a single person and $3792 for a family of four. Besides the basic services, California includes services
such as those of chiropractors, podiatrists, and optometrists, home health services, special duty nursing,
rehabilitation center services, dentistry, physical therapy and other therapeutic services, drugs, eyeglasses,
and other appliances. MEDICAID, supra note 98, at 62; Medical Services Administration, Social and
Rehabilitation Service, Selected Characteristics of the Medical Assistance Program Under Title XIX of
the Social Security Act, June io, 1969 (mimeo. rev.)
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health care program, while Chairman Mills saw the legislation very much as part of
the welfare program 0 7 The Ways and Means Committee, moreover, was on record
as saying that it had never been intended that the federal government should sub.
sidize the medical care "of the considerable portion of the adult working popula-
"3108tion.
HEW compromised by coming to the Congress with a bill (H.R. 5710) which
would have limited federal sharing under tide XIX to those whose income was no
more than fifty per cent higher than the categorical assistance maxima in the state.
In addition, the bill would have allowed states to buy into title XVIII, part B, not
only for those who were receiving cash benefits under public assistance but also for
those who were "medically indigent." Moreover, services provided by such "buying
in" procedure were exempted from the "comparability" provisions of the 1965 legis-
lation in the hope that not requiring the states to include the same services for
recipients under age 65 as were available to aged recipients would encourage buying
in. In addition, the HEW bill would have increased the scope of the federal
seventy-five per cent administrative sharing arrangement, at the same time covering
agencies other than the one directing the program. The proposed bill would also
have established the free choice of physicians, created a Medical Assistance Advisory
Council, and set up certain new programs for children under twenty-one, at the same
time linking the program more clearly with title V (Maternal and Child Welfare).
The House hearings took their predictable directions.' 0" The limitations on
federal participation in tide XIX (section 220) were supported by groups including the
American Life Convention and Life Insurance Association (who would have pre-
ferred dollar limits on federal participation), Blue Cross, Blue Shield, various cham-
bers of commerce, the International Association of Health Underwriters, the National
Association of Life Underwriters, various medical groups, and, once again, Repre-
sentative Stratton (who thought H.R. 571o did not go far enough). The federal
cutback was opposed-predictably enough-by the AFL-CIO, the Community Coun-
cil of Greater New York, the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union,
the National Association of Social Workers, the National Urban League, the
Physicians Forum, and the United Auto Workers.
But when all the rhetoric was done, the Committee decided to produce its own
"clean" bill (H.R. 12080), and, at least with respect to federal funding of title XIX,
the new bill was more restrictive than the administration one. It limited federal
participation in medical indigence categories to payments on the behalf of individuals
""
7 For a general background to the legislation, see WELFARE IN REVIEW, May-Junc 1968, at 1. For
detailed comparisons with the earlier law, together with statistics, see SENATE CoM . oi FINANCE, 90TfI
CoNG., 2D SEss., Th SocIAL SEcurTy AMENDMENT OF 19 6 7-PtmLIc LAW 248, goT CONGRESS: BRIEF
StMARY OF PROVISIONS AND DETAILED COMPARIsoN wITH PRIOR LAw (Comm. Print 1968).
108 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SOcIAL SEcuRuTY AMENDMENTS OF x967, H.R. REP. No. 544,
goth Cong., ist Sess. iI8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as AMNDMENTS OF 1967].
10" Hearings on H.R. 571o Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, goth Cong., ist Sess.
(x967).
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and families whose income was no more than 133% per cent of the highest
amount of cash assistance ordinarily paid to a family of the same size on AFDC."0
In other respects the Committee generally followed the administration bill, except
that states were given the right to pay recipients directly (or at least those not
receiving cash under a categorical program) who would then pay providers, rather
than paying the providers directly, and states were also put under pressure to collect
fees on the behalf of any Medicaid patient who was legally entitled to recover from
another (as in an accident)."' The states were also partially relieved of their
obligation not to use the new federal money merely to replace other state effort in
the field of medical care ("State effort"). The new section 221 allowed other pay-
ments to be taken into account so that, in the words of the Committee report, "no
State is penalized for limiting its medical assistance program to what it conceives
to be sound and proper levels."'1 2 Finally, instead of having to provide five basic
services under the program, states were given the alternative either of including those
five or any seven out of the fourteen which the 1965 legislation had enumerated as
approved for federal matching.
The House bill, introduced, as is traditional with Social Security bills, under
a closed rule, passed in mid-August, and the Senate began hearings at the end of
the month. Secretary Gardner attacked the House's limitation on federal participation
("We believe it to be too constrictive a definition of medical indigence""'), and the
cry was taken up in Undersecretary Wilbur Cohen's detailed evidence." 4 While the
inaccurate projections for Medicaid made in 1965 and 1966 hindered the presentation,
Cohen stressed that the House restrictions would be likely to force a cutback in
fourteen of the thirty-five states which had Medicaid programs." 5 To a very large
extent the testimony before the Senate Finance Committee was similar to that before
Ways and Means. The AMA testimony was sympathetic to title XIX,"8 while a
Medicaid lobby appeared to protest section 220117 and New York's Commissioner of
10 AaiENDmENTS OF 1967, supra note zoS, at iig. This was for states beginning Medicaid programs.
For those states with a program already in existence, the proportion would be 150% until December 31,
1968, and 140% until December 31, x969. The 1333% limitation would apply thereafter.
""Id. at 123-24. For the general Committee position, see id. at 18: "Your Committee expected
that the State plans submitted under title XIX would afford better medical care and services to persons
unable to pay for adequate care. It neither expected nor intended that such care would supplant health
insurance presently carried or presently provided under collective bargaining agreements for individuals
and families in or close to an average income range."
... Id. at 119.
" Hearings on HR. Xzo8o Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, goth Cong., ISt Sess. 217 (967)
[hereinafter cited as z967 Hearings].
"/'Id. at 274-82.
"
1 Id. at 279-80. "The House limitation will destroy the concept of medical indigence in a number
of States."
... Id. at 755. "We recommend, therefore, that any income limit placed on eligibility for title XIX
benefits should not be so rigid as to exclude those who are dearly unable to pay for needed health care,
especially those whose need is such that they are already receiving cash assistance ....
11 Id. at 1591-92. The Chairman of the Citizens' Committee for Medicaid stated that Congress
should "make no mistake, if H.R. 12080 passes in its present form, it will strike hardest at those
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Social Services argued that all his state was doing was attempting to meet the
"comprehensive services" requirement." 8
As reported out," 9 the Finance Committee restored the i5o-per-cent-of-AFDC-
payments formula to the bill. At the same time the Senate proposed altering the
variable grant formula, by keeping the fifty to eighty-three per cent share with respect
to those covered by categorical programs of public assistance but having a variable
grant of twenty-five to sixty-nine per cent for the medically needy.120 There were
other important changes. The new bill called for licensing of those nursing
homes in which Medicaid patients were living, as well as the licensing of nursing
home administrators. The Finance Committee accepted the House alternative of
any seven out of fourteen of the allowable services under section 1902(a) for the
medically indigent, but it required states to continue to provide the five basic
services for those receiving cash payments through public assistance. Home health
services were also added as a mandatory service for certain groups by 197o as were
"early and periodic screening and diagnosis" of those under twenty-one.' 2 ' It was
made clear that deductibles could be imposed at least for the medically indigent, 12
and the authority of the General Accounting Office to hold spot checks was under-
lined. Dentists were added to the direct-payment-to-recipients provision.12 And in
one important respect the scope of the program was expanded, by adding a new
category of possible beneficiary-the "essential person" defined as "the spouse of a
cash public assistance recipient who is living with him, who is essential or necessary
to his welfare, and whose needs are taken into account in determining the amount
of his cash benefit."'"4 Elsewhere in the bill, the Senate restored the administration's
proposal for federal matching funding for "intermediate care facilities," which would
handle those persons who were not able to live at home but did not need the
services of a hospital or a skilled nursing home.'
families who have managed to pull themselves up from the lower depths of poverty, who are just
beginning to see daylight and learning to become productive members of society. . . . We cannot
rationalize the anguish of the medically needy with the unrealistic formula of H.R. 12080."
118 Id. at 1547. George K. Wyman stated, "In fact New York is the only State which has met the
,975 deadline established by Congress in title XIX which requires all States by that time to have provided
comprehensive medical care for all needy persons."
"I The revised version of H.R. 12080 is Calendar No. 728. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, SoCIAL
SEcuIr= AENmEN sars OF 1967, S. Rr. No. 744, 9oth Cong., Ist Sess. 32-36, 175-90 (1967).
12' This suggestion was made by Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. He re-
introduced the proposal the following year. See note 199 infra.
2I SENATE COMM. oN FINANCE AND HousE CoMM. ON VAtS AND MEANS, 90TH CONo., IST SESS.,
SummARY OF SOCIAL SEcuiTY AmENDMENTS OF 1967, at 23 (Comm. Print 1967).
122 Id.
28 id.
12 1 Id. There was at least one other expansionist aspect of the 1967 legislation. The "earned income
disregard" incorporated into the AFDC program increased the number of persons eligible for cash pro-
grams and thus for title XIX.
"' This eventually became § 1121, part of title XI, the "General Provisions" title of the Social
Security legislation. The Conference Committee, however, dearly saw the section as basically part of
Medicaid. Id. at 22. "There is no Federal vendor-payment matching for people who need institutional
care in the intermediate range between that which is provided in a boarding house (for which eligible
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The Senate debates were dramatic, but more because of the increases in Social
Security and what many regarded as the repressive changes in AFDC;.2 and only
one important change was made in the Committee bill with respect to Medicaid,
the amendment by Senator Ribicoff requiring state plans to provide utilization
review procedures..' 7 The bill finally passed on November 22 and went to con-
ference. With the exception of the federal financial provision, where the House
formula for matching grants was adopted, the Senate version of the bill generally
prevailed. The House easily accepted the Conference bill. Because of the AFDC
provisions there was thought to be a possibility it might not pass the Senate, but it
did in December and was signed by the President in January 1968.'2s The first stage
of the history of Medicaid was complete.
Of twenty-three states providing care to the medically needy, eleven cut back
or adjusted their income eligibility levels following the 1967 amendments; these
included California and New York.129 Governors of nine states whose eligibility
levels were cut back, and twenty-five without cutbacks were polled in the summer
of 1968. Six of the former and nineteen of the latter considered the cutbacks de-
sirable, on such grounds as that the limits were realistic and reasonable, that the
limits would force states to raise public assistance levels, and that this would keep
the wealthier states from taking an undue share of available federal money33
The dilemmas of Medicaid were evident; they revolved around the continuing
question of whether Medicaid was primarily a welfare program or primarily one
for medical care. As a service program attached to a system of cash assistance
benefits, Medicaid lacked the financial controls of other aspects of public assistance.
As a system of public purchase of services in the private medical sector, Medicaid
had little or no authority over medical care providers. The administrative structure
of the program assumed that Medicaid could be viewed as one more categorical
assistance program; the role of HEW was therefore limited, with major devolution
persons may receive a money payment under the money payment programs), and those who need the
comprehensive services of skilled nursing homes ..... This provision should result in a reduction in the
cost of title XIX by allowing States to relocate substantial numbers of welfare recipients who are now
in skilled nursing homes in lower cost institutions." The cost of ICFs, however, is not included in the
Medicaid budget.
I" STATUTORY IhTORY OF Tm UNIrED STATEs, supra note 7, at 823 et seq.; 23 CONORESSIONAL
QtUARTER.Y SERVICE, CONGRESSbONAL. QUARTERLY ALMANAC 9o9-i6 (1967).127 WELFA E IN REvIEw, May-June 1968, at 16.
118 Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 8i Stat. 82X.
"'The 1967 legislation encouraged cutbacks to 150% of the top AFDC level by July 3, x968;
to 14o% by January 1, 1969; and to the final 133%% by January z, i97o . It was still possible, of
course, for states to go beyond these limits, but only if the financing was exclusively from state funds,
a generally difficult hurdle to clear. The result was that eight states felt obliged to come down to the
150% level (California, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and
Rhode Island) although, in effect, Pennsylvania avoided the cutback by raising its maximum AFDC
payment levels. Two other states (Connecticut and Illinois) imposed cutbacks by January 1969. One state
with a new program (Iowa) imposed a cutback to reach the i33 level by July 1968. ADvIsoRY Com-
SSION oN INTR ovamErAL RELATIONS, INTERCOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAID 33-34 (1968).
'"Id. at 34-35.
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of programs to the states. Instead, then, of a unified national policy toward Medicaid
from the executive, the growing budgetary problems in the states ricocheted back
to the Congress. Powerful spokesmen such as Representative Mills, Senators Russell
Long, Jacob Javits, and Clinton Anderson brought the experiences in their own
states back for committee consideration in the House and the Senate. The 1967
amendments tied the means-test levels for medical indigence to other public assistance
means tests in the states. Medical indigence was thereby restrictively defined, with
Medicaid eligibility more firmly linked than before to the operation of other public
assistance tides. Nor were Medicaid's other problems eased. They were problems
not of any one organization's making; rather, they were inherent in the system itself.
They were expressed in terms of Medicaid's spiralling and uncontrollable costs, but
they were at root problems of goals, authority, and administration.
III
CosTs AND FINANCING
A. Rising Medical Care Costs
From its beginning, as has been seen, the Medicaid program was bedeviled by
problems of costs and expenditures. The 1967 amendments attempted to provide
cost brakes by tying state Medicaid eligibility requirements, for the purposes of federal
cost-sharing, to AFDC income levels. In theory, too, the newly-invented category of
intermediate care facilities was expected to remove part of nursing home expenditures
from Medicaid. All else being equal, a reduction in the total costs of Medicaid
might have been expected. Yet the rapidly rising costs of medical care and
Medicaid's acceptance of reimbursement mechanisms which were tied into these
rising costs-an essential feature of the public-private mix-contributed to continuing
increases in Medicaid expenditures. The patterns and pressures were similar to those
experienced under Kerr-Mills.
Legislators and their staffs at all levels of government were unprepared for
Medicaid's fiscal impact. In January 1967, before the passage of the restrictive Social
Security Amendments, the President's budget predicted total federal and state
vendor medical payments of $2.28 billion in fiscal 1968, with forty-eight states par-
ticipating. The actual expenditures for that year, with only thirty-seven states having
operating programs, were $3.54 billion. For fiscal 1970, the estimated expenditures
are $5.5 billion, of which the federal share is $2.8 billion.181 Between 1965 and 1970
federal expenditures for vendor medical payments will have had a five-fold in-
crease, with similar increases in the states. And there is no sign of any lessening of
the cost acceleration.
The difficulty of making accurate cost estimates for the federal share under
-x STAFF OF SENATE COmm. oN FINANCE, gisr CONG., xST SESS., MEDICARE AND) MEICAIm: PROBLE11s,
IssuEs, AND ALTEINATXvES 4, 42 (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 STAFF REPORT].
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Medicaid has been a focus for sharp criticism in Congressional hearings. According
to the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration, Robert J. Myers, the
initial additional cost for Medicaid for noninstitutionalized recipients was estimated
as $238 million in the first full year of operation, calendar year 1966. This figure,
however, reportedly excluded the costs of patients in institutions, who were to form
an important group for Medicaid payments, as well as the new Medicaid category
of medically indigent children-the so-called Ribicoff Amendment added during
the passage of the 1965 act. Altogether it was estimated that additional costs would
be $353 million, added on to the previous medical vendor payments through the
categorical assistance and MAA programs (an estimated $678 million); the total cost
would thus be over $I billion.' 32 These total costs were important because Medicaid
involved substantial shifts of money among the previous categories. As states moved
into title XIX their vendor payments under OAA, MAA, AB, APTD, and AFDC
were absorbed into the states' medical assistance (MA) programs. In the month of
December 1969, for example, forty-five jurisdictions were receiving payments under
title XIX (a total of $34z. 8 million in that month), and another nine were still
working through previous arrangements (a total of $17.7 million), x3  Not sur-
prisingly, there was confusion as to what, then, were the costs of "Medicaid."
This was reflected in questions by Senator John Williams to Undersecretary Wilbur
Cohen in the Finance Committee hearings on the 1967 amendments:
Your first estimate on the cost of Title XIX was $238 million, if I understand it
correctly. Then you were going before the committee a year ago and were shocked
to find it was going to cost around $2 billion .... Now, what is the estimated
cost of this Tide XIX as it stands, about $3 billion or more, is it not?134
Although Undersecretary Cohen reiterated the explanation of the partial and addi-
tional nature of the $238 million, the initial obfuscation has hindered all later HEW
attempts to explain the early estimates.
There remained, in any event, the basic fact that the total federal share of medical
vendor payments had still been consistently underestimated, and this was a critical
factor in growing Congressional concern. This fact was brought out succinctly in
evidence to the Finance Committee in further hearings in 1969. The estimate for
fiscal 1969 made in December 1967 was $i.58 billion in federal funds; a month
later the estimate was enlarged by $450 million; by January 1969 it had had another
$200 million added to it; and in the revised budget three months later another
$40 million had appeared. The resulting estimate was thus fifty per cent greater
than the initial estimate.3 5 The potentially unsatisfactory financial position was
1B R. MYERs, MEDICARE 282-85 (1970).
... U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFAmE, SocrAL AND RmHuABLITATION SERVICE, PU-muc
Assls'rANcE STATIsrncs DEcE rER ig6g, table 13 (NCSS Report A-2, 1969).
z 16Y7 Hearings, suPra note 113, at 275-76.
18 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 9st Cong., ist Sess. 6-7 (ig6g) [hereinafter cited
as z969 Hearings].
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
underlined by three reports published during 1968-one private 30 and two official. 187
The problems of cost estimation were not confined to Medicaid. Caught in the
same medical price spiral, the Medicare program, too, consistently underestimated its
fiscal needs. Little more than a year after the Medicare program started, Congress
increased Medicare taxes by some twenty-five per cent to meet unexpected hospital
cost increases under Medicare's part A. The contributory premium paid by the
elderly under Medicare's part B for physician services was also increased from the
initial $3 a month to $4 a month, and later to $5.30 a month, effective July i, i97o,
each sum being matched by concomitant increases in federal matching funds1 8
Both parts of Medicare are, however, self-limiting in that they have identifiable
contributions into national trust funds, with income matched to expenditure.
Medicaid, even with the 1967 retrenchments, continued to be relatively uncontrollable,
because its financing was open-ended. Rising expenditures meant increased pressures
on hard-pressed tax funds in the states. In the Congress, the combined and rising
expenditures of both Medicare and Medicaid focused attention on the purpose of
the latter.
In 1968 the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee-Senator Russell Long-
reintroduced his measure for reducing the federal share of Medicaid from the range
of fifty to eighty-three per cent to the range of twenty-five to sixty-nine per cent-
a measure designed to save $3io million in fiscal i969.8 With little debate-and
opposition only from Senator Case of New Jersey-the amendment was passed,
forty-four to twenty-five, as part of the so-called "Christmas Tree" Tax Reform
Bill. After passage, however, there was an outcry both from HEW and the states.
While Long argued that the states "with the connivance and cooperation [of HEW]
have found ways to make all kinds of people eligible that nobody in Congress ever
intended to make eligible," Wilbur Cohen, by then Secretary of HEW, responded
that "it is absolutely unrealistic to expect states to put up $5oo million additional this
year to keep the Medicaid program at its present level."' 4° Liberals in the Senate-
particularly those from states hardest hit by the cutback-threatened a "minibuster."'141
.
8 
MEDICAID, supra note 9 8 .
1 7 REPORT OF THE STATE-FEDEnAL TASx FORCE ON Cos'rs oF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND PuBLIC
ASSISTANCE (I968); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAID, supra note 129.
"IThe actuarial estimate of 1970 costs for Medicare part A made in 1965 was $3.1 billion; the
current estimate is $5.8 billion. The federal share of part B costs rose from $623 million in fiscal
year 1967 to an estimated $1245 million in fiscal year 1971, with equal matching from the personal
contributions of the elderly. 1970 S-rAFF REPORT, supra note 131, at 3-4.
189 $129 million from New York alone. $27.5 million would have been cut from California, $40
million from Massachusetts, $S6 million from Minnesota, and $3o.5 million from Pennsylvania. All told 23
states and the District of Columbia (but no southern states) would have been affected. Id. at 202.
1"0 AMA News, Oct. 7, z968. Long's chief complaint was that "The federal share of Medicaid is
$700 million more than they said it would be in December... That is getting pretty badly off on n
program of this size."
141 Senator Mondale called the vote a "hasty and unwise decision." For further details of his views,
see 24 CONGRESsIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CONGREssioNALi. QUARTERLY ALMANAC 633 (1968). The min-
ibuster was led by Senators Javits and Goodell of New York.
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Senator Long capitulated, and the amendment was withdrawn.14 But Medicaid's
cost problems remained.
Estimates of total public and private health expenditures for fiscal 1969 reached
$6o.3 billion. This represented additional expenditures of $i8 billion over fiscal
1966, and in total accounted for 6.7 per cent of the gross national product. In fiscal
1966, the public sector funded about twenty-two per cent of total expenditures for
medical care; three years later the proportion had risen to thirty-six per cent.1 43
Despite Medicare's contribution to financing health care for the aged, because of
accelerating prices the contribution of other public programs-notably Medicaid-
was maintained at about the same proportional level. Instead, then, of Medicaid
acting as a relatively limited backstop to a social insurance program, it appeared
to have an important and continuing financial responsibility; but the nature of the
responsibility was such that Medicaid was blamed for failures which were essentially
caused by the inadequacies of other programs.
The primary reason for rising expenditures lay in the costs of providing in-
hospital and nursing home care. Expenditures for hospital care increased by seventeen
per cent within one year to a total of $22.5 billion in fiscal 1969.144 Only part of
these increases could be attributed to expanded or better services. 145
These general cost trends had specific implications for Medicaid. Inpatient
hospital care represented 37.5 per cent of expenditures of $4.3 billion for medical
assistance in fiscal 1969, and nursing home care another 29.8 per cent, a combined
total of 67.3 per cent.146 The 1965 legislation specified that inpatient hospital care
(though not nursing home care) under Medicaid should be reimbursed on a "reason-
able cost" basis (rather than, for example, on a statewide fee schedule) 14 The
Medicare interpretation of reasonable cost, defined in regulations by the Social
Security Administration, was adopted for interim payments under title XIX. 4s
1 2 N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, i968, at I, col. 2. The only legislation relating to Medicaid which
passed in 1968 was a provision in the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 9o-364,
§ 305 et seq., 82 Stat. 273, extending the time during which states might sign up Medicaid patients
under XVIII B without losing matching funding. For details see 24 CONGRESSIONAL QUtEuLY SERVICE,
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 265 (1968).
""' U.S. DEP'T or HEALTH, EDuCATION, AND WELPARE, SoCIAL. SECURITY ADMINISTRATIoN, REsAC
AND STATISTICS NOTE (Nov. 7, 1969).
" The total cost of hospital care was reported in 1966-67 as $I6.8 billion and nursing home care
as $ .7 billion. Nursing home expenditures rose to $2.4 billion in 1968-69. These figures refer to ex-
penditures in all institutions, paid for from both private and public funds. Id.
"'A study by the Social Security Administration of the $2.x billion increase in hospital expenditures
for the elderly between fiscal years 1966 and 1968 estimated that 61% of the increase was the result
of price changes and another 7% could be attributed to population increases. This left only 32% of
the increases for changes in the provision of services. Similar cost rises could be observed for the non-
elderly population. Id. (July x6, 1969).
14 U.S. DEP'T oF HE.ALTr, F C -0io, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL AND REHAnILITATION SERVICE, MEDICAID
FscAL YEaR 1969, table i (NCSS Report B-5, 1969).
Pub. L. No. 86-97, § 19o2(a)(I3)(B), 79 Stat. 345 (1965).
SThe reasonable cost regulations were introduced in May 1966 as Principles of Reimbursement for
Provider Costs. These were adopted by the Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS) in January 1969 as
the standard for hospital reimbursement under title XIX. The objective of the principles is that the
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The arrangement greatly facilitated the accounting procedures for payment for hos-
pital services on behalf of elderly persons who were recipients of both Medicare
and Medicaid.'49 But, at the same time, reasonable cost reimbursement tied states
to the rising costs of hospital care. The total costs of hospital care for the elderly
rose from $4.17 billion in fiscal year 1967 to $6.53 billion in 1969; nursing home costs
rose from $1.52 billion to $2-.7 billion in the same period.' 0 'Similar increases were
observed for hospitalization with respect to other age groups. As hospital costs rose,
so in large part did Medicaid reimbursement rates.
There was no similar provision in the legislation that nursing home costs be
reimbursed by Medicaid on a reasonable cost basis. Apart from hospitals, suppliers
of services were to be reimbursed according to state policies, which were to "provide
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that . . . such care and services will
be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of administration and the best
interests of the recipients."'' This principle was elaborated in the requirements for
a state plan of medical assistance in terms which defined the "best interests of the
recipients" as receipt of medical care and services included in the plan "at least
to the extent these are available to the general population."'"2 California was one
state which interpreted the intent of Medicaid as being to provide services to the
poor on the same basis as services were provided to the middle-class population
through the private sector-a stand which argued for payment of services through
public program pays all allowable costs with respect to an individual patient, and that no part of the
individual's allowable cost is subsidized by, or is subsidizing others. Methods of apportioning allowable
costs under the Medicare regulations include (z) Departmental Method-Ratio of Charges to Costs (e.g.,
if X per cent of a hospital's x-ray charges are for services used by the Medicare patients, Medicare pays that
percentage of the total allowable costs of the department); and (2) Combination Method, which includes
the hospital's average daily charge for routine inpatient services, together with appropriate apportionment
of charges for special services such as x-ray, laboratory, and operating room. Besides these two methods,
a third and simpler formula was developed by SRS for Medicaid--Gross Ratio of Hospital Cost to
Hospital Charges. Under this, the total allowable annual inpatient cost of operating a hospital is divided
by the total annual charges for inpatients. The percentage which results is applied to the bill of each
inpatient covered by Medicaid. Following discussions between SRS and SSA (the administrator of
Medicare), it was agreed to limit the third method to hospitals not participating in title XVIII. All
formulae were for the determination of interim payments, with final settlement subject to audit. See
Reasonable Cost Of Inpatient Hospital Services, CCH MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE para. 14,725; Iierney,
Incentives and Hospital Cost Reimbursement, Titles XVIII and XIX, Nov. 2, 1967 (paper presented to
the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Hospital Effectiveness, Washington, D.C.). Hospitals were also
reimbursed an additional 2% of allowable costs for depreciation and other overheads; this was abolished
in 1969.
... Part A of Medicare today provides hospital sevices after an initial deductible of $52 and with
cost-sharing by the patient of $3 per day from the 61st through the 9oth day of hospitalization, with an
additional 6o days provided as a lifetime reserve with a $26 co-insurance feature. Medicaid is required
to pay the initial deductible for cash-assistance recipients, and it may pay the other hospital costs and
receive federal financial participation. An estimated 2.9 million persons 65 years of age and over
received medical assistance (but not all in hospitals) through federally-aided programs in fiscal year 1969.
MEDICAID FiscAz. YEAR x969, supra note 146, table 2; Soc. SEC. BumL., Dec. x969, at 77.
as, U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDucATnoN, AND WELFARE, Soc s. SEcuviT' ADrIINISTRATIoN, REsARcH
AD SrAvs'rscs NoYE (June 18, 1970).
"'
1 Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1902(a) (19), 79 Stat. 347 (1965).
"' SUPPLEIENT D, supra note 48, para. D-532o.
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Medicaid under similar arrangements to those made by private insurance schemes or
Medicare. This interpretation appeared to be also the original policy of the Social
and Rehabilitation Service. For institutions other than hospitals, states were advised
that fee structures should focus on payment on a reasonable cost basis, equivalent
to the reimbursement methods under part A of tide XVIII. 55 Prior to title XIX, the
usual method of vendor payment for skilled nursing home care by state welfare
departments was on the basis of negotiated fees, per diem or monthly flat rates
which were in many cases below the institutions' operating costs. In states which
shifted to reimbursement methods more nearly reflecting the costs incurred, im-
mediate increases in expenditures were observed. 54
A second factor in increasing nursing home expenditures under Medicaid was
the immediate boom in nursing home development, largely the result of private
speculation which accelerated rapidly following the passage of Medicare and
Medicaid. In Connecticut, for example, the number of beds in nursing homes
expanded from 7725 in I96I, to 11,284 in 1966, to 14,305 in 1970; applications for
another goo beds had been approved by the state Hill-Burton agency. 55 Nursing
home care appears to be particularly elastic in terms of demand; to this point,
at least, the more beds, the greater their utilization. In states such as Connecticut,
where the great majority (seventy per cent) of nursing home beds are filled with
welfare recipients, the expansion of facilities led to an unexpected increase in
the number of eligible recipients and thus to an unexpected rise in nursing home
costs; and to a greater or lesser extent this was true of all states with relatively
generous Medicaid provisions. Expenditures on nursing home care being met from
public sources (chiefly Medicare and Medicaid) more than doubled between fiscal
1966 and fiscal 1968.156 Medicaid thus became a part of the cause of the rising
costs of nursing home care as well as a victim of their implications.
1" In a later State Letter (No. Io63, Mar. 13, 1969), the Social and Rehabilitation Service stated that
this policy was not to apply to skilled nursing home care, and that provisions for the application of upper
standards of reimbursement for skilled nursing home care would be clarified when regulations governing
the standards for payment for such care were issued. These clarifications were, however, never issued.
Effective July I, 1970, the upper limits for payment for skilled nursing home services, outpatient hospital
services, and clinic services are "customary charges which are reasonable." Fee schedules are acceptable
provided they fall within the reasonable charges established for Medicare. CCH MaDCARE & MEDICA D
GumE para. 14,723.
...In Connecticut, for example, where reimbursement levels are set annually by a state Hospital
Cost Commission, skilled nursing homes were reimbursed a maximum of $1o.5o a day under title XIX
in fiscal year x967, and between $15.oo and $16.oo a day in fiscal year 197O. Personal communication
from Connecticut State Department of Welfare.
"'This expansion caused the Connecticut legislature to put controls on further construction.
Effective July 1, 197o, nursing home construction in the state is conditional upon the issuance of a cer-
tificate of need by the State Department of Health. CONN. GEaN. STAT. ANN. § 19-32 (Supp. 1970).
The rapid expansion, however, was probably already over. B. Sullivan, A Patient Origin Study of Con-
necticut Nursing Home Residents, 1970 (essay presented to the Department of Epidemiology and Public
Health, Yale University Medical School, in candidacy for the degree of Master of Public Health).
""From $604 million to $1490 million. The great majority ($5364 million) of the latter sum
represented care of the elderly. U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY
AD2WUNISTRATiON, REsEA.Itc AND STATISTICS NOTE (July i6, z969).
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The initial approximation of reimbursement methods under Medicaid to the
methods used in Medicare was not limited to institutions. The coincidence of
passage of Medicare and Medicaid in the same legislation, and a prevailing mood
in Secretary John Gardner's Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that
medical care for the poor should be provided with equal dignity and through
similar channels as the medical care of other members of the population, made
this approximation inevitable. 57 This was a question not merely of political phi-
losophy but also of encouraging effective professional participation in the program.
Fee structures, it was emphasized in 1966, should be "realistic to assure eligible
persons medical care and services in sufficient quantiies." 8 As a minimum, the
participation ratio determined separately for each profession, and for specialties
within a profession, should be approximately two-thirds of such practitioners in
the state.' 59
In terms of physician participation at least, this suggested the incorporation
into Medicaid of fees similar to those charged in private practice. As a result
there was a movement, led by state medical societies, to establish payment of
physicians on the basis of their "usual and customary fees" in the developing Med-
icaid programs. A review in 1967 found that fifteen title XIX programs had
established payment of physicians through their usual and customary charging
structure; only one of these states (Idaho) had previously paid on this basis.'
The success of this policy in encouraging physician participation was universally
commended by physician organizations. The president of the Illinois State Med-
ical Society, for example, ascribed the jump in physician involvement in Medicaid
in that state, from 3228 MI)s in 1967 to over 6ooo in 1969, to the move from the
previous pattern of closed panel "welfare physicians" to one which allowed all
physicians to participate. 61 At the same time, a commitment by states to pay the
charges as determined by physicians, with only minimal state controls, added to
the inflationary characteristics of Medicaid programs. A survey of states with
programs early in 1968 found fourteen states reporting unwillingness of physicians
or other suppliers to participate, chiefly because of inadequate fees; on the other
hand, seventeen states reported sharp rises in fees and charges, and already there
were charges of profiteering and racketeering on the part of providers. 1 2 For
reasons both of extended services and rising fees, the amount paid to physicians
It is, of course, true that even before Medicare and Medicaid a large share of nursing home beds were
occupied by welfare patients. The effect of the 1965 legislation was to increase competition for available
beds, which, coupled with a rapid rise in the standards demanded, forced welfare departments to pay
more substantial rates.
... Cf. J. GARDNER, No EASY VIcroiSus ch. io (x968).
... StPPLENT D, supra note 48, para. D-534o.
... Id. para. D-53 3o.
... The common pattern prior to title XIX was payment of welfare patients' physicians according to
negotiated fee schedules. Personal Communication, Social and Rehabilitation Service.
... AMA News, Jan. 13, 1969. See also pp. 418-T9 infra.0 MEDICAID, supra note 98, at 42.
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under medical assistance programs increased five-fold between 1965 and 1969; by
the latter year physician fees absorbed twelve per cent of expenditures of assistance
programs.16
3
While many of the additional expenditures represented extra services and
possibly extra time spent with medical assistance patients (and perhaps even less
tangible elements such as greater personal attention to welfare patients), there
was undeniable evidence that much of the benefit of the additional expenditures
was flowing into the pockets of providers-hospitals, nursing homes, physicians,
laboratories, and other participating facilities and services. The providers had,
after all, previously provided a substantial subsidy to welfare recipients. 64 Cost
increases in Medicaid between 1968 and 197o were estimated to be three times as
great as the increases in the number of persons served by the programs;' 65 a
remarkable phenomenon even taking over-all inflation into account.
It was thus in an atmosphere of concern about rising costs that the debates
over Medicaid continued after the 1967 amendments as before. Senator Long
expressed the increasing interest of the Senate Finance Committee in cost con-
trols over Medicaid and Medicare in announcing further hearings in 1969.
Medical care provided under the programs, he emphasized, should be of high
quality; "but we think it should be provided on the basis that is efficient and eco-
nomical, not on a basis which is wasteful and extravagant."' 66
B. Medicaid Budgets in the States
Medical vendor payments represented less than one third of state welfare
budgets in 1965. By 1969 medical vendor payments had risen to well over forty
per cent of the welfare budgets.6 It was reported that one out of every three
states had been forced to raise its taxes, at least in part because of Medicaid. 6 '
California, Michigan, and New York had run into fiscal difficulties even before
the end of the 1967 fiscal year. By 1968 three other states, Maryland, Nevada, and
Oklahoma, were running ahead of their budgets. Except for Nevada, categor-
... In calendar year 1965, $i21.6 million were spent on physicians' services; in fiscal year 1969, the
figure was $523.3 million. MEDICAID FIsc.AL YEAx 1969, supra note 146, table I.
... On this see p. 409 infra.
155 In 1968, Medicaid served 8.6 million people; in ig7o, an estimated io.2 million. Expenditures,
meanwhile, increased from $3.5 billion to $5.5 billion. z969 Hearings, supra note 135, at 8-9.
... Senate Committee on Finance, Press Release, June 26, 1969, included in id. at 3.
""Vendor medical payments for medical care from state funds amounted to $I.52 billion in fiscal
year 1969; total state funds for federally subsidized public assistance amounted to S3 .47 billion. Taking
all funding sources together (federal, state, and local), 9 states and Puerto Rico spent more than half
of their welfare funds on medical care. U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SoCIAL AND
RmiuABILITATIolm SERVICE, SoURcEs oF FUNDs EXPENDED FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS, tables 2, 3, 8
(NCSS Report F-i, 1969).
108 Data Presented by Staff of Senate Finance Committee. 1969 Hearings, supra note 135. The Tax
Foundation survey noted, however, that state tax increases were associated with expansions in more than
one government program. There was some evidence that Medicaid was being used as a convenient scape-
goat. MEDICAID, supra note 98, at 40.
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ical coverage in these states was quite broad. In Maryland, Michigan, and
New York, moreover, substantial proportions of the Medicaid payments were
being made for nonwelfare cases 69 The states were thus subject to a number
of pressures. First, their welfare budgets were being strained, with payments
for medical care competing and in some cases threatening to overrun funds for
direct cash assistance. Second, Medicaid was becoming unpopular politically,
especially in terms of requiring additional taxes on those lower income groups
whose own medical care was not always adequate. There thus seemed to be no
alternative to an attempt to cut back coverage and tighten payments to providers.
State retrenchments therefore joined retrenchments by the federal government.
Some sense of the impact of the 1967 amendments in the states may be
gleaned from the reactions in California and New York. California's plight during
its period of apparent deficit and service reduction had a major impact not only
on the passage of the 1967 Social Security Amendments and subsequent concern
in Washington but also on political reactions to Medicaid in other states which
in the event were not so fortunately situated. New York had similar visibility
and national importance. Taken together, in the fall of 1967 the two states
accounted for nearly half (48.5 per cent) of payments to medical vendors and for
about thirty-seven per cent of all recipients of medical assistance in the country' 70
The experiences in these two states were thus of particular importance to the
general development of Medicaid programs.
Governor Rockefeller's situation was unlike Governor Reagan's in that New
York had established what other states felt to be abnormally high eligibility
levels. The New York situation was thus one of justifying population coverage
rather than services. But again there were immediate problems of costs exceeding
budget estimates. Initial estimates stated that during fiscal 1967, the Medicaid pro-
gram would raise public assistance costs by $36 million; this was to be accom-
panied, as a bonus, by expected increased federal funding of $I14 million and a
decreased state and local share of $78 million. In fact, costs increased sharply for
all three levels of government. Original total outlays of $350 million were ex-
pected for fiscal 1967. The actual expenditures reached $461 million, and further
deficits were expected for fiscal i968'" By fiscal 1969 New York State was spending
$426 million from state funds alone; the total cost of the program (federal, state, and
local) was S.9 billion.'72
... MEDICAID, supra note 98, at 35-39.1 0 Id. at 35. Even with expanded programs in other states, New York and California continue to
dominate Medicaid. In fiscal year 1969 New York accounted for 28.1% of all medical assistance
expenditures, and California for 17.1%-a total of 45.2%. MEDICAID FISCAL YEAR 1969, stipra note 146,
chart I.
... These deficits occurred in spite of the fact that less than half of the estimated eligible population
applied for participation in the program in fiscal 1967.
.7 Sou cas OF FuNDs EXPENDED FOR PUBLIC AssIsTANCE PAYMENTS, supra note 167, table 8. Out of
this New York spent $54 million (including $4 million in state funds) on administering the program,
including determining eligibility. U.S. DEP'r oF H.Am, EDUCA7IoN, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL AND RE-
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Although Governor Rockefeller had joined Mayor Lindsay in urging that
President Johnson not sign the bill which became the 1967 Amendments, once it
was law the Governor was faced with a need to raise an extra $150 million
in connection with the different welfare changes made. No less than twenty-eight
municipalities had raised their sales tax, and nearly all sixty-two counties had
raised their property tax, virtually all alleging the "Medicaid problem." Governor
Rockefeller admitted he had been mistaken to be so enthusiastic about Medicaid
and called for cutbacks in the program in his budget message to the Legislature.
The state Senate-controlled by the Republicans-cut back the program with little
debate. In the Assembly, Speaker Travia hoped to keep the bill bottled up in
committee, but eventually a group of upstate Democrats forced him to release it,
fearing a taxpayer revolt in their constituencies. After an emotional three-hour
debate, the bill was passed, Travia declaring it a "day of infamy" when the
needy ill were sold for "a few paltry pieces of silver." Although the bill made
greater cuts than he requested, Governor Rockefeller signed the bill almost as soon
as it reached his desk-some said in the hope of obtaining conservative backing
for his Presidential campaign. The cost of the state's Medicaid program would,
it was estimated, be cut by some $300 million (although experience did not bear
this out), while the new eligibility levels-down to $5300 from $6ooo for the
family of four1.--- were expected to remove roughly a million persons from the
nearly three-and-a-half million who had by that time enrolled. Mayor Lindsay
claimed that New York City would lose $120 million a year and have to curtail
services (and he also argued that Washington and Albany had flunked the first
test posed by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders). But even
at $5300, New York's was still the most generous Medicaid program in the
nation.174
The medical care needs of the people cut off the rolls in New York City, as
elsewhere, did not of course suddenly go away. Mayor Lindsay estimated that the
eligibility cuts would mean a loss of about $8o million in state aid to municipal
and voluntary hospitals and could mean closing public health facilities?' 5 Part of
the costs were thus shifted from one public pocket to another; indeed, to help those
dropped from Medicaid, the New York City Department of Hospitals was forced
to cut its own fees in municipal outpatient departments.176 The situation thus
HAzILITATION SERVICE, PUBLIC AssisrANcE CosT OF STATE AND LOCAL AnMINIsrRATION, SERvIcEs AND
TRAINING, table 8 (NCSS Report F-3 , 1969).1 1In certain cases counties could lower eligibility still further. The new state legislation also dis-
qualified working persons between 21 and 65, except in cases of catastrophic illness where medical
cost exceeded more than 25% of a patient's annual income.
7'"For a study of the politics of reduction in New York, see M. Petrina, A Look at Medicaid, 1969
(paper on file with the authors).
"7" N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1968, at 35, col. I.
""
6 The standard fee was to be $S6, graduated down to $3 a visit for a family of four with an
income of $53oo. The department took the step reluctantly, after pressure from house staffs and from
the HEW Regional Office.
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aggravated the already perilous financial situation of the city hospital system.
With the coming of Medicaid, much of the former private subsidy of welfare
cases had been replaced by public subsidy; Medicaid had in large part eliminated
"charity." The voluntary and proprietary hospitals and, for that matter, private
practitioners in the health fields, were not prepared simply to revert to the pre-
existing situation. The voluntary hospitals, in particular, could not afford it. It
was by then illegal, moreover, for welfare workers to press a recipient's relatives
to contribute. There was no adequate resource to pick up the services and
patients that Medicaid dropped. All in all, the medical care available to the
many thousands of poor in New York City who were no longer eligible for
assistance was worse in 1968 than it was before Medicaid was enacted.
Yet still the budget rose; and the New York legislature took further measures
to attempt to control it in 1969. Effective July i, 1969, the eligibility level for a
family of four was reduced to $5ooo (eliminating another 200,000 persons from New
York City's Medicaid rolls, leaving about 650,000 low-income participants, to-
gether with the one million welfare recipients). Reimbursements to hospitals were
frozen and a general cutback of twenty per cent in fees was ordered effective as of
June i. For the medically indigent (but not those on welfare), doctors, dentists,
and pharmacists were to collect twenty per cent of bills directly from Medicaid
recipients. 177 On behalf of users of the programs U.S. District Judge Constance
Baker Motley in New York City issued a temporary restraining order against the
putting into effect of the regulation for compulsory contributions from the
medically indigent, 178 although this was dissolved after a hearing before a three-
judge court.179 But another three-judge federal court in Brooklyn struck down
Medicaid reimbursement restrictions on hospitals in New York, on the ground that
they violated federal law.'8 But the eligibility levels stuck, and Albany's efforts
to curb the state Medicaid budget continued.
The problems of Medicaid in California and New York were paralleled by
similar budgetary increases (if on a lesser scale) in other states. In Oklahoma in
fiscal 1968 the Welfare Department's cash reserve became so low that the state was
forced to draw federal funds in advance to make monthly welfare payments; as a
result, services under the Medicaid program were cut for all persons receiving aid
(predominantly for payments to hospitals and physicians), and the number of
people classed as categorically related was reduced.' 8 '
" N.Y. Ti1mes, June 24, 1969, at 20, col. 3; id., Aug. 13, 1969, at 33, col. 5. The latter was an
article entitled Medicaid Shifts Cause Bewilderment, and included a photograph showing a line of persons
outside a medical center waiting "to clarify their status."
"
8 AMA News, July 21, 1969.
x O'Reilly v. Wyman, 3o5 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Despite its success, the state decided to
delay implementation. The order requiring a twenty per cent contribution is now due to go into effect
on December 1, 197o. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 197o, at 53, col. 7. For a similar proposal in California,
see AMA News, June 16, 1969, at 3.
180 See p. 411 infra.
... MEDrcmD, supra note 98, at 38. In that state some 145,000 persons on welfare were eligible, to-
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In Maryland, which initially offered services to all eligible categorical groups
(for federal cost sharing) and to the medically indigent in the twenty-one
to sixty-four age group (from state and local funds), medical vendor payments
were running at the end of 1967 at a rate nearly four times that of calendar year
1965.: s2 To pay for the unexpected costs of the program (which were ascribed to
increased costs of hospital care) a transfer of money was made from the 1969
capital construction fund. In this state as elsewhere there was growing concern
over where Medicaid money was going. In July 1968 Governor Agnew cut
eligibility for a family of four from $312o to $3oo0 and for a single person from
$i8oo to $1500, in the expectation of cutting 22,ooo persons out of the Medicaid
program. In addition, for the "medically indigent" (who received a special card
to distinguish them from other "indigents") a $4o deductible for each admission
to hospital was imposed, together with a twenty-one-day maximum stay, and
partial charges were imposed for use of dental services and emergency rooms,
for drugs, and for visiting a physician s3 The state medical society resolved at
its x969 meeting that Medicaid services for hospital inpatients and outpatients
should continue to be reimbursed at the usual and customary levels until
the budget was depleted; physicians would then give care without charge
1 8 4
Even this apparently generous gesture was insufficient. By the end of 1969, hos-
pital officials claimed the state owed Baltimore hospitals more than $6.3 million
in unpaid bills."6 5
State legislatures were increasingly reflecting the hostility of Congress to the
Medicaid program. New Mexico, which did not even cover the "medically in-
digent," was faced with a legislature which refused to allocate enough funds to
pay even for the barebones program 86 Nevertheless medical vendor payments in
that state rose from $54 million in 1965 to $16.9 million in fiscal year 1969P7 A
series of budget cuts were made in 1968, including a reduction in physician fees by
twenty-five per cent.' s But these measures were not enough. New Mexico
became the first (and so far only) state to close down its Medicaid program
(on May I, 1969); the program was reinstated after nine days, although remaining
gether with 35,000 of the "medically indigent." The cutbacks were made primarily among the providers
and included limiting physicians to one hospital visit per day, two nursing home visits per month, and
so forth. But for recipients, hospital stays were limited to io days, and recipients were exposed to an
information program "urging them to carefully use the benefits available." AMA News, June 24, 1968.
1"' About 70% of Medicaid payments were being made on behalf of the medically indigent. MEDICAID,
supra note 98, at 36.
"" The program was designed, in the words of the Maryland State Medical Journal, to "weed out
certain persons" and not to affect "the legitimate indigent." Details from AMA News, July 8, 1968, and
Oct. 14, 1968. There were still deficit problems. See id., Oct. 17, 1968.
'Id., May 5, 1969.
" Id., Jan. 1g, 1970.
I86 d., June 24, 1968.
1 7 MEDaCAI, supra note 98, at 7o; MEDICAID FiscAL YEA 1969, supra note x46, table 4.
... Other attempted tightening included limitation of payments for diagnostic radiology and pathology
to specialists in these areas, payment to nursing homes only when care was certified by a physician, and
limitation of drugs to listed items. AMA News, Feb. Io, 1969.
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
chronically underfunded.'8 The state welfare department of Nebraska was forced
to seek a $i million deficit appropriation in 1969, three-fourths of which was
attributable to Medicaid.190 In August 1968, Louisiana retrenched, cutting in-
patient stays, drugs, and payment of co-insurance under Medicare's part B;191
even then there were demands for further cutbacks.0 2 In Connecticut, after
beginning its program in 1966, the eligibility levels were actually raised slightly
in 1967, only to be reduced again in 1969.' And the story has been similar in
various other states1 0 4-or at least in those which instituted the program well before
the December 1969 deadline.'0 5 In some states, however, such cutbacks were
difcult if only because there were no "medically indigent" categories.'0 0
C. Medicaid Budgets and Controls: Increasing Federal Intervention
The defeat of the Democrats in the Presidential election in November 1968
signalled a rethinking and re-appraisal of Medicaid. In 1965, the message of
Medicaid had seemed to be one of purchasing health services of a quality equal
to private services for a substantial proportion of the population under basically
state-controlled programs. Tide XIX, as passed in 1965, had it been fully im-
plemented, could have covered as many as thirty-five million Americans and cost
as much as $20 billion a year.' 1 7 From the time of the 1967 amendments, and
especially since the beginning of the Nixon Administration in 1969, the prevailing
Congressional view of Medicaid has been quite different. A shift is now apparent
towards greater federal control over Medicaid (the federal audits of 1969 were
one indication), engendered by concern over rising budgets, and at the same time
"' A meeting of the New Mexico legislature on April ii, 1969, had ordered the state to withdraw from
its relatively liberal Medicaid program and re-enter with a reduced program. But this was contrary to
federal regulations. AMA News, Apr. 28, 1969, and July 7, z969. It was this fact which prompted
Senator Clinton Anderson to sponsor a relaxation in the federal requirements. Pub. L. No. 91-172 (1 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NFws 816 (1969)).
.
9 AMA News, Apr. 7, 1969.
191 Id., Sept. 2, x968.
" New Orleans Times-Picayune, Dec. 28, 1968; id., Dec. 29, x968.
...For details see CCH MEancARaE & MED cAi GuIDE para. 15,566. For some of the political im-
plications, see New Haven Register, Sept. 24, z969 (editorial).
'94.Eligibility standards were reduced in California in January x969 and in Virginia in July 1969. CCHI
MEnscARE & MaEDic~i Gum paras. 15,56o, 15,652. Maryland cut 22,000 people off the Medicaid rolls
in the summer of 1968 and restored them in January x969. AMA News, Jan. 29, 1969. Massachusetts
reduced eligibility by executive order. Id., Feb. 3, x969, and Mar. 3, 1969. For details of the reduction in
New York, particularly with respect to the property disqualification, see N.Y. Times, June 24, 1969, at 20,
col. 3; id., Aug. 13, 1969, at 33, col. 5.
"'
9 The "poorer" states (e.g., Mississippi) and the more fiscally conservative (e.g., New Jersey) delayed
action until the last moment and in general put in modest plans. See, e.g., on New Jersey proposals,
AMA News, July 22, 1968. For some of Florida's fears about "spending millions on indigents," sec
Miami Herald, June 2, z967. The Florida program actually began in January 1970.
196 For instance, while some states, such as Texas and Louisiana, began without a "medically in-
digent" category, others dropped them-e.g., Iowa in February 1969. CCH MEncMaRE & MDicAID GuIDE
para. 15,586.
""Fred H. Steininger, Director of Family Services, HEW, The New Medical Assistance Program,
cited in MEDICAID, supra note 98, at 5z.
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a recognition that Medicaid cannot and should not be regarded as providing the
equivalent of middle-class medicine. This last point of view was stated succinctly
by Dr. Roger Egeberg of HEW in the summer of 1969. Claiming that title XIX
would never provide a single standard of services for rich and poor under the
present system of distribution of health services, Egeberg said the slogan "let's get
everybody into the mainstream" (that is, the private medical care system) should
never have been used.' 9
In the Congress, concern over medical costs increased still further in 1968.
HEW was discovered to have made an error in estimates of nearly $I billion. 99
Although Senator Long withdrew his amendment calling for the reduction of
matching grants for the "medically needy,"'20 he continued to be sharply watchful
of accountability under and administration of Medicaid, both individually and
through his chairmanship of the Senate Finance Committee. This committee held
highly critical hearings on Medicaid and Medicare in both 1969 and 197001 In
addition, the Finance Committee staff began a probing analysis of Medicare and
Medicaid, whose results, published in i97o, provided the most detailed review
as yet of management practices and cost deficiencies in these programs 2
At the same time a general concern over health care costs was building in the
Congress. Hearings on health care in America before Senator Abraham Ribicoff's
Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of the Committee on Government
Operations in August 1968 focused on the costs of medical services20 This sub-
committee sent out questionnaires in 1969 to all of the twenty-four federal govern-
ment agencies and departments found to be involved in health, and in 1970
produced a major report 04 The conclusion of the report (which was emphasized
1*1 AMA News, July 21, 1969.
10 25 CONGRESSIONAL QU.RTEa.Y SERVICE, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTE.Y ALmANAC 203 (1970). It
should be noted that the estimating process has been fraught with some unavoidable difficulties. These
have included the difficulty of estimating accurately the size of the potentially eligible population and
the rate of enrollment; estimates of service utilization by the population; problems of assessing the
amount of funds transferred to Medicaid from other state and local programs; lack of adequate estimates
of the combined effect of both Medicare and Medicaid on the medical care economy as a whole; and the
lack of controls over provider participation and charges. Inaccurate budget estimates were a reflection of
the more general administrative deficiencies in the areas of management information about the programs
and of inadequate mechanisms for cost controls.
20 0 Long's amendment was attached to a tax bill relating to farm improvement costs (H.R. 2767).
It was withdrawn after liberal Senators threatened to defeat the entire bill through a filibuster. 24 CON-
GRESSIONAL QAuRTrERLY SERVICE, CONGRESSIONAL QUARaERY ALMANAC 633 (I969); 25 id. at 203 (1970).
" Hearings on Medicare and Medicaid Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 9st Cong., 2d Scss.
(1970) [hereinafter cited as 197o Hearings].
20 1970 STAFF REPORT, supra note 131. The staff also published a report of background information
for the I969 hearings. STAFF OF SENATE CoMMe. ON FINANCE, 9iST CONG., isT SEss., DATA RELATING TO
MEDICARE-EDICAID STUDy (Comm. Print I969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 STAFF REPORT].
'o Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, goth Cong., 2d Sess. (x968).
-0 In reply to the questionnaire, HEW noted no problems, but stated that Medicaid was in effect
in 43 jurisdictions and being provided by physicians who represented 50 to 95% of all physicians in
a state, and compared the much wider coverage and individual expenses under medical assistance in
1968 than in 1965. The blandness of this and other replies was roundly castigated in the Report. SuBcomm.
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in a special analysis made for the subcommittee)2 5 was that government expendi-
tures of all kinds ought to be used to further an integrated federal health policy,
and that this policy should attempt to influence and improve the system for
providing medical care. The presumption was that the previous isolation of
Medicaid from other health programs was untenable.
Interest was also developing in other Congressional committees. The Senate
Special Committee on the Aging and its subcommittees held some thirty days
of hearings during 1969 in Washington and around the country. An advisory
committee on health costs and aging, assisting Senator Muskie's Subcommittee
on Health of the Elderly, came out in favor of "comprehensive compulsory health
insurance for all Americans," and its testimony underlined the deficiencies in
Medicaid, "a poor program with no standards, no quality controls."2-" The Sub-
committee on Long-Term Care also held hearings in 1969 on regulations for
nursing homes. Other Senate committees with an active or stated interest in
health organization and costs by the end of 1969 included the Senate Committee on
Public Welfare's Health Subcommittee, and the Antitrust and Monopoly Sub-
committee, which was particularly interested in proprietary health institutions,
especially those owned by physicians. All of this interest ultimately resulted from
concern over costs and possible exploitation in publicly financed health programs.
Medicaid, accounting for nearly one fourth of all public medical expenditures,"' 7
would have been a target for probing criticism even without its obvious difficulties.
Beside rhetoric, concrete actions were taken to control the costs of Medicaid
from the beginning of the Ninety-first Congress in the wider frame of the Nixon
Administration's attempt to control increases in federal appropriations. In March
1969 HEW announced that procedures for reviewing the appropriate use of
services would be required for state Medicaid programs, as well as for Medicare.
The regulation, whose purpose was to give effect to the legislative intent first
expressed in x967, was to provide methods for policing costs208 by requiring
that each state plan encourage its hospitals and nursing homes when possible to
use the existing utilization review mechanisms set up under Medicare. Where
these did not exist, the state agency was required to perform utilization review
Ozq ExEcUTrrv REORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RESEARCH oF THE SENATE CO m. ON GOVERNM,1ENT
OPERATIONS, FEDERAL ROLE IN HEALTH, H.R. REP. No. 91-8o9, 9ist Cong., 2d Sess. 220-22 (1970).
2
05 Dr. James Shannon, Health Activities: Federal Expenditures and Public Purpose, analysis made
pursuant to S. Res. 320, 9ist Cong., 2d Sess. (June 1970).
'
0
' Testimony of Dr. John Knowles, 25 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERaLY SERVICE, CONGREsSIONAL Qu AtTRLY
ALMANAC 850 (1970).
.r See Cooper, Medical Care Outlays for Aged and Nonaged Persons 1966-69, U.S. DEP"r o0' HEALTH,
FucATIoN, AND ,WELPARE, RESEARCH AND STATisTIcS NorE (June 18, 1970).
.. This provision was added in the 1967 amendments. Pub. L. No. 90-248, 8i Stat. 82r. The
intention was that methods and procedures would "safeguard against unnecessary utilization," and that
payments would "not [be] in excess of reasonable charges consistent with efficiency, economy, and
quality of care." 42 U.S.C. § 139 6a(a) (3o) (Supp. IV, i969). The new regulations were isssued in 34 Fed.
Reg. 3745 (969).
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services itself or to monitor services performed by others. Review of services by
existing peer review mechanisms was encouraged to the fullest possible extent.20 9
Behind this provision there lies the supposition that review of how and by
whom services are used, for how long, and with what effect, is a necessary and
desirable administrative mechanism. In any profit-making organization, the board
of directors would expect that some form of production (if not quality) control
would be applied to a major program of expenditures. So far in Medicaid such
had not been the case. Indeed Medicaid did not have a board of directors (nor,
incidentally, does Medicare)-and this fact was at the root of many of its problems
and much of the concern.
The early development of the program was a matter largely of trial and error in
the states.1 With the accelerating costs and the apparent lack of dynamism,
courage, power, or authorization in HEW to take firm control of the Medicaid
program-even to the extent of publicizing standards and detailed critiques of the
programs in the states-concern about shortcomings in management grew in the
Congress. The Senate Finance Committee, in particular, has become a powerful
substitute for a board of directors.
Utilization review procedures (which are now in the process of being de-
veloped21 ) were by no means the only attempted controls on Medicaid providers
and services in 1969. One of the primary targets for cost controls was physicians'
fees. As part of its growing investigation of Medicare and Medicaid costs, the
Senate Finance Committee requested from HEW in April 1969 a list of all prac-
titioners who received $25,ooo or more under Medicaid in 1968. This was followed
in June by an announcement by Senator Long that the resulting names would be
turned over to the Internal Revenue Service' Only a week after this announce-
ment HEW officials revealed that payment schedules would be set up for Medicaid
and that these would be based on the lowest Blue Shield payment plans. Fees
would thus be deliberately fixed on a lower scale than those for Medicare, which
were actually higher than the average Blue Shield fees.21 3 This announcement,
"Peer review" means nothing more sinister than that services provided by physicians should be
evaluated by physicians, and so on. One caveat is made; a practitioner may not review cases when he is
the attending practitioner or has had significant professional responsibility; nor may he sit on a title XIX
review committee of the institutions in which he has a significant ownership interest. The detailed regu-
lations specify that each state must have a professional medical review committee under which periodic
evaluations of patients in nursing homes and mental hospitals are made, to ensure that such patients are
receiving the proper care in an appropriate setting. See CCH MEDC ItAE & MEDicAD GuiDE paras. 14,731,
21,720.
... Even in the question of hospital reimbursement, which was established in the law on the basis of
"reasonable cost," Connecticut successfully challenged HEW to accept its own hospital reimbursement
rates, established by a state Hospital Cost Commission, as "reasonable costs," although this method re-
portedly costs $4 million to $5 million less a year than if hospitals in the state were reimbursed for
Medicaid on the same basis as for Medicare. 1970 STAFF REPoRrT, supra note 131, at 5o.
W"' . Nelson, Utilization Review-Medicaid's Salvation?, 1970 (paper on file with the authors).
W ASHINGTON REPORT ON MEDICINE & HEALTH, Apr. 14, 1969. See also pp. 412-15 infra.
... N.Y. Times, June 23, 1969; id., Apr. 21, x969.
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which came as a shock both to physicians and to those who still hoped to see
Medicaid with a reimbursement program tied to full private fees, was followed
by a statement from HEW Secretary Robert Finch in June 1969 that payments to
physicians would indeed be limited. Also to be eliminated from both Medicaid
and Medicare was the two per cent "cost-plus" beyond identified costs, a pay-
ment which had been allowed by government to nonprofit hospitals and nursing
homes, and a similar one and a half per cent cost-plus factor which had been
granted to proprietary institutions 14
Following a series of discussions in HEW and with professional organizations,
the interim regulations for physicians and other individual practitioners appeared
in July i969?15 The link to Blue Shield was dropped. Instead the regulations
limited Medicaid fees to seventy-five per cent of physicians' customary charges
in January 1969. Subsequent increases would be tied to changes in the Consumer
Price Index or in an alternative index developed by the Secretary. Moreover,
before increases were to be allowed there had to be evidence that the state and
the profession concerned had established an effective utilization and quality control
system, including provision for disqualifying practitioners found to have de-
frauded, overutilized, or otherwise abused the program. These regulations thus
froze physician fees at a given level (although administratively that level was
difficult to define), providing for each physican a kind of personalized fee schedule.
With the new regulations two levels of payment were recognized, one for Med-
icare and one for Medicaid, with lower fees for the latter. For the elderly who
were entitled to Medicare but part of whose medical bills were picked up under
Medicaid, the situation was anomalous. On the one hand they possessed recog-
nized rights to medical care in the private sector; on the other, they were once
more "welfare" patients with physicians donating to them at least one fourth
of their normal fee. Physicians themselves responded in different ways. The
AMA, protesting the move, questioned whether HEW had the authority to
set up nationally applicable regulations21 But meanwhile the AMA itself urged
local medical groups to establish the effective controlling mechanisms to review
services and fees which were the necessary alternative to future fee reductions2P 7
At the same time that cost controls were beginning to be developed through
federal intervention in Medicaid, there was a movement-again from within the
Senate Finance Committee-to slow the expansion of services which had been
:2 2.5 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLy SERVIrE, CONGRE IONAL QuARTERLY ALMANAC 204 (1970).
2t 34 Fed. Reg. i1,o98 (1969); CCH MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE para. 14,723.
21'AMA News, Aug. ir, 1969. It should be noted in passing that the announcement of the regula-
dons coincided with the withdrawal of the nomination of Dr. John Knowles as Assistant Secretary of
HEW-a move widely heralded as being a victory for the AMA, but one which cost the Association
dearly in terms of further political leverage.
21 AMA News, June 30, 1969. Peer review was also made the central topic of the AMA Clinical
Convention in December 1969, and led to AMA endorsement in 1970 of so-called "peer review organiza-
tions" as an integral part of national financing schemes.
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envisaged in the initial development of Medicaid. On the proposal of Senator
Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico a rider was attached to a tax bill in May
1969, permitting states to cut back some Medicaid services and suspending the
requirement that states provide comprehensive care to all the medically needy
by July I, 1975. The Senate Finance Committee, expressing its concern over the
"sharp, accelerated and unanticipated increases in the cost of Medicaid," ' sup-
ported the rider and a compromise version was passed by the Senate; the com-
promise extended the deadline requirement until July I, 1977, and set conditions for
cutting back Medicaid services in the meantime. In the House the amendment,
supported by Chairman Mills of the Ways and Means Committee, was passed by
voice vote, and the Anderson amendment was duly signed into law-part of an
act continuing "the existing suspension of duty on certain copying of shoe
lathes."2 ' Under the amendment states could not eliminate the five basic Medicaid
services. They could from then on, however, reduce or eliminate other services
such as payment for drugs or dentistry. States were thus given a green light
to amend their Medicaid programs by reducing services in order to cut costs.
Meanwhile, the prospect of comprehensive health services for a relatively large
group of persons-the original apparent implication of Medicaid-was receding
rapidly.
The dual effort by the Congress and by HEW (through power of regulation)
to cut back services and to increase centralized control in Medicaid-both primarily
for fiscal reasons-promised to continue. Secretary Finch encouraged a much more
active control of the program from Washington; the new regulations to limit pay-
ments to providers under Medicaid were a primary example. Dr. Francis Land,
Commissioner of Medical Services Administration (the HEW bureau charged
with administering title XIX), after announcing on July i6, 1969, that he had
not even considered resigning, resigned on July 25-the day a Task Force on
Medicaid (the McNerney Task Force) was established within HEW with the
announcement that the program was "badly conceived and badly organized. '220
The Task Force, whose staff was believed to be larger than MSA, the object of its
investigation, issued its interim report in November 1969 and its final report in
June i97o. 1
218 25 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SEvIcE, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 203 (1970).
'Pub. L. No. 91-172 (z U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 8i9 (1969)) amended sections 19o2 and
1903 of the Social Security Act. Section 2(d) allowed states to "modify" their programs providing,
among other things, that the over-all amount of nonfederal funds being spent on medical assistance in the
state was not cut back, that the state was conforming to the requirements for utilization procedures under
§ 1go2(a) (30), and that the cutbacks were not being made to pay large fees to providers under some other
part of the program.
220 25 CONGREssIONAL QUARTrLa.y SmEvcE, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 204 (970).
'
21 TASK FORCE ON MEDICAID, INTERIM REoT (1969) [hereinafter cited as IN'rrms TAsx FORCE Ra-
PORT]; REPORT OF anE TAsm FORCE ON MEDICAID AND RELATED PRoaRsaS (1970) [hereinafter cited as TAsx
FORE REPORT].
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By that latter date the Social Security Amendments of 197o (H.R. i755o) had
passed the House. The new bill would repeal section 19o3(e)-the ultimate goal
of comprehensive services-entirely; limit increases in physicians' fees; allow states
to determine reasonable hospital costs rather than following the Medicare formula;
encourage cost savings in various areas and especially intermediate care facilities;
require Medicare-type utilization review committees for hospitals and skilled
nursing homes participating in Medicaid; extend the power to apply deductibles to
recipients; and, among other things, provide federal incentives for administrative
innovation. Most significant, however, is the proposed formula change for federal
involvement. Section 225 of H.R. i755o suggests an over-all increase of twenty-
five per cent in the federal share of outpatient hospital services and home health
care services up to a maximum of ninety-five per cent, but, after sixty days in
a general hospital or ninety days in a skilled nursing home or mental hospital, the
federal share would be reduced by 33% per cent. Whether these proposals will
be enacted and whether they will be any more successful than their predecessors in
cutting costs, is still to be seen. But while, at the time of writing, the Senate has yet
to act, it is clear from the February hearings on the Finance Committee's Staff
Report2 2 that the "economy" approach is in the ascendant. This was made clearer
still by President Nixon's August 197o statement saying that there would be
further cuts in fiscal i97i.F'
222 See z97o Hearings, supra note 201.
22 CCH MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE, Report Letter No. 22, at z (Aug. 25, 197o). The President
explained that savings would be accomplished "by changing administrative regulations to reduce certain
excessive charges far above the national average imposed by some medical institutions." At the time of
writing (October 1970), H.R. 1755o had passed the House but had not been reported out of the Senate
Finance Committee. It was likely that the latter would adopt the tone, if not all the recommendations,
of the House Ways and Means Committee Report. The key issues stressed in the House report and in
the Senate hearings on the bill were methods of approving administration and developing more effective
utilization review.
On the latter point the House report recommended the full adoption for Medicaid of the utilization
review provisions required under Medicare. In the Senate, however, a radically different proposal was
developed by Senator Bennett (with the help of the Senate Finance Committee staff, and following guide-
lines for peer review organizations developed by the AMA) and referred to the Finance Committee (of
which the Senator is a powerful member) on August 2o, r970. The Bennett amendment to H.R. 17550
would establish national, state, and local networks of Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO),
which would be responsible for reviewing professional activities and institutional medical services given
under Medicaid, Medicare, federally-sponsored maternal and child programs, and any other designated fed-
eral programs. A PSRO would be designated by the Secretary of HEW in each area and would represent
at least SOO physicians. The first group to be considered as such an organization would be the relevant
state or county medical association. Over-all standards and norms for services would be developed by a
national committee, also composed of physicians, with technical assistance from HEW.
This proposal, which would recognize medical societies as agents of the federal government (PSROs
would be appropriately reimbursed for their activities) and set up a national peer-review policy network,
is strongly opposed by the hospital associations, whose hospital utilization review committees would
presumably be replaced by local medical society review. It was also initially opposed by the AMA with
respect to a requirement that prior approval should be sought by a physician from his PSRO before
undertaking elective procedures; but this requirement was subsequently modified to require prior
approval only in selected circumstances. With this and certain other modifications the amendment was
reported to have been approved by the Finance Committee. It is also understood that HEW has given
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The combination of generally rising health care costs with the resulting budgetary
difficulties in the states made increasing federal intervention and the economy
approach inevitable. Moreover, Medicaid must be seen in the more general context
of concern over its relationship with any potentially larger scheme of national health
insurance. At hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
in September i97o, John Veneman, Undersecretary of HEW estimated that cradle-
to-grave insurance would cost $77 billion in its first year of operation, fiscal 1974, a
sum "equivalent to a Federal health tax of over $i,ooo a year for every household in
the United States." ' This figure may be inflated. Nevertheless it illustrates the di-
mension of the cost issues and an important relationship between Medicaid and
future payment schemes. If Medicaid, a program designed to provide medical services
for the poor, often without the amenities expected in suburban middle-class medicine,
cannot control its costs, how-it can be argued-will proposals for national health
insurance succeed?
In terms of the controls themselves, however, the Medicaid program is in constant
danger of having the argument of costs used not to provide services more efficiently
but to cut down the provision of services to those who need them the most. The
program needs stronger federal direction to protect the consumer against this con-
tingency, not merely to issue a series of requirements for monitoring and reporting
fraud, or for collecting information. It was this message that Medicaid should be
federally organized as a health program rather than an economy-drive, which formed
the primary theme of the report of the Task Force on Medicaid.225 Indeed, the
Task Force went much further, arguing that the structure of health services them-
selves needs to be reformed, and that Medicaid should play a deliberate part (with
other federal programs) in initiating structural change through providing funds
for stimulating new local systems of health care delivery.
Translating such proposals into action is, however, still in the future. For the
present, Medicaid is trapped in its own history. Its forms of administration, its
relationship with providers and recipients, are the present actualities. As such they
deserve more detailed analysis.
the amendment its support in return for Senator Bennett's support of another controversial proposal
in H.R. 1755o-the development of "health maintenance organizations" under Medicare. This latter pro-
posal would allow Medicare funds to be paid on a direct capitation basis for comprehensive services to be
provided by designated health care systems. The intention of the provision as written is to support two
goals: (i) the encouragement of preventive care through such payment arrangements (Medicare pays for.
care when people are sick but not for general health maintenance); and (2) an expected reduction in
Medicare costs, on the basis of fixed annual budget reimbursements to health maintenance organizations,
and a provision that reimbursements be at the level of only 95% of prevailing Medicare expenses.
Action is expected on H.R. 1755o after the 1970 election recess, and the Bennett amendment is thought
to have a good chance of passage. Its long-term result would appear to be delegation of authority over
the quality aspects of Medicaid to the providers. It would pose even more serious problems of quality
control if a national health insurance program is developed.
.. Reported in N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1970, at 21, col. I.
"'Se TAsc FoRcE REPORT, supra note 221, at 2-3 and passim.
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IV
ADMINISTRATION, PROVIDERS, AND RECIPIENTS
Medicaid has provided an opportunity to assess state behavior in organizing a
major health planning program. It has also offered the vehicle for evaluating the
realities of federal health administration. In the long process of cost acceleration,
what have been the stumbling blocks, who were the villains?
In terms of administration Medicaid has fallen between several potential villains.
Its link with the welfare system has had disastrous financial implications both for
Medicaid and for funding programs of cash benefits. The welfare system itself is
under increasing attack on the one hand as racist, demeaning, and demoralizing and
on the other as inflationary and soft. The last five years have, moreover, seen a
growing scepticism about federal grants-in-aid to the states, a scepticism which
rubrics like "creative federalism" have not managed to stifle. At the local level,
Medicaid could not be further out of touch with the ideas of community control,"2
which were legitimated by the "maximum feasible participation" amendments to
the poverty program. At the same time the administration of Medicaid has been
hampered not only by political pressures, inflation, budget cutbacks, and the rest,
but also by a shortage of medical resources-especially physicians-and a tradition
of laissez faire which has frequently prevented an intelligent deployment of such
medical resources as do exist. It is with these factors in mind that the operation of
Medicaid should be evaluated.
A. Federal Administration of the Program
The federal role in Medicaid, following the Kerr-Mills experience, began by being
weak and is only belatedly being strengthened. But at the same time the organiza-
tional problems of HEW itself have also to be taken into account. The unwieldiness
inherent in the congeries of empires which make up the nation's major social policy
agency is in danger of becoming an American tradition.2 7 It is no secret that
HEW has not always been presided over by effective Secretaries; and, in any event,
their rate of turnover has ensured that little will be done to break down the traditional
lines of demarcation in the Department.
Despite a series of departmental reorganizations in recent years, even the nation's
top health official, Dr. Roger Egeberg, Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific
Affairs, has "effective control" over only twenty-two per cent of HEW's health
budget; Medicaid is not included in that fraction 2  The Assistant Secretary is
responsible for the U.S. Public Health Service, which contains the Health Services
258 But see z970 Hearings, supra note 2o, at 25; TAsC FoEcE RPOaRT, supra note 22r, § D.
227 President Johnson described the nation's health programs as "a programmatic and bureaucratic
nightmare." 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON x967, at
o99 (1968).
228 H.R. REP. No. 9i-8o9, 9ISt Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1970).
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and Mental Health Administration (a sprawling complex of different programs
with a budget of nearly $1.2 billion), the National Institutes of Health ($1. 4 billion),
and the Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service ($o.2 billion).
These three divisions are supposedly the Department's major health foci. Yet
Medicare (with $7.3 billion in the trust funds for part A and part B) because of its
organization as part of the Social Security system, is administered by the well-
entrenched and secure Social Security Administration, a separate arm of HEW.
Medicaid ($2.7 billion in federal funds), to add to its woes, is run by the Medical
Services Administration (MSA), a division of the separate Social and Rehabilitation
Service (SRS)-what used to be the Welfare Administration 29 Unfortunately
that was not, and is not, the most powerful empire in HEW; its purpose was to
make grants to states rather than to innovate or run services; it was not loved on
the Hill; and it had not the power or prestige to deal with the powerful professional
groups who were the providers of Medicaid.
To these difficulties were added the chronic understaffing of MSA throughout
its career. Not only did its leadership feel itself impotent and change frequently;
not only were senior posts left unfilled; but the staff of MSA was so small that even
had it had the will, power, and prestige to press states and providers, or to face other
problems squarely, it would not have had the manpower to follow through23 The
unwillingness to staff MSA adequately must be counted as a major contributing factor
in the "Medicaid Crisis." Tide XIX, as passed in 1965, was so vague that only a well-
staffed department could have implemented it effectively. The refusal to support MSA
was a tragedy.
As it was, mandatory dates were not met (for example, Arizona and Alaska
failed to meet the December 1969 deadline for producing a state plan for Medicaid),
and cutoffs in state funds (which could, for instance, be imposed on those several
states who have not met utilization review requirements) were not only not made
but never considered very seriously. Despite the fact that each year Medicaid took an
increasingly significant share of the federal budget, the issuing of regulations-the
very core of an effective federal-state grant-in-aid program-proceeded remarkably
slowly. The basic regulations for administration of the program were not issued until
.9 SRS is also responsible for an array of health programs for children ($0.2 billion), run through
the Children's Bureau. Altogether the HEW health budget in fiscal year 1970 was almost $13.5 billion,
out of a total federal health budget of nearly $S8.8 billion. Medicaid thus represents 2o% of the HEW
health budget and 14.4% of all federal health expenditures. Id. at 9, 2o6-07.
-"In July 1965, when Medicaid was authorized, there were only 23 persons-including secretaries-
employed in the Medical Services Division of what was then the Bureau of Family Services. Thirty-five
more positions were authorized after the law was passed. This small group was made responsible for
federal direction of the new multi-million dollar program. By mid-z969 the renamed Medical Services
Administration, as part of the Social and Rehabilitation Service, only had 76 positions-again including
secretaries-in Washington and 24 in the SRS Regional Offices, for communicating with 44 states' Medicaid
programs, for guiding in program planning and development, and for providing program evaluation.
z969 Hearings, supra note 135, at 112. Since the arrival of Dr. Howard Newman as Commissioner, the
staff of MSA has expanded considerably.
400 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
I969,31 and, for instance, MSA only just made the deadline provided by the 1967
legislation, which required federal standards for licensing of nursing home admin-
istrators 2 and definitions of a skilled nursing home 2 a3 by July X970. Even then,
some of the regulations were provisional, with the result that regional offices and
state welfare departments treated them with some suspicion lest the offices and
departments commit limited resources only to find the regulations withdrawn.
The Medical Services Administration also had difficulties in making use of its
Advisory Council, established by the 1967 amendments, and also its representatives
in the regional offices.F 4 The Medical Assistance Advisory Council was "one of
... Reg. 250.20, "Utilization review of care and services," was eventually made in March 1969. 34
Fed. Reg. 3745 (969). Other regulations published are: Reg. 250.21, id. at 14,649; Reg. 250.30,
"Reasonable charges," id. at 1244 (Jan. x969), revised, 35 id. at 50,013 (June 1970); Reg. 25o.r3,
"Payments for medical services and care by a third party," 34 id. at 752 (Jan. x969); and Reg. 250.4r,
"Consultative services to medical institutions," 35 id. at 6322 (Apr. r970).
Two further regulations, representing interim policy, have been issued, Reg. 250.71 "Information
reporting requirements, Internal Revenue Code," id. at 3898; Reg. 250.80, "Fraud in the medical
assistance program, 34 id. at 19,775 (1969). There is now a further proposed regulation-25i.io-on
"Interrelations with State health and State vocational rehabilitation agencies, and with title V grantees."
35 id. at 8664 (1970).
For two related regulations see Reg. 250.120, "Staffing for administration of medical assistance pro-
grams, Federal financial participation," and Reg. 250.210, "State financial participation; State plan
requirements." 34 id. at 205 (z969).
The enacted regulations mentioned above are codified at 45 C.F.R. § 25o et seq. (1970). For details
of all regulations see CCH MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE para. 21,241 et seq.
2
. Interim regulations were issued on February 28, 1970, See 35 Fed. Reg. 3968 (1970). For an
outline of regulations on state licensing, see Man. TIUONE, July 17, x969.
For the somewhat strange role of the MSA in the state implementation of § 19o8, see Sullivan &
Byron, Nursing Home Administrator Licensing Under Section 19o8 of the Social Security Act, 1970
(paper on file at the Yale Law School Library). This is one of a series of clinical studies into the
nursing home industry undertaken by students of the Yale Law School and the Department of Epi-
demiology and Public Health of the Yale Medical School.
... Herein lies a curious tale of the way some regulations are written. A nursing home con-
sultant was retained by both HEW and the American Nursing Home Association to work with
Medicaid staff in drafting new nursing home standards, required under § 1902(a)(28) by the z967
amendments of the Social Security Act. Earlier drafts of these regulations were felt by the ANHA to
be unrealistic because of a shortage of nurses. An initial draft of the new regulations, on which
he consulted, would have eliminated the nurse requirement altogether from the third shift; but this
was turned down by HEW. Interim regulations, published June 24, 1969, stated that in the future an RN
must be in charge of the day shift but that the charge nurse on the other two shifts need only be
approved by the state licensing agency (statewide standards were lower than title XVIII requirements). A
deluge of complaints followed, chiefly from consumer groups on the grounds that the standards would
lower nursing home quality, and hearings were called by Senator Moss for July 3o, 1969. WAsnINGoroN
REPORT ON MEDIcICE & HE.ALTH, June 30, 1969, and Aug. 4, 1969. Final regulations for skilled nursing
homes were published in April 197o. They require a professional RN or licensed practical nurse on
duty at all times. The latter must be a graduate of a state-approved school of practical nursing. Until
July 1, 1970, provided that they were working as a charge nurse on July I, 1967, practical nurses recog-
nized by the state licensing authority as having equivalent background were allowed, but after this
date they must also have equivalent training. CCH MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE paras. 14,752 & 21,633.
... The title XIX staff of the nine regional offices was also inadequate to handle the work load and
ill-equipped to deal with the medical profession (and sometimes the state health departments). More-
over the Associate Regional Commissioners for Medical Services are not subordinate to the MSA staff
in Washington but are responsible to regional SRS Commissioners-adding further to the administrative
confusion.
In Boston, for instance, a staff of three and one secretary handle Medicaid for the six New England
states. The work of the regional office is largely an advisory and auditing one. The Boston office is
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the least-used panels in HEW's large stable of advisory councils," partly because
it was uncomfortably attached to Medicaid after the program had been in existence
two years and partly because it was thought not to have the support of the then
HEW Secretary.P 5 Even the Nixon Administration seemed disinterested in using the
Council. It was not consulted when Dr. James Haughton was appointed to review
Medicaid's reimbursement for physician, dentist, and other health professional
services, and this was reported as "bruising the already battered feelings!' of the
Council.2 30 While the new so-called "197o Broom" announced the "reactivation"
of the Medical Assistance Advisory Council,= it has yet to be seen whether the
Council will be able to find a role working with the present Commissioner of MSA,
Howard Newman.
The "197o Broom" was a direct result of the two McNerney Task Force Reports
and the Senate Finance Committee's Staff report.Ps Even before the first McNerney
Report was issued, the preliminary findings of the Finance Committee staff had
appeared:
Federal officials have been lax in not seeing to it that States establish and employ
effective controls on utilization and costs, and States have been unwilling to
assume the responsibility on their own. The Federal Medicaid administrators have
not provided states with the expert assistance necessary to implement proper con-
trols. Also, they have not developed mechanisms for coordination and communica-
tion among the States about methods of identifying and solving Medicaid prob-
lems.
2 3 9
Belatedly, in 1968 HEW had set up a scheme for standard audit in sixteen major
Medicaid states; the reports were released during 1969. Among the findings were
that Illinois had drawn nearly $i million in federal funds improperly, 40 that New
York City has wasted as much as $9.7 million in federal funds because of alleged
procedural violations and administrative laxness,241 that Texas was using procedures
which resulted in the loss of interest income to the federal government of $48,750
a month 42 All told, the audits reportedly revealed weaknesses in management
thought to have mediated the dispute between the ophthalmologists and optometrists under the Rhode
Island program, and the staffs of all regional offices join the Washington staff in a bi-annual or tri-
annual review of each state's program. Often, however, regional offices see themselves as defenders of
"their" states against Washington. The over-all result has been considerable conflict between Washington
and the regions. On these generally see K. Gideon, The Role of the HEW Regional Office in the
Administration of Medicaid, 1970 (paper on file with the authors).
... WsnNmaroN REPORT ON Mn mciNE & HzMLa-, Mar. "o, 1969.
111 Id., May i9, x969.
2ITz97o Hearings, supra note 201, at 24. The new chairman was Donald C. Smith, M.D., of the
University of Michigan. The 1970 STAFF REPOrT, supra note 131, at 133-34 recommended the merging
of the MAAC with HIBAC, the title XVIII advisory council.
2"8 See notes 202 & 221 supra.
ass 1969 STAFF REPORT, supra note 202.
24o AMA News, July 21, 1969.
"Id., Sept. 8, 1969.
2" The Texas case is interesting in that the State Department of Public Welfare made an agree-
ment with Group Hospital Service, Inc. (Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Texas) to "insure" Medicaid recipients;
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controls, procedures for processing claims, eligibility, and other areas amounting to a
minimal "questionable dollar impact" (that is, waste) of $318 million.243 These
audits served to emphasize two major features of Medicaid. The first was the
administrative inefficiency in the states, the second the lack of adequate federal guide-
lines, methods, and controls in a program which is substantially federally funded.
It is illustrative of the low-keyed central role of SRS in Medicaid's early years that
not until June i97o was a federal regulation proposed for Medicaid to require that
a state, in discharging its fiscal accountability, "maintain an accounting system and
supporting fiscal records adequate to assure that claims for federal funds are in
accord with applicable Federal requirements." 24 A layman (or taxpayer) might
have supposed that such records were already available, with state accountants acting
busily and inventively to increase productivity and save costs under the watchful eye
of federal administrators. Such was not the case.
This absence may be attributed in part to the very real difficulties in establishing
adequate guidelines for reimbursement of health services. It may be noted, in
defense of Medicaid, that the federal Medicare program, despite a battery of regula-
tions over reimbursement formulae and utilization controls, is barely more advanced
in its accounting procedures.24 5 At the same time, however, Medicaid has suffered
from its initial development as a program of only loosely supervised federal grants-
in-aid to states. Mismanagement by some of the states or their fiscal agents led to
"duplicate payments," inadequate utilization review, and waste of resources in
determining eligibility. 4 These events were allowed to occur because there were
the audit found that in fact GHS was acting under a fiscal agent agreement for the state, merely admin-
istering the state program rather than providing full insurance coverage. Between September i, x967,
and June 30, x968, it was noted that GHS had accumulated more than $r4 million of state money
as premiums for medical services in excess of actual disbursements. The state held that this was in
accordance with the state interpretation of the agent function and that such accumulations were a hedge
to offset future claims. Experience bore this out; by June 30, 1969, GHS expenditures exceeded
receipts by almost one half million dollars. The state claimed that this method resulted in a reduction
in premium rates and better administration of services. The HEW Audit Agency ruled that the
arrangement with GHS was not insurance since the element of risk for GHS did not exist, and it
therefore did not comply with the requirements of SUPPLEMENT D, supra note 48, paras. 552oA, 5830.
This ruling was upheld by the administrator of SRS. Also at issue was the sum of nearly $888,o0o,
which represented the difference between federal matching at the 5o% rate for administrative costs
and the higher matching at the medical assistance rate. This latter sum is still in dispute in appeals and
decisions involving the state, SRS, and the HEW Regional Office. See x969 Hearings, supra note 135,
at 72-73; 197o Hewings, supra note 201, at zo6-o7.
""The greatest single cost ($126 million) lay in determining eligibility. 1970 STAFF REPORT, supra
note 131, at 245.
24 35 Fed. Reg. 8780 (1970). This regulation would also apply to tites I, IV-A, X, XIV, and XVI
of the Social Security Act. Agencies would be required to maintain accounting records for each title
for a period of a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 5 years after the end of each fiscal year, subject to
the timing of federal audit.
a24 A Senate Finance Committee report of 1970 (nearly 4 years after the initiation of Medicare)
noted the lack of data to assess the financial position of hospitals under Medicare reimbursement, de-
ficiencies, abuses, and "lack-luster administration" in paying for physician services, a widespread failure
to apply utilization review procedures (required for hospitals under title XVIII), and other areas of
abuse and laxity in administration. I97o STF REPORT, supra note 131, at 4, xo, x8 and passim.
a" Id. at 204.
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inadequate staffs in the regions, without clear lines of command, and without
"definitive guidelines relating to policies, procedures and goals.:"4" There was in-
adequate follow-up of PREP (Program Review and Evaluation Projects) reports
on the operation of the program in the different states, and there was considerable
evidence of approval of plans and arrangements which did not conform to the
federal law.2 4 MSA, with only fifty professionals and thirty-five support staff in
Washington, was found wanting in many areas. "Responsibilities had not been dis-
charged," manpower was inadequate, too much time was spent "putting out fires,"
regulations had been delayed and guidelines implementing them had not been
issued, while there was no real procedure for reviews.249
After the Preliminary Staff Report in July 1969 and the Audit Report published
in August, it seemed there was little more that could be said about the shortcomings
of MSA. But such an assumption was wrong. In addition to calling for better
coordination in all health programs, the first McNerney Report called for more
information about title XIX, better training of staff, new management techniques,
x25 new positions in Washington, and a restructuring of MSA both in Washington
and in the regions.2 50 The report of the Finance Committee staff, in addition to
specific recommendations,, 5. put the general need bluntly:
While the Medical Services Administration probably requires additional personnel
if effective Federal supervision of Medicaid is to be realized, it appears vital that
any additional personnel-including officials-operate with a greater sense of re-
sponsibility and direct involvement than has been manifested heretofore. The
Medical Services Administration needs dynamic, concerned, and qualified leader-
ship and staff if a complex, costly and important program such as Medicaid is
to be soundly administered.2 52
So, too, the Final Report of the McNerney Task Force, while re-echoing the need
for review of the whole federal apparatus in health and better integration of health
programs and the health bureaucracy, did note that
the haste with which it [the 1965 legislation] had to be implemented left little
time for meaningful planning or imaginative leadership. MSA's management
style has been characterized by a crisis orientation to the detriment of sound
management practices and long-range planning 2 53
"' Id. at 236.218 Id. at 238-39.
..o Id. at 239-42. In fact xo6 additional accountants had been hired by SRS earlier in 1969 to make
regular visits to every state possible. AMA News, Mar. 31, 1969.
"'o INrTaaii TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 221, at 27-41. In the covering letter, the Chairman said
the basic findings were that Medicaid "has serious organizational, financing, productivity and access prob-
lems, and (2) bolder moves than have characterized the last five years are required to achieve measurable
improvement."
"' The actual recommendations on federal administration appear in 1970 STArF REPoRT, supra note
X31, at 131.
155 Id. at 127.5 TAsK FORCE REP'ORT, supra note 221, at 104.
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197o well and truly drove home the points of 1969; and the present Administrator of
SRS (John Twiname) has already announced changes-including new staff, a new
structure for MSA, and development of program management procedures 4
B. Administration in the States
It would be wrong to leave a discussion of the administration of Medicaid with-
out some look at its operation in the states. The majority of states make the welfare
department or its equivalent the primary administrator of the program, while some
states leave it to the health department. Neither arrangement has been entirely
satisfactory. The choice of welfare departments was partially encouraged by HEW
in Washington, and this was a disappointment to those who hoped the 1965 legis-
lation was a move away from the welfare image 5 More important still, welfare
departments were often thin in top-level talent and rarely had the political
influence to buck powerful lobbies such as the providers of medical care in their state.
Even state health departments, whether the primary administrators or consultants
to the welfare departments, were similarly rarely headed by physicians of sufficient
prestige to stand up to leaders of the professions or the legislatures.
The results have been predictable. For instance, the Finance Committee "Staff
Data" found that "a number of States have yielded to demands that they reimburse
skilled nursing homes on the more generous basis under which extended care
facilities are paid under Medicare.""5 New York City had to give up its efforts
to authorize only certain physicans and specialists under title XIX.21 It seemed
natural (if regrettable) to state welfare and health departments in most states that,
when cuts were made in Medicaid programs, recipients rather than providers were
the first ones to be axed! 5 In general, states have often not lived up to the require-
ments laid down from Washington,259 and the use of state advisory councils has
frequently been ineffective.
254 1970 Hearings, supra note 2o, at 26-27. Recent innovations in MSA include new auditing pro-
cedures, experiments in quality control, and use of prepaid programs in lieu of Medicaid (e.g., in Balti-
more and Hawaii). See Schmeck, Medicaid Leaders Trying New Ideas, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1970, at
42, col. z. The attempts to reform and restructure MSA are recorded in its new monthly, Medicaid,
published since April 1970.
2"See, e.g., AmERIcAN PUBLic WELFARE Ass'N, SURvEy OF STATE PuBLic WELFARE DmToRs
REGARDING PRoBLEMs IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS or TITLE XIX or THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
15 (r969) [hereinafter cited as APWA SumwEY]. Medical witnesses in x965 had argued in favor of
using welfare departments rather than health departments. Contra, z965 Hearings, stapra note 33, at
641.
-56 1969 STAFF REPORT, supra note 202, at 30. See also note 151 supra.
27 AMA News, Oct. 3, x966; N.Y. Times, July 21, 1966, at 35, col. 8; id., Sept. 15, 1966, at 45,
Col. I.
259 E.g., cutbacks in the Louisiana program, where physicians' usual and customary fees were pro-
tected. AMA News, Sept. 2, x968.
"' One example may suffice. SuPPLEmENT D, supra note 48, para. D-51 4o, states that the tide XIX
agency should also participate actively in community planning for facilities where it is a substantial
purchaser-e.g., skilled nursing home care. This has been more honored in the breach than the
observance.
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The administrative structures of Medicaid in most-if not all-states have indeed
favored the providers (just as welfare administration and funding fluctuates accord-
ing to the perceptions and interests of persons other than the recipients). Advisory
committees have tended to reflect majority interests. Connecticut, for example, set
up a medical advisory committee to assist the welfare commissioner review claims
for payment to physicians. The committee consisted entirely of physicians-fifteen
selected from a list of nominees submitted by the state medical society and eight
others added by the commissioner, the latter including university medical school
representatives and medical administrators from three major insurance companies.
Medicaid programs were also allowed to use private fiscal agents to administer the
program. In Connecticut, where the insurance industry has a powerful lobby, an
insurance company was appointed as fiscal agent.26° In theory, the use of private
agents was similar to the use of fiscal intermediaries and carriers under Medicare,
and it might have been supposed that the opportunity would be firmly grasped in
the states to run both programs on a similar basis.26 ' But, in at least one state
which expected such intermeshing of administration, the levels of usual and cus-
tomary fees for physicians as determined under Medicare were held by the carrier
to be confidential information and were not released to the Medicaid administrators,
and the situation is thought to have been similar in other states.
The use of fiscal agents, in some cases for different parts of one state program,
added to the confusion in available information about Medicaid in all the states: the
California budget crisis of 1967 was merely the most spectacular example. Budgetary
confusion was compounded by the problem of whether the amounts "tossed out"
from time to time were the total costs of all payments for medical care to welfare
recipients and the medically needy, whether state costs alone were being quoted,
whether the costs of services to welfare recipients and the medically needy were
separated, and so on. Over and above this was a serious deficiency in information
about the extent and costs of the services which were actually being provided.
"0 Freeland, Medicaid in Connecticut: The First Year, 1968 (paper on file with the authors).
California also used three fiscal agents rather than having direct payment to providers. See note
262 infra. Although incurring a good deal of criticism (e.g., APWA SuRvY, supra note 255, at 15;
BARtNS, supra note 62, at iox-o6; Mans-CAL, supra note 62, at 40-42) the idea of using outside agencies
for administration was endorsed by the TASK Foraca Ra,'o'r, supra note 22x, at xoo. On the operation
of the fiscal agents, see R. Girard, The Use of Fiscal Agents in Medicaid: Who Does What, Why and How,
1970 (paper on file with the authors).
Alabama has the most curious method in terms of fiscal agents for Medicaid. Inpatient, outpatient,
and emergency hospital services, together with skilled nursing home services are reimbursed through
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama as the fiscal agent. Laboratory and x-ray services outside these
categories, physician services, eyeglasses, and optometric services are reimbursed through the Equitable
Life Assurance Society. Prescribed drugs and non-legend drugs are reimbursed, for reasons unexplained,
through the State National Bank of Decatur. CCH MEnieCAI & MniscAsr) GUIDE para. 15,55o. 1970
STAFF REPoRT, supra note 13x, at 285 also notes that Blue Shield (and not Equitable) is carrier for
Medi-are part B, while Blue Cross and Mutual of Omaha are carriers for part A. Id. at 262, 267.
2"' On the functions of such intermediaries under title XVIII, see 42 U.S.C. § 13 9 5h (Supp. I, 1965),
"Use of public agencies or private organizations to facilitate payments to providers of services" under
part A), and id. § 1395u, "Use of carriers for administration of benefits" under part B.
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The welfare departments in smaller states have been hard-pressed enough in account-
ing to their legislatures for expanding welfare budgets and at the same time
explaining their limited services to welfare rights organizations, let alone in pro-
posing expensive new systems for data collection and analysis.
But the larger states have fared little better. 62 Across the country huge multi-
million dollar programs were established without the basic mechanisms of program
accountability. The tradition of inadequate statistical data was carried through from
the welfare programs into Medicaid. As a result, the administrators of the Medicaid
programs (and other interested groups, including the recipients themselves) had
little ammunition to defend the operations or to justify the rapidly increasing
expenditures.
Everywhere states seemed to have basic problems of effective administration.
New York's administration was a kind of standing complaint with the federal
government, providers, and recipients. During 1968, private hospitals even evicted
Medicaid patients, and the drug stores held a brief boycott of Medicaid. 20 4 There
have been standing disputes between the state Department of Social Welfare and
New York City since the program began because the city was anxious to have a
rigorous audit of physicians, and saw the need to have some limits on freedom of
choice for Medicaid patients 0 5 But the city was also in trouble with the state
because of its plan to mix payments made for Medicaid patients being treated in
the municipal hospitals with general city funds.266 While that dispute was settled
in favor of the state, the city in late x968 refused to go along with a state rule
requiring payment of doctors in teaching hospitals for general supervision of
.6 Officials in California made more strenuous and imaginative efforts than most states to set up
statistical reporting methods; information such as type of procedure and primary diagnosis was coded by
a clerk in the offices of the fiscal agents, together with other information such as date and type of service,
amount of payment, claim and check number, and identification of recipient and vendor. Each month
the agents sent the resulting tapes to the state Department of Health, which was the responsible agency
until September 1967 (when responsibility was shifted to the welfare Agency). Such information was,
however, limited in usefulness. It only referred to bills paid (and there was an initial allowable time
lag of up to seven months between service and payment) and comprised relatively crude data, since it was
derived from claim forms carried over from the time of hand-processing and providing far from specific
information about service utilization. The head of the Medi-Cal Surveillance Unit later remarked, "The
possible uses of computers within the new health care programs have scarcely been touched." See
Anderson, Statistical Surveillance of a Title XIX Program, 59 Am. J. Ptm. H.ALTH 275 (1969).
... States reported a total sum of $r7. million spent on the costs of administering medical assistance
payments in fiscal x969, of which 52 per cent was from federal funds (and 9 per cent from local
funds). Much of this was, however, being funneled to pay the salaries of social workers and supporting
welfare offices, in the expensive process of determining a potential recipient's eligibility, rather than
in ensuring the efficient operation of the whole system. PtmLic Ass~sANea Cosr O St m AND LoCAL
ADaINIsT'B.x.rAoTN, SaRsVICFS AND TRAINING, supra note 172, table 8.
... Petrina, supra note 174, at 27.
21'N.Y. Tmes, Dec. 9, 1966, at 35, col. 5. The city also wanted to license under Medicaid only
these nursing homes licensed under Medicare. Id., Dec. 31, 1966, at 1, col. 1,
200 Id., Oct. 27, 1966, at 29, col. i; id., Dec. z8, x966, § 4, at 13, col. 5; id., Jan. 6, z967, at 32, col.
4- By the end of 1966, the hospitals were in desperate financial shape in New York City because of the
delays in reimbursement of Medicare and Medicaid. Id., Dec. 3, 1966, at I, col. 4; id., Dec. 4, 1966,
at x, col. x.
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Medicaid patients.267 New York City has also perpetuated other crises, being not
only a center of alleged fraud, but being in the lead in most disputes. 68 And when
New York City has not taken the lead, the state has, as with the attempts to
freeze payments to hospitals despite the reimbursement requirements in the law.
Perhaps the weaknesses in state welfare and health departments are insuperable.
The disenchantment with state administration was so widespread that even the
Senate Finance Committee staff, working for a committee dominated by Southerners,
demanded far more rigorous federal control. But it may well be questioned how far
such guidelines would help unless there were also radical restructuring of the
departments within the states. The second McNerney Report made it clear that
the ideal would be to federalize health care almost entirely, although it suggested
that some improvements might be attempted in state administration in the mean-
time.269 That the urge was to give more power to HEW, whose defects in this
field were manifest, was a mark of the even graver defects in state administration.
The ultimate solution will not be easy. We would argue that if medical care is
to be considered a right and some administration is to be provided which will stand
up to the powerful providers of medical care, then it will have to have a federal base.
Even with federal administrative back-up, however, it would not be easy for the
majority of states to enter into this role. Regional HEW offices would have the
capability, but only if their purpose were fundamentally altered. The political
attraction of giving even greater power to fiscal agents is obvious. But if that line
of development is followed, it may have to be coupled with some type of federally
chartered and regulated medical care corporations.
C. Relations with Providers
The providers of services under title XIX have basically been dealing with the
state agencies in the absence of federal legislation or effective regulation from MSA
-at least during the crucial period of development of the program. The one excep-
tion to this is inpatient hospital care, where the 1965 legislation laid down the test
of "reasonable cost," which, as has been seen, was linked with the Medicare test 70
But elsewhere the battles have normally been between providers' groups and state
agencies, and, as the Senate Finance Committee data revealed, normally the providers
have fared well.7 1 It is true that occasionally the battles have been between groups
M They would have been paid for patients seen by residents and interns. The Citizens Committee
for Children, a private group, deplored this "Medicaid windfall of over S2o million a year" for
physicians while eligibility levels were being cut. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2o, 1968, at 44, col. 2.
' sE.g., the refusal to reimburse corporations formed to advance fees to doctors and to collect
them from the welfare agency. Petrina, supra note 174, at 28-29. The 1970 STAIF1 REPORT, supra note
131, at 13o, recommends the end of such collection agencies. That recommendation has yet to be
implemented.
'8 TAsK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 221, at 53-70.
25 See p. 364 supra.
""Thus some skilled Nursing Homes did better under state Medicaid programs than they were
doing as Extended Care Facilities under title XVIII. 1969 STAF REP ORT, supra note 202, at 30.
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of providers as when the specialists fought the general practitioners in Kentucky
over differential fees272 or when internecine warfare broke out over differentials
between optometrists and ophthalmologists in Rhode Island.273 But where the pro-
viders have been united, it has generally been the recipients who have suffered.
Much of the difficulty lies with the very concept of vendor payments. The state
neither employs nor contracts with its providers of services; it has merely paid the
bills according to established criteria. When these criteria revolved around reduced
fees-for example, lower fees for welfare patients than for private patients-the state
(and the vendor) might well take the view that the provider of services (hospital,
doctor, dentist) was doing the state a favor. The provider was part of the charity
system. (Indeed there are still some hospitals in this country with the word charity
in their name.) With Medicaid's on the whole much more generous reimbursement
procedures, this aspect of favor was taken away. Yet the relationship between state
welfare department and vendor was not substantially changed. While being paid
more reasonably, the aspect of favor on the part of providers has remained. Pro-
viders have tended to react with surprise at any apparent limitation on their freedom
of action under Medicaid. States, on the other hand, have tended to accommodate
themselves to the wishes of the providers to ensure widespread participation in their
Medicaid programs.74
Such a situation is barely surprising in view of the methods which Congress
adopted for the administration of Medicaid. Indeed had the states not been pliable
the net result would merely have been to ensure a lower rate of participation on the
part of providers. As suggested in the previous section, the only solution may be
to develop some new hybrid creature to administer the program in the sense of
purchasing the services of providers. Some such powerful monopsony may, in the
long run, be the only way of coping with the various legalized monopolies which
comprise the providers of medical care.
These administrative and economic weaknesses, however, are equally apparent in
the unfair contest between the providers and the understaffed, undervalued, and
underinformed members of the welfare and health departments in the different states.
272 AMA News, July 4, 1966.
275 For a detailed study of this on-going battle, see B. Burke, Medicaid Negotiations in Rhode Island:
A Case Study, 1970 (paper on file with the authors).
"" One example of this is Tennessee, where the Medicaid program was reported early in 1970 to be
hamstrung by ineffective physician participation, although the president of the Tennessee Medical Asso-
ciation stated that doctors were in fact seeing poor patients but "just aren't following through with the
forms." To counter this, physician fees under Medicaid were doubled, retroactive to January i, z97o -
from 5o% to ioo% of a rate equivalent to three fourths of usual and customary fees. AMA News,
Jan. 12, 1970, and Feb. 2, X970.
Providers have also complained about the additional work involved in making claims. For example,
the Massachusetts Medical Society (a state which spent nearly 8% of its $236 million Medicaid budget
on physician services in x969) protested vigorously against the introduction of new, more complicated
vendor payment forms designed by the Department of Welfare as part of a new computerized admin-
istrative system. AMA News, Oct. 6, x969. From the management viewpoint the issue is one of delicate
balance between the exercise of public accountability and the ability to offer adequate services to patients.
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The most interesting of these battles has been between the most prestigious and
highly paid of the health professions-the physicians-and the state departments.
It has not been an entirely noble story. The AMA opposed Kerr-Mills because it
claimed that physicians already provided care to the elderly poor free of charge 5
It opposed the medical care package in 1965 on the ground that no one in the
United States went without medical care merely because he was poor2 7 Thus when
physicians began to be paid for their services under Kerr-Mills in i96o and under
title XIX in 1965, they received a sudden and significant increase in their incomes,
2 77
allegedly for services they were already donating.
In view of the emphasis the medical profession places on public service-an
emphasis heavily underlined in all Congressional hearings on medical care since
the days of the New Deal-one might have expected that they would be satisfied
171 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Problems of the Aged and the Aging of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-42, 228 (i96o). Dr. James Z. Appel of the AMA
Board of Trustees described the AMA view of the aged: "[n]o other age group is likely to have as
favorable a liquid asset position," and "[m]ost older people are in good health." He also reaffirmed
the AMA view that "[m]edical care is available to every man, woman, and child in the United States
regardless of his or her ability to pay.... Physicians themselves are doing what they can as individuals
to soften medical expenses for persons over 65 with modest resources. Public welfare, religious, and
fraternal programs and donated services by doctors provide care for the indigent." The AMA News
had an editorial urging "State medical groups to publicize the fact that no one who needs medical
attention need go without it because he is without funds."
The AMA took the same line in the hearings on the Social Security Amendments of 196o-which
gave rise to the Kerr-Mills program. See Hearings on H.R. 1258o Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 86th Cong., 2d Ses. 203, 206 (596o). Dr. Leonard Larson, President-Elect of the AMA
asserted that "[t]he financial problems of the aged have also been greatly exaggerated . . . we have
proved, again and again, that no person in the United States need go without medical care because he
is unable to pay for it."
270 Z965 Hearings, slupra note 33, at 6o2-i2 contained the testimony of Dr. Donovan F. Ward, the
President of the AMA. He observed, "[w]e believe, and have consistently held, that all Americans
should have available to them the best medical care, when they need it, regardless of their ability to pay
for it. This care is primarily a personal responsibility, but where the individual requires financial
assistance, we believe that such aid should come from his family, his community, and where necessary,
from all levels of government." But "[long waits, poor equipment and facilities, short, impersonal
examinations, and lots of record-keeping appear to be the major accomplishments of nationalized health
systems." Among other things, Dr. Ward noted that "physicians have a far better record than hospitals
in keeping the price of their services within bounds. In the past 25 years, physicians' fees have risen
only ioo per cent while the overall cost of living has increased 115 per cent." The Medical Association of
Alabama opposed the legislation because "the administration of the proposed program will result in con-
trol of both the vendor and the recipient of the services. We sincerely believe that such a step would
be dangerous to the physical health of our people, not in the public interest, and an improper function
of the Federal Government. The practice of medicine-art and science-is a highly individualized
endeavor, fitting particular needs with best available remedies, and does not lend itself to rigid rules or
regimentation. . . . The physicians of Alabama respectfully remind you that we have always given
freely of our time and talents for the needy. We desire and expect to continue to contribute our time
and efforts, and we believe that we can best serve our patients without third-party interference." Id.
at 664-66.
1771d. at 681. The immediate past president of the Pennsylvania Medical Society stated "[t]hat
Pennsylvania physicians provided $41,969,ooo worth of free care during i96o. This free care was
apportioned on the following basis: 28.4 per cent resulted from treating private patients without
charge; 37.3 per cent resulted from hospital ward service; 24.3 per cent was provided in outpatient
clinic service; io per cent resulted from free care to all other persons . . . "
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with any reasonable and unexpected increase in their incomes. But the conjunction
of Medicaid with Medicare raised a new possibility-that physicians would be able
to release themselves and their patients from the clutches of welfare reimbursements,
in favor of "usual, customary, and prevailing" fees-the title XVIII basis of payment.
In fact, the general impression has been created that physicians have on the one hand
been ungrateful with respect to the financial bonus and, at the same time, frequently
insensitive to the attempts to change the psychological atmosphere of welfare
medicine. Worse still, there has been extensive evidence of profiteering, fraud on
the Medicaid program, and, allegedly, a propensity to cheat the Internal Revenue
Service on the part of some members of the medical profession.
The battle about usual or customary fees and the fee schedule has marked the
disputes about Medicaid from the very beginning. It was in the end to lead to
federal intervention at the White House level to curb fees in 1969. But, in the
meantime, it had soured relations in many states. Inevitably in New York there
were problems. While the state medical society had in general supported Medicaid,
by mid-i966 there was trouble about fees. During May, a task force from the state
Budget Bureau drew up a suggested scale of charges, while the medical society
endorsed a more generous one 7s The Governor claimed that the state fee scale was
slightly above the ones which the private insurance carriers had been paying,270
while the doctors still argued that the "rates [were] considerably below those in
most, if not all, communities." 2s0 In the end some kind of compromise was worked
out with a gubernatorial Interdepartmental Committee on Health Economics,
which represented the state281 but was assisted by a five-man advisory committee
of the state medical society
s28
A large state with a powerful governor was able to resist pressure from physicians.
For instance, California, while providing for reasonable charges in the light of usual
and customary fees, put ceilings on the amounts the fiscal agents could in fact
pay28 3 But in other states the pressure for establishing Medicaid often came from
the physicians-for example, in Virginias--but on the condition that the physician
fee arrangements were the same as in Medicare. In Pennsylvania, the state medical
society organized an elaborate lobbying program to show how much they were sub-
sidizing title XIX because they were being paid on a fee scale rather than their
usual and customary fee. Each physician was asked to send statements to patients
and to the state welfare department showing the degree of "subsidization" in each
17 The scales are set out in Minutes of Special Meeting of House of Delegates, May 26, z966, in 66
N.Y. STATE J. MrD. 2332 (x966).
""N.Y. Times, July 5, 1966, at 76, col. x.
=" Id., Dec. xS, 1966, § 4, at 13, col. 5.
81 Id., Aug. 6, x966, at 1o, cOl. 7.
282 i9 N.Y. STATE DFP'T HEALTH WNEEKTy BULL. x91 (Nov. 28, 1966).
... BA.rNEs, supra note 62, at xo8 et seq.
"' M.D.'s Request Title XIX, AMA News, Nov. 13, 1967.
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case.28  In other states-for example, Massachusetts-physicians lobbied for the
appointment of Blue Shield, a physician dominated organization, as the fiscal
agent.28 6
Connecticut provides an example of a middle-of-the-road state. It established
a relatively cautious program in 1967 with moderate eligibility standards and a fee
schedule for physicians and other individual providers with a Hospital Cost Com-
mission for reimbursing the hospitals. The latter has had a long history in Con-
necticut, having been first established in 1949.287 Indeed its tradition was so strong
that for the first few years of Medicaid it refused to apply the federal formula
for reimbursement and actually paid hospitals less-a fact that clearly surprised the
federal officials when Connecticut was given its first PREP at the end of i967 8s
More interesting, however, was the pressure put on the legislature to drop the fee
schedule and pay physicians their usual and customary fees. The administration of
the program in Connecticut is subject to a battery of committees-a Professional
Policy Committee, a Professional Advisory Committee, and a Medical Advisory
Committee, a configuration which helped to confuse even federal officials.289 Ulti-
mately, despite the financial crisis in the state Medicaid program, the legislature
passed Public Act 548 in 1967, which called for the payment of usual and customary
fees for an experimental period between March 1968 and March 1969. The experi-
ment was tried; physicians participated more readily, but costs skyrocketed.290
After hearings in February 1969, and the listing by name of major physician
beneficiaries of Medicaid in local Connecticut newspapers, Connecticut returned to
a fee schedule. The medical profession was displeased, but in the end it was the
recipients who suffered-it became much more difficult to persuade a physician to
take a title XIX patient.291 Compared with the physicians, the other providers caused
"id., Apr. 1, I968. The bills were to be marked: "The difference between the state payment
and the customary fee represents the service gratuitously provided by the physicians."
I d., Dec. 9, 1968.
. N. Gellman, Hospital Reimbursement Under Medicaid in Connecticut 12 et seq., 1970 (paper on
file with the authors).
.s CONNECTicUT TirE XIX MwicAto PREP Rwcvw, November-December x967, at 9. The 1967 legis-
lature passed an act to allow appeals from the HCC to the regular courts, and under that legislation a
number of hospitals brought a successful action against the HCC, the latter being found to have abused
its discretion. The Commission was ordered by the Superior Court to reconsider its rates in accordance
with the mandate of the statute. It refusedl And the 1969 legislature abolished appeals from the HCC
to the courts, substituting binding arbitration. On this and related matters, see Gellman, supra note 287,
at 16-xg.
New York was less successful in its efforts to avoid paying the hospitals under title XIX according
to the title XVIII formula. In Catholic Medical Center v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. x256 (E.D.N.Y.
1969), the court refused to give a preliminary injunction until it had heard HEW as amicus curiae,
but it expressed serious doubt that a New York statute freezing hospital rates under Medicaid at their
March 31, 1969, levels was lawful.
... See Freeland, supra note 26o, at 8 and passim.
... In April x968, physician services had cost Connecticut Medicaid $66,718. By December, the sum
was $518,347. New Haven Register, Jan. 2o, 1969.
"'
1T. Mitchell, Physician Participation in Medicaid in New Haven, Connecticut, 1970 (paper on file
with the authors).
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little problem.292
In any event, by the summer of 1969 the idea of "usual and customary" fees
was almost a dead issue in the tide XIX program, for the federal government had
moved to freeze physician fees.293 The rather rapid change of heart had come
because of the general rise in costs described earlier and because a pattern of excessive
payments to physicians and dentists had emerged and with them growing evidence
of fraud on the part of various groups of providers.
The first rumblings of these matters were heard shortly after the beginning of
tide XIX. At the end of 1966, in New York State, Senator Thaler of Queens claimed
misuse of funds by a Staten Island hospital? 4 Early in 1967 the General Accounting
Office reported rumors of physician misuse of drugs and nursing homes in the
Cleveland area.295 By August of that year, as part of a campaign by Senator Thaler
to expose New York City's hospitals, there were allegations of excessive visits and
prescribing under title XIX in New York City-a state of affairs conceded to exist
by the city's Health Services Administration.?" By the time the Senate held hear-
ings on the 1967 amendments later in the fall, the Finance Committee was prepared
to investigate the increasing allegations of abuses-a procedure in which the Chair-
man of the AMA's Board of Trustees concurred. 297 But already-particularly in
California-the allegations of fraud by physicians, pharmacists, dentists, and others
were reaching epidemic proportions. The October issue of Parade charged that
during the first eighteen months, 1200 physicians had been paid an average of nearly
$70,000 each.298 Although the President of the California Medical Association denied
that there had been abuse by providers, and instead claimed that Medi-Cal had
saved taxpayers millions because of effective utilization review, 299 there was in-
creasing evidence from all over the country that many physicians had at least not
been particularly restrained in their billing;s°° and this was true, on a lesser scale,
of other groups.
Inappropriate care, high costs, and fraud were not of course necessarily related,
592 The worst problem came from the dentists, whose leadership has boycotted the program from
time to time; but according to PREP roughly half the dentists in the state have actually participated. For
a study of the politics of this, see R. Gomes, The American Dental Association and the Connecticut State
Dental Association Policies Regarding Participation in the Medicaid Program, 1970 (paper on file with
the authors).
"9 For details see part III, section C. For implementation of the 1969 charges see State Letter No.
io63, Medical Services Administration, Social and Rehabilitation Service, Mar. 13, 1969; Soasa IMPLcA-
"IONS OF THE INTERIM POLICY PuBLiSHED x JULY x969 oN REIMBURSEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL PaRACTrIONERS
BY STATE UNDER TITLE XIX OF TnR SocrAL SEcmurr AcT (July IO, x969).
"'N.Y. Tunes, Oct. 25, 1966, at 34, col. I.
295 200 J.A.M.A. 47 (1967).
201 N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, I967, at i, col. 2.
:072o2 J.A.M.A. 46 (1967).
"98 AMA News, Nov. 13, 1967.
:9D MED. TIBUNE, Nov. 6, 1967.
o0 E.g., at hearings in Elmira, New York, in 1968, a chiropractor was discovered to have billed
Medicaid for the spinal manipulation of a seven-month-old infant, a dentist to have received $8o,ooo from
Medicaid in 1967. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, x968, at 26, col. I.
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but they became so in the press, as concern over all three mounted simultaneously.
The line between inept management on the part of administrators and fraud on the
part of providers is never clear. The existence of fraud was, however, the most
flagrant administrative deficiency, and on a major scale the easiest to identify.
Moreover as time passed, the rumors of fraud were being shown to have more than
a core of truth. In November 1967, the California Department of Justice held hear-
ings in Los Angeles, and, while it gave the nonprofit hospitals a clean bill of health,
it found that overservicing, kickbacks, and duplicate billings "seem to be predominant
in physician-owned hospitals." ' The following month the state Attorney General
made public a report showing that $8 million had been "drained" from Medi-Cal by
unethical means. Hospitals, doctors, the fiscal agents, and almost all providers came
in for attack3° The Attorney General of Maryland announced he was investigating
frauds by physicians, dentists, and pharmacists.303 By the end of the month, pro-
viders in Massachusetts were under attack (one dentist was said to have grossed
$i64,ooo in x968 from Medicaid),3 4 and the prosecution of ten physicians for fraud
had begun in Maryland 03 5
The new administration had inherited accumulated evidence of fraud. On taking
office as Undersecretary of HEW, John Veneman announced, "We have to move
toward eliminating greed in Medicare and Medicaid whether on the part of the
recipients or the vendors." 306 The press was increasingly reporting incidents of
fraud; and the position was not helped when HEW announced that forty-seven
doctors had been paid more than $5oooo under title XVIII during the previous year.
The collapse of the Medicaid program in New Mexico was attributed by some to
the greed of the providers;307 while in May, in reporting the Senate's investigation,
the Associated Press report carried the theme that "Medicaid Reported Bilked Out
of Hundreds of Millions of Dollars."308 Even the Chicago Tribune, normally more
harsh on recipients than providers, was forced to admit that "in the health programs
the cheating is being done mainly by unscrupulous doctors and sticky-fingered func-
tionaries."3 09
There was inevitably a demand for the publishing of the names of highly paid
physicians. As Senator John Williams of Delaware put it, "The only way to end this
sort of thing is to name names and sums of money and put it on the front pages all
over the country." 310 The states complied. For instance, in Maryland it turned out
... Tsus VWrax roa HossprrALs, Nov. x5, 1968.
... AMA News, Dec. 2, 1968.
"Id., Dec. 23, 1968.
Do& Id., Dec. 9, 1968.
"Id., Dec. 30, z968.
"Id., Feb. I7, x969.
.. Rocky Mountain News, Feb. z8, 1969 (Denver).
"'E.g., Press Herald, May i6, 1969 (Portland, Me.).
°AMA News, July 21, 1969.
.. Id., Mar. so, x969.
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that one-fifth of the $4 million paid to 2470 physicians under Medicaid had gone to
twenty-eight of them. One physician received almost $50,000 while thirteen others
got more than $3oooo. Thirty-nine dentists were paid more than $io,ooo, and one
drug store received $245,497.P-1 By April 1969 the Senate Finance Committee was
notifying states that it wanted data on all physicians paid more than $25,ooo under
title XIX in 1968.12 The AMA expressed concern about abuse by physicians,"'3 but
many local medical societies were protective about their members. The California
legislature introduced special legislation to punish defrauding providers,3 14 while
Senator Long pressed for sending data to the IRS 15
While some doctors no doubt were paid large sums under title XIX because
they chose to work in low-income areas, some of the data which gradually emerged
was remarkable31 In Maryland, after a "nolo" plea, six physicians and a dental
intern were put on probation and returned $68,ooo to the state, a sum which had
been illegally billed to Medicaid. The highest payment to a physician in Michigan
proved to be $169,ooo, while three osteopaths were alleged to have filed over $8ooooo
in claims. In Kentucky, ten physicians received more than $5oooo each; the highest
payment to a physician in Illinois was $xio,8o6; and Kansas reported cases of
revoking licenses and banning participation for fraud8 17 It finally emerged that,
in 1968, at least 1329 MDs received more than $25,000 and 290 received more than
$50,000 from tide XIX, while over 7000 received more than $25,000 from Medicare.818
In many ways, the physicians looked better than the nursing homes in the
1969 hearings-for weak administration in Washington and the states had made
the nursing home industry the center of shady business deals and gross fraud; 10
but when the 1968 payment statistics were released as part of the 197o Staff Study
it was the physicians who received pride of place320 Moreover, there was further
"lid., Mar. x7, x969.
Id., Apr. 7, z969.
513 Id., Apr. 21, 1969.
814 Id., Apr. 21, 1969, and May 26, x969. Similar legislation was also proposed in Massachusetts. Id.,
Apr. 29, 1969.
... Id., June 3o, 1969. See also z969 Hearings, supra note z35, at 92 et seq. Changes were made
in the IRS reporting requirements in November 1969, but the z97o Stafg Report still considered the
arrangements open to abuse. 1970 STAFF REPoRT, supra note 131, at 145.
... The figures, as originally issued, had shown 68 physicians collecting more than $2oo,0oo per
annum from Medicaid. AMA News, July 21, 1969.
317 Id.
318 1969 Hearings, supra note 135, at x61-62. But even these were incomplete figures and had to be
revised upwards later. See note 321 infra.
... The casualness of administration in California, for instance, allowed 225 ineligible nursing homes
to participate. AMA News, July 2z, z969; 1969 Hearings, supra note 135, at x15-22. See also 1970
STAFF REPoRT, supra note 131, at 97-104.
8201t finally emerged that, under Medicaid, solo practitioners had been paid the following sums over
Soo,ooo in 1968: California-$iox,968, S2x,188, $105,513, $X32,975, $152,458, $xoi,o6r, S132,921;
Illinois--$o3,698, $104,872, $102,357, $xio,8o6; Kentucky--$19,768, $r03,255, $108,490; Michigan-
$aoo,5o8, $107,758, $122,464, S112,451, $I69,o61, $203,402; New York-$55,x34, $363,iox, $1,356,978,
$xxi,869, $110,592, $101,604, $292,304, S13,781, $142,208, $X13,146, $121,025, $115,752, $123,774,
$io6,618, $119,6zi, 615r,932; Oklahoma--$oo,623. 1970 STAF R.Po.T, supra note 131, at 163-98.
MEDICAID: ANATOMY OF A DILEMMA
agitation when, later in 1970, the Treasury Department claimed that one-third of the
physicians with large payments under Medicaid had cheated in their tax returns. 21
Nevertheless, it was increasingly accepted that the freezing and utilization changes
made in 1969 had taken care of the worst abuse problem. Indeed, the action
appeared to have shifted to the government's right to police the quality of care in
Medicaid and other programs of governmental health care. In July 1969, the
AMA passed a resolution opposing any governmental auditing of quality care in
favor of professional peer review.32 In a biting response the New York City Depart-
ment of Health refuted the AMA position, pointing out the large amount of low-
quality care being provided under Medicaid-at least in New York City. The
lines were being drawn for the next step in the battle. 24
D. Recipients
Fraud on Medicaid is not limited to providers. There have been well-documented
frauds among recipients ranging through the usual frauds associated with any means-
test program to examples of impersonation and "doctor shopping." 25 But the recent
study from the New York City audit program has concluded, "In comparison to the
abuse emanating from providers of care, we estimate the dollar cost of patient abuse
to be relatively negligible. 320 Indeed, the first McNerney Report, in its effort to
551 Evidence presented by the Treasury Department to the Senate Finance Committee showed that
some 4000 of those ii,ooo physicians who had earned more than $25,000 from Medicare and Medicaid
in 1968 had failed to report all or most of it. In some cases the unreported income exceeded $xooooo.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1970.
.
2 The more socially aware spirit abroad among members of the medical profession was the product
of various influences, not least of these was the profession's own public image. The President of the
New Haven County Medical Society (Dr. Charles Verstandig) warned members "we've got to quit
strangling the goose that can lay those golden eggs. . . . The temptation to get rich while the
getting's good is powerful. . . . A lot of our group have payments to make on their apartment house
complexes, their shopping centers, their outside business interests.... You can't blame the average patient
for thinking that we doctors are living much too high on the hog." New Haven Register, Mar. 28, 1969.
That the problem has survived is reflected in the frankly mercenary approach to Medicaid on the part
of some professionals. For example in the "Professional Practices for Sale" section of the N.Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 1970: "General medical practice. Tremendous Medicaid area. Gold mine. Rent or sale."
... Bellin & Kavaler, Policing Publicly Funded Health Care for Poor Quality, Over-utilization, and
Fraud-the New York City Medicare Experience, 6o A.m. J. PuB. HEALATH 8i (1970). In a study of
optometric service, for instance, 17.2% of patients had received "unsatisfactory care." In x968 the New
York City auditing program for Medicaid cost $681,475 and saved $27,398,737. For a detailed analysis
of the New York "Watchdog" System for Medicaid, see 1970 STAF'F REPoPT, supra note 131, at
249-52.
' Unfortunately, we know far too little about Medicaid seen from the point of view of providers.
HEW has commissioned only one study, now being done at the Graduate School of Public Health at the
University of Pittsburgh. In an attempt to find out about use and attitude, four questionnaires have been
developed; they are directed to hospital administrators, physicians, dentists, and community groups.
Preliminary results should be available shortly. Letter from Edmund M. Ricci, Graduate School of Public
Health, University of Pittsburgh, to authors, Apr. 21, 1970.
.. Because of the freedom of choice provision, Medicaid patients sometimes see a number of
physicians in connection with the same problem. For an example, see 1970 ST'AFF REPoRT, supra note 131,
at 128. This kind of problem is avoided in the national health programs of most developed societies by
requiring that beneficiaries register with one primary physician or facility.
..o Bellin & Kavaler, supra note 323, at 815.
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provide a method "for determining eligibility" that would "be simple and fast and
...preserve dignity and self-respect of applicant" came down in favor of the
declaration system in place of the formal means test.
32
Unfortunately, getting on Medicaid has not always been as easy as it might
have been. 28  It will be remembered that, in New York, Governor Rockefeller
justified the apparently generous eligibility level on the ground that he was expecting
only twenty to twenty-five per cent to sign up, an expectation that was largely
fulfilled. Thus, although New York City made efforts to register the "medically
indigent,""2 9 culminating in "Medicaid Alert" in January 1967,330 most of the en-
rollees were already on welfare rather than being "medically indigent." Connecticut
claimed to have handled its sign-up program more vigorously. Indeed, State
Welfare Commissioner Bernard Shapiro explained the discrepancy between his
claim that tide XIX would cost the state no more than existing vendor payment
programs331 and the $15 million deficit at the end of 1967 in terms of the wide-
spread publicity. 2 But the PREP Report made at the end of 1967 still found that
the state did not provide adequate arrangements for emergency eligibility services
and that "the agency has been taking far too long to determine eligibility." ' 8
The difficulty of obtaining Medicaid care became proverbial in New York, but
there were other weaknesses in the system. The New York Times claimed that the
form to be filled in to obtain Medicaid was "at least as difficult as the long-form
tax return" and "could prove an impenetrable barrier to the least affluent who also
tend to be the least educated. 3   More confusing still for the potential recipient
was the reflection of the confusion felt by many Welfare Departments about the
categories of eligibility under title XIX. As suggested earlier, out of the patchwork
of the 1965 and 1967 laws, a series of courageous glossators have suggested cate-
35 7 INTaUm TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 221, at 1-2.
"' There is still too little data about "getting off" Medicaid. The details of the fair hearing procedure,
required under the x965 legislation, were laid down in a regulation published in January x969, but the
studies of the operation of the fair hearing procedures in the New York and Connecticut programs, cur-
rently being undertaken at Yale, are not available. For some of the problems encounterd in a Maryland
fair hearing situation, see MAraaxALs oz; HEaT LAw, supra note 1, at 381-83.
32 N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, z966, at 45, col. X; id., Oct. 4, 1966, at 37, col. 4; id., Nov. 28, 1966, at x,
col. 4. The N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1967, at 26, col. 2, editorialized that the "slow rate of enrollment has
given rise to worries exactly the opposite to those expressed by many critics when the enabling legislation
was rushed through the State Legislature . . . the people who are supposed to benefit from it most are
the people who know about it least." See id., Dec. 12, 1966, at 63, col. 1.
...By November only I8,5oo out of a possible 4 million had registered in New York City. Id.,
Nov. 28, 1966, at z, col. 4. Welfare recipients were paid $1.50 an hour to sign up new enrollees. Id.,
Jan. 20, 1967, at 88, col. I.
381 SA-T OF CoNNEcrctrr, Pus.ic WEL.LFsR TRENDS io-ii (Oct.-Dec. x965).
.. Address by Commissioner Shapiro to Lions Club of Hartford, Conn., in PtuLs WELFARE TRENDS
(July-Sept. x967). By that time, some 16,218 out of a possible 50,340 eligible for Medicaid as "med-
ically indigent" had signed up.
... PRE R vvw, supra note 288, at 2, 13. Of the PREP Report, the State Welfare Department noted
only that "An Administrative review by the Federal Government of this program (Title XIX) resulted
in commendations to the State for the services available and program administration." CONN. DP'T
OF WELFARE, ANNuAL REPORT To Tma GOVERNOR 46 (1968-i969).
.. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1967, at 26, col. 2.
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gories of persons who may be covered. But decisions made in the state capital do
not always filter down to the local welfare department or individual social workers.335
The potential recipient of Medicaid, then, may be faced with a humiliating and
complex means test and either confusing or inadequate advice. He will also be
faced with gradually receding eligibility levels and marked differences in entitle-
ment and services among the states. New York State in 1968 spent $63.95 per in-
habitant while twenty-one states spent less than $io per inhabitant33 6 The year before
it had been estimated that potential coverage ranged from forty-five per cent of the
population in New York to seven per cent in Massachusetts, with actual utilization
ranging from a high of eleven per cent in New York to a low of 2.5 per cent in
North Dakota a 7
Recipients might well be thought to be discriminated against by the variation of
services available to them in the different states. For those receiving cash under
federally supported public assistance, programs had to provide seven basic services
by July i97o: inpatient hospital care, outpatient hospital services, other laboratory
or x-ray services, skilled nursing home services for those over twenty-one, screen-
ing and treatment for those under twenty-one, physician services, and home health
services. But beyond that, states had great latitude. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming offered no program to the "medically
indigent." Mississippi provided no services other than the required ones to the
groups compulsorily covered, while Wyoming offered only transportation by way
of such service. New Mexico, on the other hand, although having no program for
the categorically related or the "medical indigent" category, offered to welfare
recipients home health services, drugs, dental services, eyeglasses, hearing aids,
prosthetic devices, physical therapy, private duty nursing, optometrists' services,
podiatrists' services, chiropractic services, clinic services, transportation, and other
diagnostic services. At the other end of the scale, California, Connecticut, Minnesota,
New York, and North Dakota offered every additional service for which a federal
contribution was available to those covered by the categorically related programs.
555 For instance, the title XIX informational pamphlet issued in July 1969 and entitled Medical Care
for People in Connecticut dassifies as a category "Parents or other relatives with whom a child under
21 years of age is living with sufficient income or resources to meet their general living expenses but not
enough to meet the cost of medical care." But spot checks have shown that social workers in Connecticut
(including those working in the hospitals) have advised their clients that this is not a category of "medical
indigence" in Connecticut, except for those under 21. For a study of the procedures for applying for
Medicaid in Connecticut, and especially the risk of being refused after services have been performed,
see Lahav, The Treatment of Title XIX Patients in Health Care Facilities 2-6, 1970 (paper on file with
the authors).
"  U.S. DaP'T or HALTH, EDUCATON, AND WELFAxR, SOCIAL AN REHABILITATION SERVscE, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, MEDICAID: SELECTED STATISTICS, 1951-i969, at 59 (1970).
117 Puerto Rico, which presents special problems, is excluded. Titus, supra note 6x, at 37.88 CCH MEDICARE & MEDICAID GrmDE para. 15,504.
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For the "medically indigent" as a whole, the differences were even greater and more
erratic. As one aging Vermont recipient was alleged to have said: "Your program
isn't much good if you can't help me when my eyes get so bad I can't see and my
teeth get so bad I can't chew."3" 9 It was arguable that the level of medical care
in the United States had become more uneven rather than less in the years since
1965.340
Excluding the issue of different services in different states for a moment, there
is still the problem recipients may find in attempting to obtain the services to which
they are entitled. The professional press is full of examples of appeals to providers
to cut back on tide XIX services.41 But recipients may just find that providers
refuse to join the Medicaid program at all. A year after Medicaid began only 4500
of New York City's i5,ooo physicians 4 and only 2400 of the city's 7500 dentists were
registered for Medicaid.133 Indeed New York ultimately avoided the problem by no
longer requiring licensed providers to sign up for the program. 4 But such moves
did not stop boycotts by pharmacists in New York City 45 and dentists in Con-
necticut,346 nor, in October 197o, a boycott by skilled nursing homes in Massachu-
setts. But perhaps the most sordid boycott of all was in the nation's capital-the
hospitals' boycott of the D.C. Medicaid program. As the result of a dispute about
payment for outpatient services, only two of the city's ten hospitals agreed to
... SocIAL WELFARE IN VERMoNT: BIENNIAL REPORT To TH GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY 18-1g
(July I966-June Y968).
...In response to this, and in an effort to expand the concepts of "equal protection" developed in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 6x8 (1969), the welfare rights movement has begun to test the constitu-
tionality of these discrepancies in the court. In Dimery v. Dep't of Social Services, - F. Supp. - (S.D.
Iowa 1969), the plaintiff, a permanently disabled boy of 14, was denied medical assistance under title
XIX in Iowa because his father was employed and therefore the boy was not covered by Iowa's AFDC
program or, therefore, by its tide XIX program. Had the state had the voluntary AFDC-UP categorical
program the family would have been covered and the boy would thus have been eligible for Medicaid.
While not dwelling at length on that point, a three-judge federal district court held that the Iowa
Medicaid statute represented an undue delegation of legislative power to the welfare agency. The state
appealed to the Supreme Court. See Dep't of Social Services v. Dimery, 398 U.S. 322 (197o), which
in a memorandum decision, with Justice Douglas dissenting, vacated the judgment and remitted it to the
District Court, for reconsideration in the light of another decision holding that a plaintiff who had not
exhausted his state remedies could not test the constitutionality of a statute. Rectz v. Bozanich, 397
U.S. 82 (970). See also MATERIALs ON HEALTH LAw, supra note x, at 197 et seq.
" E.g., Kansas physicians have been urged to use special restraint in hospitalizing Medicaid patients.
AMA News, Apr. 21, x969. A more general appeal in connection with all services was made by the
Governor of Virginia. Id.
" "I wouldn't call it a boycott," said a surgeon who was coordinating the five county medical
societies, "this is merely an expression of the way doctors feel about the program." N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1966, at i, col. i. Physicians in Suffolk County did in fact boycott the program. Id., June 23, 1966, at
r, col. 2. In contrast see the revealing study of physicians' changing support for Medicare. Colomboros,
Physicians and Medicare: A Before-After Study of the Effects of Legislation on Attitudes, 34 AM. SocIo-
LOGICAL REV. 318 (1969).
AMA News, Jan. 2, z967. There were higher percentages among optometrists and podiatrists.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1966, at i, col. i.
Petrina, supra note 174, at X7.
s" On the 1967 boycott, see id. at 27; on the 1969 boycott, see N.Y. Times, June 23, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
... PREP Rmviw, supra note 288, at 5.
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cooperate 47 For a year the burden on the hospitals cooperating was intolerable 4s
Then in the summer of 1969 (the program had begun on July i, 1968) a com-
promise was finally worked out, 49 and Medicaid became generally available in
Washington hospitals 50
Perhaps more frequent were the situations where providers were evasive. This
appears to have been the situation after Connecticut reverted to a fee schedule for
physicians, following the twelve-month experiment with usual and customary fees,
in March 1969. The medical profession was not well pleased with the change. The
AMA News announced: "Medicaid Killed in Connecticut," '351 while Medical
Economics described the twelve-month experiment as the "one glorious year" when
Medicaid "really worked." '52 Apparently during that year, 3000 out of a possible
4500 physicians took part in the program. After the fee schedule was re-introduced,
these reports suggested that only about iooo doctors took part. And the reports would
seem to be borne out by studies made in the New Haven area early in I97o.r3
To the geographical and social problems 54 involved in reaching some physicians
has been added a noticeable reluctance to treat Medicaid patients on the part of
many physicians. For a profession that elleged it willingly treated poor patients
gratis before 1965, the situation is confusing.
In the 197o hearings, John Twiname announced that "over twelve million will
receive aid this year" and that "public assistance recipients who are eligible for
medicaid are getting more health care than other low-income people who are not
eligible." 55 If this is so it raises basic issues about whether the federal government
should allow states indefinitely to offer widely varying programs to differing groups.
The 1970 Finance Committee staff study moved a long way to question such dis-
3" AMA News, Oct. 21, 1968. The District Health Department proposed paying only 8o% of the
cost of such bills. Id., Sept. 2, x968. See also id., Nov. i8, 1968.
... Neighborhood Legal Services Program, Washington, D.C., Medicaid in the District of Columbia,
Mar. 1969 (mimeo.).
... AMA News, Apr. 14, 1969.
"'°For a critique of the services of Medicaid in Washington in October I969, see Testimony of
Margaret Ewing of Neighborhood Legal Services Program before the D.C. Council's Committee on
Health and Welfare (Oct. 27, 1969). See also MATERuALs oN HEALTH5 LAw, supra note i, at 228
et seq.
"'1 AMA News, Dec. 14, 1969. 1
' Lavin, What to Expect from Washington Now, MED. EcoN., Jan. 20, 1969, at 21.
"'A spot check of 15 physicians who were paid more than $25oo in 1968 from Medicaid funds
resulted in 8 responses (3 specialists, 5 general practitioners), all of whom had become more restrictive
in accepting Medicaid patients since March 2, 1969. In a more general (though not statistically reliable)
survey, it was estimated that 58% of practitioners in the New Haven area were willing to take
Medicaid patients. Mitchell, supra note 291, at io.
.. For a description of some of these psychological barriers, see Lahav, supra note 335, at 6-8.
Duo 1970 Hearings, supra note 2oi, at 19. The figures are based on preliminary data from the
federally financed study at the Columbia School of Public Health to determine the quality of care under
Medicaid. With this thought compare the Dimery decision, supra note 34o. Data are still scarce about
Medicaid. A recent Report to the Governor of Vermont noted: 'There is a regrettable lack of meaningful
statistical data available on the operation of the Medicaid Program in Vermont. For example, as recently
as April of this year, the Department had no reliable statistics on how many persons were receiving
Medicaid benefits." REX'o.T oF THE GovaRsoR's C01r-l=E INWSTGATING SOcIAL WELFARE 74 (1969).
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criminatory support; and the final report of the McNerney Task Force called for
a basic federal floor 856 as one step towards the full federalization of health care.
Medicaid as described in this paper may be on the wane.
V
CONCLUSIONS
While the future of medical care in this country, in terms either of funding
through federally sponsored health insurance or of provision through health mainte-
nance organizations, is beyond the scope of this paper, there is little doubt that Med-
icaid as it is known today is destined to be phased out during the next decade °7
Current White House proposals call for a Family Health Insurance Program as part
of the Administration's Family Assistance Plan to cover what is now covered by Med-
icaid with respect to young, low-income families. The combination of this with an ex-
panded and more effective program for the elderly and disabled under Medicare
would reduce the need for other forms of medical assistance among the most needy
population groups. Or perhaps Medicaid will be replaced by something more ex-
clusively "medical," through the development of comprehensive health services
under the impact of national health insurance. The Health Security proposals being
sponsored by Senator Kennedy are a notable example of such an approach838
Yet even if the present program is transitional or moribund, the study of Medicaid
is vital. It is vital because, as Secretary Richardson has recently made clear, the
program will not disappear overnight and insurance, in its various guises, still has
many hurdles to clear. And it is vital, too, because, while in so many ways Medicaid
is a museum of the defects of a medical care program, it is a remarkably instructive
museum for future planners. If the new long-term solution for health care in the
United States is to be a success, then its architects would do well to reconsider the
Medicaid experience.
Tide XIX, as drafted, was bound to be ineffective in its double role as a health
service program and as an expansion of public assistance. Indeed, it was the com-
bination of a program of services and a program of cash assistance which provoked
Medicaid's initial dilemmas. Whether Medicaid was in fact to be regarded as a
health care program or part of a broader program of income maintenance was never
sufficiently elucidated. The discovery of the intention of Congress, as lawyers have
long known, is at best a slippery process. While there is evidence that some legis-
856 E.g., "We recommend converting Medicaid to a program with a uniform minimum level of health
benefits financed zoo per cent by Federal funds," TasK FORCE REPORT, supra note 221, at x4, and "the
commitment to provide comprehensive care to substantially all needy and medically needy should be
reaffimed." Id. at 15. Few states would probably quibble with that. See, e.g., REPoRT or THE Gov-
FRNoR's Commayrrra INVEMSGATING SocIA. W.LFARE, supra note 355, at 73.
83TThe Task Force Report put it more tactfully: "Medicaid . . . should not . . . be relied upon
indefinitely as the Nation's primary approach to [medical care]." TAsx FoRcE RrEoRT, supra note 2zx,
at 13.
"' S. 4297, 91st, Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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lators intended to provide a new concept in medical care, there is ample evidence
that other legislators, even among those who were in favor of tide XIX, saw no
need for any radical change from earlier policies under which health care was pur-
chased from private vendors on the same kind of peripheral basis as that under which
other goods (bedding, pots and pans, and so forth) are purchased for cash assistance
recipients.
The lack of clearly stated national goals for Medicaid in 1965 was a major and
reverberating deficiency. Congress, in so many ways, made a series of classic errors
which were transmitted down the line as the programs were developed in the
states. These errors led to conflict in interpreting Medicaid between powerful com-
mittees in Washington and the legislatures of major states (particularly New York
and California), to state budgetary crises, and to the sometimes selfish behavior of the
medical providers. In that sense the villains portrayed in these pages were themselves
the victims of confusion in the Congress.
Why was there this initial confusion about the purposes and goals of Medicaid?
There can have been few legislators who were unaware in 1965 that Kerr-Mills was
somewhat less than a success. Kerr-Mills had indeed received substantial publicity
in the debates preceding the 1965 legislation. That program had already demon-
strated the basic characteristics which were later to plague Medicaid: the transfer
of funds by states from one public pocket to another under the stimulus of greater
federal matching funds; the unevenness of programs from state to state; the im-
plications of attaching a system of medical vendor payments to an administrative
structure of grants-in-aid which relied on minimal federal direction; the interpreta-
tion of "medical indigency" as a rather rigid test of means, albeit at a somewhat
higher average level than for cash assistance; the greater interest by the state legis-
latures in balancing their budgets than in reorganizing medical care; and, in the state
bureaucracies, the inadequate administrative expertise for running a major medical
program. Yet tide XIX was developed under similar principles.
Those loath to ascribe confusion as a natural attribute to Congress might assume
that the adoption of the Kerr-Mills strategy for the much larger program of Medicaid
was predicated on deliberate doctrine, founded perhaps on recondite principles of
marginal gain or of greater chaos. Medicaid has brought medical care to many
thousands of persons, with less individual financial anxiety than had the program
not been developed; in this sense the gains are real, albeit marginal and expensive,
and the balance sheet should be so interpreted. In this argument the major defects
of Medicaid lie in the lack of adequate cost projections and cost-benefit analyses.
Those favoring a doctrine of greater chaos might point toMedicaid's intrinsic social
importance in accelerating Congressional and general concern over the costs and
provision of health services. Without a doubt the Medicaid experience, coupled with
some rather similar concerns over Medicare, has been a salient factor in the develop-
ment of proposals for national health insurance. In retrospect, the muddle of
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Medicaid will undoubtedly be seen as a necessary forerunner of rationalization of
health services in the United States in the 197os or 198os, part of what may be
essential chaos which precedes and precipitates major legislative reform. Under this
argument, Medicaid's problems were inevitable, and the program itself was born
to be transitional.
But while both these approaches contain' at least a grain of truth, such considera-
tons assume that the Congress, or at least its leaders in the health and welfare areas,
did in fact have a planned long-term objective for Medicaid. The evidence does not
bear this out. Medicaid appears to have been enacted almost as an afterthought-
hence its early description as the "sleeper" of the Medicare legislation. Medicaid
was the culmination of a long and continuing thread of argument in the Congress,
going back at least to the i94os, calling for an approach to medical care provision
through welfare instead of through a general program of health insurance. Medicaid
thus appears as the natural conclusion of a gathering momentum, built up through
reams of Congressional documentation, rather than a reasoned approach to medical
care. Built on the rhetoric of the past rather than the realities of the present, it was
a necessary, if expensive and somewhat painful, transition from the I940s to the
i97os. The lesson for the future lies in attempting to build a program with stated
aspirations and a vision which looks forward rather than back.
In its shape as well as its intentions, Medicaid began with inbuilt deficiencies.
The assumption that effective and economical medical services can be provided
through existing structures of health services and public assistance was challenged
almost as soon as the program was implemented. The problem was in the program
itself, not in the reactions of the various states; for Medicaid, nominally an assistance
program, was blessed (or cursed) with attributes which were inappropriate to the
welfare tradition. Unlike other forms of assistance, Medicaid was asked to do more
than fill a gap or provide a back-up service for reasonably effective programs (such
as jobs or housing) in the private sector. In health, the other programs themselves
were insufficient. If Medicare, designed to provide health care as an entitlement to
the whole population over age sixty-five, had been sufficiently comprehensive, Med-
icaid's substantial and growing commitment of services to the elderly would have been
unnecessary. Similary, if private health insurance had effectively covered the
working population (including continuing coverage for survivors and dependents,
and in times of sickness and temporary unemployment) the concept of medical in-
digency need not have been invented. As it was, Medicaid, with its uncontrollable
budgets and rising costs, has been a reflection of broader deficiencies in the health
sector.
At the same time, Medicaid raised serious questions about the use of welfare
structures to administer a system of vendor payments. The purchase of services by
a public agency in the private sector is an appealing prospect. It is one, incidentally,
which is continuing to appear in proposals for health payment schemes, ostensibly
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including the Administration's proposed Family Health Insurance Program. But the
philosophy of the public-private mix contains its own dilemmas, not the least of
which is the tacit assumption that the private sector itself is efficient. Yet by the
very fact that the medical care industry is dominated by legalized monopolies, there is
reason to question this assumption. Certainly the Medicaid experience gives little
ground for optimism that the private sector can regulate itself efficiently.
Over and above this basic inconsistency in the philosophy of vendor medical
payments, Medicaid tested, and found wanting, the traditional federal grant-in-aid
when it applies to a service rather than a cash payment program, particularly where
that service has generalized standards and is subject to Congressional review in terms
of national rather than state intent. The evidence of Medicaid suggests that if it is
the purpose of the Congress to bring medical care to every person in the country,
control of these services cannot be left to the fifty states and to other governmental
units. The present state of Medicaid raises vital issues of equal protection. Even with
respect to cash payments, the Nixon Family Assistance Plan is moving towards
nationwide standards and administration. A fortiori this central control will have
to apply to the service aspects of the largely federally-funded Welfare State.
These observations point to tighter federal regulation over providers of care and
increasing federal standards for services under Medicaid, or for whatever scheme
replaces it, as the essential part of public purchase of services in the private sector.
It is clear that any program with national goals which wishes to administer an effec-
tive program in the private sector as it presently exists will have to include (and
to enforce) national standards and appropriate regulatory mechanisms over the
operation and charges of providers who are themselves organized either as monopolies
or oligopolies. A vendor payment system cannot exist without adequate controls.
If the intention is that a revised Medicaid program is to be a national one, then
the national government is going to have to set standards and to take a major part
in dealing with the providers. The restructuring of medical providers almost certainly
calls for greater political strength and acumen than any single state can provide,
and for a federal role which is immensely stronger than that yet developed for
Medicaid.
At the same time the implicit advantages of utilizing the private sector also need
to be examined. Besides the familiarity of vendor medical payments as a means of
providing public assistance health care in the states, there appear to have been two
basic assumptions behind the adoption of vendor medical payments in Medicaid.
The first was that services are more likely to be available and are of better quality
through purchase in the private sector rather than through the development of a
publicly financed and controlled system of hospitals and clinics. Existing problems
in public hospital systems (of which New York City is a notable example) would
seem to bear out this assumption. Moreover, many states and counties, having
relied for years on vendor medical payments, did not have a ready-made public
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system for development. The chief deficiencies in implementation of expanded
vendor payments were that the private sector itself, as already suggested, was not
prepared to respond efficiently to vast infusions of public funds, and that the public
agencies developed no adequate machinery of public accountability. Both of these
deficiencies could be rectified, however, through modifications of Medicaid or the
development of a new program.
A second basic assumption of vendor payments in Medicaid, at least in its first
two years, was the acceptance of a social ethic of equal opportunity in medical care.
There was (and remains) a commitment by many reformers to provide medical
services to the poor of roughly the same quality as those provided to other members
of the population; this was interpreted as meaning provision of services through one
set of providers rather than espousing a separate-but-equal philosophy of medical
care. Medi-Cal was the most publicized example of this "mainstream" approach,
in that state administrators embarked on a deliberate program to break down Cali-
fornia's separate public hospital system as the locus of medical care for the indigent.
Taking Medicaid as a whole, however, it has proved impossible to overthrow
centuries of poor-law mentality, and present philosophies appear to accept the
continuation of two classes of medical care.
Underlying both these assumptions was a further assumption. Medicaid fell,
if not initially, then very shortly after it began, into the persistent and debilitating
welfare myth that somehow or other there is a financial shortcut to "solving" welfare
and medical care "problems." The truth is that to "solve the welfare problem" in
America is likely to cost far more than the present public assistance programs cost.
The same is true of bringing medical care to the poor. Even bringing minimal
services will be expensive; to give middle-class medicine to the so-called "medically
indigent" will involve spending billions of dollars more than are currently being
spent under Medicaid. It is then especially unfortunate in retrospect that the early
projections of Medicaid's cost were either understated or misleading; and, at least
in present terms, it is tragic that so many state welfare departments tried to sell
Medicaid as something which, in the long run, would cut state contributions to the
welfare budget. With this advance publicity, there was little hope for a "new"
approach. As an axiom, any system of medical care which resolves to reach more
people more effectively, including national health insurance, should be expected to
cost much more than present programs even if the envisaged system is more efficient.
In summary, then, the faults of Medicaid, epitomized by lax administration and
unanticipated costs, were inherent even in the legislation. A more effective design
would demand the establishment of clear goals and expectations for Medicaid,
either as a broad health services entitlement or as a fringe benefit of a cash assistance
program. It would set up appropriate regulatory machinery to fulfil its goals, and
would be organized on a national rather than a state basis. Such action could be
taken through a revised form of Medicaid. In the long term, however, the only
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satisfactory answer to problems implicit in equal medical opportunity is a system
of comprehensive health insurance in which all members of a population are covered
for similar benefits. A concomitant of this is that the providers of benefits will have
to be encouraged to develop new systems to deliver the services they provide. In
universal health insurance as in the more limited program of Medicaid, the question
is one of a stronger federal role and careful public regulation.
Such are Medicaid's major problems. It would be wrong to conclude, however,
without considering some of the benefits of Medicaid. In most states, for those on
Medicaid the provision of care is better than it was before 1965. At least in
established health facilities-OEO health centers and the like have a special status-
there is now probably less of a gap between the services provided for the poor and
the nonpoor than there was before. Even in the most conventional hospital, the
notion of the "welfare patient" is less rampant. There has been an increasing
realization of the fact that health services should be treated as divorced from the
cash payments in the welfare system.
Moreover, as the country moves toward the i97 elections, with the almost in-
evitable further politicization of national health insurance and its alternatives, there
are more fundamental lessons to be learned from Medicaid. To have an effective
medical care program, it must have the support of the administration-both in
Washington and the states-in the legislature and in the executive. A sop to welfare
recipients is not a satisfactory basis for a good medical care program. There must
also be a commitment on the part of the providers and recipients to make certain the
program is equitable, efficient, and fairly utilized. Providers will have to be
convinced that the program is not a license to print money and that professions are
professions because they owe a peculiar fiduciary responsibility to the public. Re-
cipients will have to be assured of sufficient dignity so that they treat the program
with respect. Federal supervision, and probably control, will have to be far more
effective if the program is not going to be bankrupted; and the medical providers
will have to learn to live with such control. If only some of these lessons are learned
from Medicaid, the program will have served a valuable function.
An Index to Modern Legal Problems
One each of the following topics, LAw AND CONTTEPORARY PROBLES has pub-
lished or will publish a symposium dealing with the legal, economic, administra-
tive, and other social-science aspects of the subject. The date indicates the year
of publication.
Academic Freedom 1963
Administrative Regulation 1961
African Law 1962
Agricultural Adjustment in the South 1934
Air Cargo 1950
Air Pollution Control 1968
Alcoholic Beverage Control 1940
Alimony 1939
Antipoverty Programs 1966
Antitrust Laws and Single-Firm
Conduct 1965
Atomic Power Development 1956
Aviation Transport 1946
Bankingt 1966, 1967
Children of Divorced Parents 1944
Close Corporation 1953
Collection of Real Property Taxes 1936
Collective Bargaining Under the
Wagner Act 1938
Combating the Loan Shark 1941
Commercial Arbitrationt 1952
Commercial Codet 1951
Communicationst 1969
Consumer Credit Reform 1968
Consumption Taxes 1941
Cooperatives 1948
Correction of Youthful Offenders 1942
Crime and Correction 1958
Delivered Pricing 1950
Divorce: A Re-Examination of
Basic Concepts 1953
Electoral Processf 1962
Emergency Price Control Act 1942
Enemy Property 1945
European Regional Communities 1961
Excess Profits Taxation 1943
Expert Testimony 1935
Farm Tenancy Legislation 1937
Federal Courts 1948
Federal Employers' Liability Actt 1953
Federal Income and Estate Taxation 1940
Federal Powers Over Crime 1934
Financial Protection for the Motor
Accident Victim 1936
Financing Small Business 1945
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Legislation 1939
Government Marketing Barriers 1941
Government Contractst 1964
Government Tort Liability 1942
t Published in two parts, priced separately.
Health Caref 1970
Hemispheric Trade 1941
Home Financing 1938
Housing 1947
Housing: Perspectives and Problems 197
Housing: The Federal Role 1967
Immigration 1956
Instalment Selling 1935
Institutional Investments 1952
International Commodity Agreements 1963
International Control of Propaganda 1966
International Human Rightst 194D
International Trade Barriers 1946
Interterritorial Freight Rates 1947
Investment of Trust Funds 1938
Judicial Ethics 1970
Jurimetrics 1963
Labor Dispute Settlement 1947
Labor in Wartime 1942
Land Planning in a Democracy 1955
Legislative Reapportionment 1952
Literary and Artistic Products and
Copyright Problems 1954
Loan Shark Problem Today 1954
Low-Cost Housing and Slum Clearance 1934
Medical Care 1930
Medical Progress and the Law 1967
Middle East Crisis: Test of
International Law 1968
Migratory Divorce 1935
Narcotics 1957
Nationalization of British Industries 1951
New Look in Corporation Law 1958
New Trends in the Conflict of Laws 1903
Obscenity and the Arts 1955
Old Age Security and Welfare Titles
of the Social Security Act 1936
Patent Systemt 1947, 1948
Population Control 1960
Presidency 1970
Presidential Office 1956
Preventive Law of Conflicts 1956
Price Control in a Cold War 1954
Price Discrimination and
Price Cutting 1937
Privacy 1966
Private Insurance 1950
Problems of the Aging 1962
Protection for the
Consumer of Food and Drugs 1933
